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JPRS-UKO-84-001

9 January 1984

USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 13, September 1983

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9 January 1984

USSR REPORT
TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No 13, September 1983

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : TRANSLATION FROM KOMMUNIST, No 13
September 1983

Russian title : KOMMUNIST

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : R. I. Kosolapov

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo "PRAVDA"

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : September 1983

Signed to press : 2 Sep 1983

Copies : 835,000

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"Kommunist", 1983

ALWAYS IN FORMATION!

PM161206 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (Signed to press 2 Sep 83)
pp 3-17

[Text] The party confidently leads the Soviet people--the pioneer people--along the Leninist path of creation and peace. Selfless, wholehearted labor, mass heroism, and the immortal military feat have become the joint milestones in the lives of many millions of loyal sons of the Leninist party.

Communists have always marched ahead, have always inspired people with their example, with their staunchness, their principled approach, their sincerity, and their constant readiness both to lead the masses and to be rank-and-file fighters in the great revolutionary army of labor. Today, they work valiantly in plant shops, in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields, and in design bureaus and science laboratories, everywhere setting high examples by fulfilling their civic, party duty. And those who have departed for a well-earned rest have not stopped working with young people, and are ardent propagandists of communist ideas.

A meeting took place in the CPSU Central Committee on 15 August between Comrades Yu.V. Andropov, M.S. Gorbachev, G.V. Romanov, M.V. Zimyanin, I.V. Kapitonov, and N.I. Ryzhkov, and party veterans.

The meeting was opened by M.S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The meeting was addressed by the following comrades: V.P. Vinogradov, member of the CPSU since 1915, participant in the first All-Union Congress of Soviets, chairman of the Council for Party Veterans' Assistance to the Leningrad State Museum of the October Revolution; P.D. Borodin, member of the CPSU since 1932, Hero of Socialist Labor; V.I. Kiselev, member of the CPSU since 1918, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, and of labor, delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, chairman of the party veterans' council of Pecherskiy Rayon in Kiev; P.K. Kolesnikov, CPSU member since 1932, metal planer from the Rostselmash Works, initiator of the works movement of multi-machine operatives, one of the first shock-workers of communist labor in the Don region; N.D. Mukhin, CPSU member since 1930, head of the selection and primary seed-breeding section for winter grain crops at the Belorussian Arable Farming Research Institute, Hero of Socialist Labor, BSSR honored worker in science; V.M. Bakholdina, CPSU member since 1940, engineer, Hero of Socialist Labor, honored mechanizer of the RSFSR;

Retired Major General M.D. Takhmukhamedov, CPSU member since 1931; N.N. Golovatskiy, CPSU member since 1931, Hero of Socialist Labor, chairman of the 40 Let Oktyabrya Kolkhoz in Talkdy-Kurgan Oblast, Kazakh SSR, Hero of Socialist Labor; Ya.D. Chanyshhev, CPSU member since 1917, veteran of the civil and Great Patriotic wars, retired lieutenant general; and T.V. Fedorova, CPSU member since 1939, Hero of Socialist Labor, deputy head of the Moscow Metrostroy.

Then Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, warmly greeted by those present, spoke. His speech was heard with tremendous attention and repeatedly interrupted with applause.

The meeting between party and labor veterans and leaders of the CPSU took place in a cordial, comradely atmosphere. The veterans assured the party and its Central Committee, and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, that they would direct all their strength, knowledge and experience with renewed energy towards resolving the tasks of socioeconomic and spiritual development of the motherland, multiplying its might and the people's well-being, and educating the younger generation of Soviet people, our combat successors.

Speech by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov.

Dear Comrades! As we expected, our conversation has proved to be pithy and useful, the very talk which the Politburo was counting on. I would probably single out three characteristic features of the speeches that have been made here.

First, activeness and profound party conviction, conviction in the unfading values of communist ideals, in the correctness of the path along which the party is going; and, comrades, conviction in the fact that one must struggle, and struggle wholeheartedly, for all the good things in which we believe and for which the Soviet people strive. Quite recently we marked the 80th anniversary of the Second Congress of the RSDWP, at which the world's first proletarian party of a new type was founded. The party of the Leninist Bolsheviks has become a mighty, invincible force; to its lot fell a great world-historic mission--to open up a new era in the history of mankind, to begin construction of a new communist civilization. And the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is honorably fulfilling this mission.

Second, the realism and the weighed nature [vzeshennost] of the appraisal of our successes as well as of those problems which are still waiting resolution makes us glad. After all, to see facts as they are, understand the complexity and contradictions in the phenomena of social life, not to embellish anything but also not to water down what has been done--these are the indispensable preconditions for a scientifically based policy.

And, finally, I cannot but remark upon the creative and innovative tone which rang out clearly here. After all, it happens, and not all that seldom, that accumulated experience and impressions, habits and skills, which have been formed, hamper the adoption of what is novel and unaccustomed, but communists, real communists, are made differently. To them experience of life is something like a peak which, when climbed, gives a better view of the horizons opening up.

Such an experience does not dull but, on the contrary, sharpens the sense of what is new, without which one cannot, without which it is impossible to solve the tasks set before us by life, by the practice of perfecting developed socialism.

It can thus be stated that the corps of party veterans, of the veterans of labor, is in good form, in working form. This is very pleasant--but, after all, it cannot be otherwise. [applause]

Comrades! In the party and among the people the veterans always enjoyed profound respect. At first, as you know, this word meant "an old soldier"; today the concept "veteran" has been imbued among us by a new, humanistic interpretation--not only a tempered serviceman but a cadre worker, an agricultural toiler, a meritorious scientist, artist, teacher, physician--all of them are being called veterans with thankfulness and gratitude. They are people of inexhaustible energy, with high moral qualities, people who loyally serve their motherland and the party.

Veterans are the carriers of the unique experience of the building of a new life which has enriched all of mankind. The historical range of this experience encompassed the accomplishments of several generations. It would seem not all that long ago that those party members who would be addressed as veterans had membership back to prerevolutionary times, i.e. the unbending fighters of Lenin's guard. Then the shock-workers, the starters of socialist competitions during the first Soviet 5-year plans, became veterans to us.

Among you are also those to whom we are profoundly grateful for defense of the socialist motherland, routing of the enemy and valiant labor during the Great Fatherland War.

Time moves forward swiftly. And today our and your contemporaries are added to the galaxy of veterans, those who upturned the Virgin Lands, erected the world's biggest hydroelectric power stations, among the greatest in the world, and stormed into space. Thus the link of time is spun. To every generation falls its part in the general great work. And only the experience of communist construction itself is unified and indivisible and we have no right to waste even a single valuable grain of it.

By inviting you, comrades, to the Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee precisely counted on consulting you and thinking together about how to deal with the experience of the veterans in the most sensible way and with maximum benefit to the cause of communism. Meanwhile, as was rightly stressed here, it is a question of how to use the experience of the older generations to solve the specific tasks of our time, tasks which are new in many ways, and complex in a new way.

Comrades have already spoke about these tasks. Allow me, too, a few words on this topic.

You are all of course acquainted with the material of the November 1982 and June 1983 plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, which defined specifically

the decisions of the 26th party congress regarding the demands of economic construction and ideological work.

The main point, if one is talking about the economy, is that we have entered a new stage in the economic development of the country, a stage at which increased possibilities and increased public demand dictated the need to seriously raise the level of all economic work, significantly raise the efficiency of the economy, and turn the whole of our great economy into a well-tuned mechanism which works without interruption. This was discussed both at the party congresses and at the Central Committee plenums.

But while giving due credit to the work which has been accomplished over these past years, we cannot but admit that the tasks posed by the latest congresses are still far from having been fulfilled. Above all, we cannot be satisfied with the speed achieved in transferring the economy on to the path of intensive development. There are various reasons for this. The fact that we have not been searching for ways to solve the new tasks with enough vigor is clearly a factor. We have often taken half measures, and have been unable to overcome the accumulated inertia with sufficient speed.

We must now make up for omissions. This, apart from anything else, demands changes in planning, management and in the economic mechanism, and it is our duty to carry out these changes so as to enter the new 5-year plan, as the saying goes, fully armed.

Of course, comrades, in an economy of such dimensions and complexity as ours, one must take extreme care. Here more than anywhere the saying is true that one should measure seven times and cut once. It is for this reason that in making major decisions, we try to scrupulously study each issue. We embark on large-scale experiments to study calmly and unhurriedly how the proposed innovations work, and how they affect plan and labor discipline, labor productivity, and the efficiency of social production as a whole.

Now, about ideological work. We have held the plenum, the decision has been adopted; the main thing is to fulfill this decision. But what does this mean in practice? It means overcoming the gap which, unfortunately, still exists between word and deed; it means learning to talk to people in an earnest and frank manner, without sidestepping the acute angles. It means systematically enhancing the working people's political level [kultura] to make each person a conscientious--absolutely conscientious, comrades--participant in public life.

It is clear that this cannot be done by words alone, even the best of words. We justifiably speak about the ideological guaranteeing of economic work. But economic, or to put it more broadly, the social guaranteeing of ideological work is of no less, if not more significance. For all kinds of disorder, mismanagement, infringements of laws, money-grubbing, and bribery devalue the work of thousands of agitators and propagandists.

Consequently, in speaking about improving ideological work, we face a comprehensive and many-sided task, a solution to which demands active work in all

areas. And this applies not only to ideology. Every major task requires a comprehensive solution, taking into consideration spiritual, material, and organizational factors.

Let us take, for example, questions of discipline. Conscientious discipline, the result of which is good, conscientious work, is peculiar to the nature of a socialist society. But in some quarters the call to strengthen discipline is being interpreted merely as an unremitting administrative check to ensure that everyone is at his work place from clocking-on until clocking off-time. Of course, one must keep an eye on this, too, and punish the slackers. But we must think of another thing, too. What will a person do at his place of work, from clocking-in until clocking-out, how busy is he, how is he coping with his task, have the necessary conditions been created for productive work? By no means has concern been shown everywhere for such questions, and these are decisive questions.

Meanwhile, the essence of socialist discipline is in everyone giving his all in his job. Of course, it is more difficult to achieve such a situation than to catch those who are late at the entrance, but it is this which is the chief and fundamental thing. Naturally, much here depends on well arranged ideological and political-educative work. But this work must without fail be based on modern organization of labor, on sensible placing of people, on precise material-technical provision, and on improvement of the multifarious forms and means of moral and material stimuli. In a word, only the combination which I have mentioned of spiritual, material, and organizational factors can provide high labor standards, the most reliable guarantee of order and discipline in production.

I am speaking about these tasks and problems here because the party and people need your experience and knowledge to resolve each of them, dear comrades. After all, social creativeness and moving on to the future logically presuppose preservation and enrichment of everything of value that has been accumulated in the past, and so the work facing you, comrades, is truly immense.

But there is one sector of work where the experience and knowledge of veterans is especially needed. I think you have already guessed that the matter concerns work with young people.

In our society there is no conflict between generations, between, as they sometimes say, fathers and sons. But this certainly does not mean that everything runs smoothly for us here. For it is not by chance that there has always been a dispute about young people in one form or another--are they worse or better than their predecessors? Sometimes people of a venerable age mutter: Look at young people today--were we like that? On the other hand, there are young people who are inclined to see the fault of their "fathers" in everything that they dislike.

These disputes seem to me, to speak honestly, not very fruitful. The younger generation is no worse in any way than ours, it is just different, new. And new generations are not reproductions like copies from a duplicating machine. Each of them, inevitably leaning on the experience of the previous one, assesses

and takes in the world in its own way, introducing new methods and means into creative activity, and adjusting to the conditions and situation of its own time.

But in general, comrades, it must be recognized, although not everyone finds this easy, that each new generation is in some way stronger than the previous one, knows more, sees further. I will remind you of the words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: "We fight better than our fathers, our children will fight even better, and they will win" ("Poln. Sobr. Soc." [CCP], vol 23, p 256) Thus when we teach and bring up youth, you and I must remember these words of Lenin.

Moreover there is something else which we must not forget. Youth, like people of other ages, are different. The overwhelming majority of the young people today are active participants in communist construction, worthy inheritors and continuers of their fathers' cause. But it is against this general background that instances of parasitism, labor and social passivity, indiscipline, which are characteristic of a certain sector of youth are especially conspicuous. Also the dangerous fungus of petty bourgeois ways penetrating youth circles naturally gives rise to concern.

These phenomena, these moods must be firmly fought against. We must inject in our inheritors a view of life where material benefits, of which there must be and will be more in time, would not press on man, but would serve to satisfy his highest demands. Only the spiritual riches of man are truly without limits. And although you cannot put them in your purse, and you cannot put them on the wall as a status symbol, we condone this kind of hoarding, the only one worthy of man, Soviet man.

Also the military-patriotic education of young people is of unfading importance, about which comrades have correctly spoken here.

In general, we need to work with youth, and to work constantly, taking into account its particular feature, and the new conditions which it lives under. Let us put the issue thus: Each party veteran, each labor veteran must be an instructor of youth. In what form this mission is to be carried out, how best to deal with the matter, this is something which party and Komsomol organizations must think about along with veterans.

Another remark connected with youth. Comrades, young people will take over from us. This sentence sounds banal, but it is far from being banal in essence. Time works for the young--that is how it should be. It is important just to be confident that succeeding us are people who will never relinquish the banner of October and the ideas of Lenin, and who know their job thoroughly and well.

Our veterans' immense service to the party and the people consists of the fact that they are preparing a worthy generation for us. Their place is being taken by people capable of continuing the job which has been started, sometimes even with greater success, and the veteran can only be proud of this. This is a truly party approach, which is ensuring the continuity of our glorious Leninist party's great cause.

Let us sum up the results. The Politburo of the Central Committee fully shares the opinion voiced here that the role of veterans in all spheres must be enhanced, and the existing forms of their participation in economic and public life must be filled with more topical content. A particularly important service can be rendered by veterans in those areas which concern improving the human personality and where character is shaped. These include vocational schools, political information system's work with those called-up for military service and adolescents, as well as with the population at their homes, people's universities, circles and groups of scientific-technical creative work, people's control, and many others.

I also agree with the point that concern must be shown for increasing the involvement of veterans in party organizations where they are registered. I will quote you a figure: We have nearly 220,000 communists who have been presented with the "50 years in the CPSU" badge. This is a great force, and we must see to it that their links with party organizations are not restricted --as does happen--to paying their membership subscriptions and turning up for party meetings. In particular, it would be a good thing if the older generation of communists took an active part in the reports and election party meetings and conferences which are due to be held at the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984.

Comrades, what has been said also relates in full to the Soviets, the trades unions, and other public organizations. It would be useful to enliven the activities of the various councils of veterans in the many branches of the national economy, the army, and many grass-roots party organizations and suffuse them with new content.

It is impossible not to also note the pleasing fact that many veterans who have gone into deserved retirement want to continue feasible labor activity. Very favorable conditions should be created for this noble desire. Last, attention and a careful attitude as regards veterans' health and personal aspirations play a huge role in finding everyone a job appropriate to his powers and disposition. However, this must be our attitude to veterans in any case, whether we are talking of their labor contribution or their public activity.

I do not want to omit other, no less important, questions. Nevertheless, age is age and a veteran's transfer to a well-deserved rest is linked to the change in normal living standards. Withdrawal from activity in a pursuit one loves is not simple. With age, illness lies in wait for a person, and at times all this is accompanied by difficult spiritual tribulations [perezhivaniyami]. Even the most perfect society is not capable of banishing all this completely, but wherever they occur both spiritual tribulations and material difficulties can be alleviated. This we must do.

Recently decisions were made on personal pensions for the participants in the Great October Socialist Revolution and the civil war. There is also a more general question here. We will occupy ourselves with these questions, although financial possibilities do not allow this to be done as quickly as would be desired.

But after all, comrades, not everything turns on finance. More concern--more simple human attention, sympathy, and respectfulness--is needed. Every party or trade union organization, every state establishment, every labor collective, and every person must constantly keep this in mind.

In conclusion, dear comrades, I would like to say this: Our meeting is taking place in, as they say, a narrow circle. But I understand it as a frank conversation with millions of veterans, and I am convinced that what has been said here will be understood and supported by all who have progressed the same path in life as you have.

Thank you very much, comrades, for your active participation in the talk. All the thoughts you have expressed and all your suggestions will be most thoroughly studied.

May I wish you and those close to you good health, success, and all the very best. (prolonged applause)

Introductory speech by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev:

Esteemed comrades!

Permit me, on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to welcome the party veterans and labor veterans who are gathered in this auditorium.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo regards our meeting today in the CPSU Central Committee and other meetings with representatives of various generations and different social groups of Soviet society as a continuation of a Leninist tradition.

Comrades! You represent the generations of Soviet people to whose lot that most difficult and at the same time most honorable historical mission fell--the mission of accomplishing the revolution, raising the country from the ruins, and laying the foundations of socialism. Many of you were scorched by the fiery breath of war.

Those were hard times. We were marching into mortal combat. We had to go short of sleep and food. We had to work ourselves to the bone, as the saying goes. But the great goal gave birth to great energy. The land of the soviets rose to its feet, gained strength, matured, and took up arms to defend itself. And each of those who are gathered here--like millions of your contemporaries--can look back with pride at the path he has traveled--a path of selfless labor and heroic achievements.

Of course, we did not invite you to the party's Central Committee solely in order to pronounce once again the words of respect and gratitude. Party veterans and labor veterans accumulate the vast experience of all the Soviet people. And we would like that experience and your knowledge to continue to serve still more actively our common cause and the resolution of the tasks now facing the party and people and all generations of Soviet people.

That is why, in meeting with you today, esteemed veterans of the Leninist party, we would like to talk about how to best use your experience and knowledge. Of course, such a discussion also presupposes asking questions, making critical judgments, and analyzing shortcomings. In general, let us talk frankly, in a party, Leninist style.

That is what I wanted to say as a little introduction to our conversation.

Now, comrades, please, who will begin? Who will take the floor?

Speeches by participants in the meeting:

V.P. Vinogradov, member of the CPSU since 1915, participant in the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, and chairman of the council of party veterans' assistance to the Leningrad State Museum of the October Revolution, took the floor. Addressing Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, he said:

First of all, permit me to sincerely and wholeheartedly thank the CPSU Central Committee Politburo for its constant attentiveness toward party veterans. Today we can sense with tremendous satisfaction how the Leninist style of party leadership is embodied in the deeds of the Central Committee and its Politburo. This was manifested with particular force in the practical measures adopted by the party in accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums and the principles set forth in your speeches, Yuriy Vladimirovich.

We party veterans warmly support the party and government decisions on strengthening socialist discipline and order. We, who underwent our labor and revolutionary schooling in workers' collectives, understand very well that only conscious creative, disciplined labor creates all our assets and wealth and forges the people's well-being. Many of us heard about this from the great Lenin's lips.

Today I wish to report that CPSU veterans are doing much to enhance our young people's class awareness and educate them in the revolutionary, labor, and combat traditions of our party and people. Mikhail Vasiliyevich Roslyakov is here. He works actively as chairman of the Veterans' Council attached to the Moskovskiy party raykom in Leningrad.

Veterans devote much attention to cultivating love and respect for the workers' professions, in particular among students at vocational and technical schools, and to preparing worthy recruits for the working class. Today more than 800 Leningrad workers, labor veterans, and production frontrunners have transferred to work in vocational and technical schools. Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Smirnov of the Baltiyskiy plant and Izhorskiy Zavod fitter Afanasiy Prokofyevich Mikhalev, both Twice Heros of Socialist Labor, Hero of Socialist Labor Boris Aleksandrovich Zhuravlev, fitter at the Barrikada Association, and many, many more are giving their skill and rich experience to young people.

We all strive to ensure that every meeting with young people gives the young men and women a charge of ideological staunchness and Soviet patriotism. At these times we ourselves forget our age!

At the same time, when we meet with young people, we often notice a consumerist attitude toward life and dependent mood among young men and women. This is explained first and foremost by gaps in their labor education. And I think the Central Committee's June Plenum was very timely in posing the question of reforming our schooling.

Of course, our scientists and specialists propose specific ways and forms of restructuring, but I think the essence must lie in ensuring that schools combine education and productive labor more effectively and give young men and women a working profession as well as a general education. Much experience has been gained in Leningrad and the oblast in training skilled workers with secondary education through the system of vocational and technical schools. In our view this experience should be better utilized.

It is also evidently necessary to be more exacting regarding education in the family and to make wider use of the existing practice and the Law on Labor Collectives in order to enhance parents' responsibility for their children's behavior and moral makeup. And first and foremost communist parents should be held more accountable.

We all received with deep satisfaction the provisions which you put forward, Yuryi Vladimirovich, in connection with the preparation of a new edition of the CPSU Program. These provisions contain a good ideological, theoretical, and political basis for ensuring that the party program gives a realistic analysis of the present and accurately determines future tasks.

Hero of Socialist Labor N.D. Borodin, member of the CPSU since 1932, then spoke. It gives me special satisfaction, he said, to stress today that the decisions of the Central Committee's November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums have met with a warm response in the hearts of Soviet people and are exerting a profound, beneficial influence on all our life and all our actions.

It is a real Leninist tradition for major issues in state and public life on which important decisions are being taken to be the subject of preliminary discussion in labor collectives. I know this from the experience of the many thousands strong collective of the Likhachev plant, where I worked for 20 years as director and with which I still retain very close ties. Before adopting the resolution on labor discipline, the Central Committee familiarized many labor collectives, including the Likhachev plant collective, with the draft and heard their opinions. This greatly pleased people. They say that this is our real Soviet democracy, the party's link with the masses.

We have now embarked on the resolution of a number of key tasks in the economic sphere, the most important being that of radically improving labor productivity and accelerating scientific and technical progress. In this connection I would like to put forward a few ideas. We have every potential for making the rate of introduction and the efficiency of utilization of new machinery considerably higher than at present.

More effective measures should be adopted to ensure the preferential development of the sectors which are ultimately the basis of technical progress: modern

computer technology, universal systems for controlling manufacturing equipment, automated design systems, machine tool building, robot technology, and progressive new materials. The growth of production efficiency and labor productivity directly depends on this. Of course, this is not a simple task, but a long-term comprehensive targeted program should probably be elaborated to provide for the retooling of industry.

A resolution was adopted recently "On Additional Measures To Extend the Rights of Industrial Production Associations (Enterprises) in Planning and Economic Activity and To Step Up Their Responsibility for the Results of Work." It envisages conducting a broad economic experiment and in particular it extends the rights of enterprises.

In implementing this resolution it would be useful to increase the role and responsibility of production collectives in the implementation of socialist extended reproduction, including the introduction of the achievements of technical progress with minimum expenditure. Enterprises must earn resources for capital investments, rather than requesting them from higher organs. Then they will spend these resources as efficiently as possible. Enterprises will only embark on new construction when they have exhausted the potential of their existing production facilities. The development fund will then gain optimum significance.

V.I. Kiselev, member of the CPSU since 1918, veteran of the Great Patriotic War and of labor, delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, and chairman of the party veterans council in Kiev's Pecherskiy Rayon, said in his speech: It is a great honor for each of us present in this auditorium to participate in a meeting of party leaders with old Bolsheviks. I am confident that the present meeting in the CPSU Central Committee will meet with a warm response in every veteran's heart and will give rise to a new upsurge of strength in us.

The CPSU Central Committee has done much recently. Its tireless activity is indicated by the systematic reports on questions examined in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Meeting with comrades and visiting labor collectives, I see how people unanimously approve the party's line of production intensification and of strengthening discipline, organization, and order. This is a necessary condition of the fulfillment of all our plans and the attainment of the goals set. That is why we wholeheartedly vote for the eradication of various kinds of violations and for the high exactingness which is applied to workers at all levels--from the worker to the minister, from the rank-and-file communist to the party committee secretary.

The Food and Energy Programs are aimed at resolving peaceful tasks and increasing the country's might. The Energy Program was referred to at the June Plenum as a kind of GOELRO [State Commission for the Electrification of Russia plan of 1920] in modern conditions. Participation in the fulfillment of the GOELRO plan is a part of my life story. I voted for its adoption at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920. Then I worked on the implementation of that impressive plan. And what happiness it is to see that the baton of great work has been handed on!

But in order to successfully create a new society and build a bright future it is necessary first and foremost to "build" man himself, to mold a staunch, committed fighter for the implementation of communist ideals. We regard as completely correct the directive of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum on more widely involving young people in useful labor and social activity and strengthening their military-patriotic education.

Young people need to be educated through trust and responsible tasks. Why, in the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, were beardless youths able to command subunits? Or take machine operator Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gitalov, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, famous all over the country, who was already driving a tractor at the age of 13. And how many more examples could be cited! Today, a production specialist practically twice that age is often regarded as immature. Sometimes people cannot make up their minds to entrust him with independent work. Does this not give rise to social passivity among some of our young people?

The party veterans of the capital of the Soviet Ukraine, V.I. Kiselev said in conclusion, have asked me to convey to the CPSU Central Committee and that CPSU Central Committee Politburo heartfelt thanks for the great concern which is being displayed for us old Bolsheviks. Our spirit is youthful. And as long as our hearts beat we will work actively for the common weal and struggle for the cause of the great Lenin.

The floor was taken by P.K. Kolesnikov, a planer at the Rostselmash plant, initiator of the plant movement of multi-machine operators, and one of the first shock workers of communist labor on the Don. I will soon be 80 years old, my career has spanned over 60 years, and of those I have spent 52 working at the Rostselmash. I will say that I have the strength, I do not intend to give up work, and I will go on working at my dear plant as a planer. I am proud that many of my pupils are continuing my business.

I have been a member of Lenin's party for 50 years now. And I am gratified to see how our party has grown, how great its prestige is in domestic and international affairs, how loyally it serves the people. We know that the party is doing everything to ensure that our country is even stronger and that people live even better. The party's policy is our policy, the people's policy.

In addressing the Moscow machine tool builders, Yuriy Vladimirovich, you said that the Don-1500 is a machine necessary to agriculture. These words of yours are an order from the party for us workers at Rostselmash. And I can report to the party Central Committee that preparation for the production of the new combine is proceeding according to plan. But I must say frankly that we could have achieved more if we had put all our potential into operation. Yet we still have many unused reserves.

Take just discipline. The workers have accepted measures to strengthen it. The workers say that these measures were urgent and accord with our interests.

It must be said that there are still many careless people. There are even such people among the communists--they work listlessly, bypass shortcomings, and live by the principle "It's no concern of mine." I think that indifference

even today remains a very great evil. I will say frankly that we already have an extremely large number of soft-hearted people at our plant, but we must all be sharper-tongued when it is a case of the interests of the people and the country.

A couple of words about the role of the foreman. I well remember the times when the foreman was a most authoritative man. But now--I judge on the basis of my own plant--his role is being reduced. Sometimes no account is even taken of his opinion. We must also think about payment for his labor--in brief, the foreman's prestige must be high. The foreman represents discipline, quality, and productivity.

The workers are also worried by a negative phenomenon--drunkenness. There are still many instances of speculation, bribery, and the enrichment of individual people at society's expense. I want to make special mention of consumption. Sometimes it is not a case of necessities but of luxuries. Consumerist passions are sometimes inflamed all out of proportion. I think that tougher controls must be introduced over the measure of labor and consumption. The following question is also urgent. It is well known that in our country payment is carried out mainly as follows: He who has done more receives more. Today we must approach this in a new way: If you have done better, you receive more. Wages must be linked more closely with the quality of labor.

At the end of his speech P.K. Kolesnikov said: We know that the world situation now is heated. Our enemies want to slow down our movement and put an end to communism. But we remember our ancestors' behest: Those who treat us well, we treat well. And those who come to us with a sword will die by the sword. To thwart the enemies' designs there is only one path--strengthening the might of our dear fatherland. And we will not spare our efforts to augment this might by our labor.

Hero of Socialist Labor and honored worker in science of the Belorussian SSR P.D. Muhkin, chief of the Belorussian Arable Farming Scientific Research Institute section for the selection and primary seed growing of winter grain crops, also spoke. The economy created by the labor of all generations of Soviet people under the leadership of Lenin's party and its present dimensions and development potential, he said, demand the further enhancement of state, planning, and labor discipline. Without proper discipline, we will not be able to make rapid headway. However, as in any big matter, we have phenomena which are delaying our advance and causing great harm to our country's economy. They include absenteeism, the presence of drifters, and those who seek to profit at society's expense.

No less damage is caused to our economy by lack of discipline and irresponsibility, even among some leaders. What do we sometimes observe? Individual workers fail to ensure the fulfillment of plans and contract commitments. And they get away with it. They hold posts for years while they make a mess of things. We must make tougher demands on such leaders and dismiss those who do not know how to work.

The party and government render us scientists every support and attention. Responding to the party's concern, our country's scientists have enriched

science with new discoveries and inventions. But do we receive the corresponding return from all scientific developments? Unfortunately not. Many of them remain in cupboards and grow obsolete, yet time, effort, and money have been spent on them. In my view, a system and precise mechanism has not been worked out for introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress.

We know well that whatever complex problems may arise in our country, they are undoubtedly successfully resolved if they are taken up by the party and the CPSU Central Committee. That is why it would evidently be expedient if the question of accelerating scientific and technical progress were to be examined at the CPSU Central Committee. This would undoubtedly play a large part in the further development of production forces.

In conclusion P.D. Mukhin said: We veterans, who have known the tragedy of war, warmly support the peace-loving policy of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo. The world situation has been aggravated and is being heated by the U.S. imperialists. But they must know that Soviet people cannot be intimidated.

Allow me on behalf of my comrades--the veterans of the party organization of Soviet Belorussia--to convey to the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo words of sincere thanks and gratitude for their enormous, truly gigantic work in preserving peace on earth and consolidating the country's economic and defense might. Allow me to assure the CPSU Central Committee that we Communists of the older generation will continue to loyally serve Lenin's party and to make the contribution that is within our power to the common cause of building communism.

Hero of Socialist Labor V.M. Bakholdina, engineer and honored mechanizer of the RSFSR, took the floor. The older generation's experience, she said, contains an example of the selfless giving of efforts and boundless devotion to the cause of the party and the motherland. And it is particularly gratifying for us veterans that this experience is being preserved and augmented.

My fate has been a happy one. I believe that the basis for this has been the fact that I have tried all my life to work honestly and have traveled the path from an ordinary tractor driver to director of the Shipunovo machine-tractor station, Altay Kray. At my advanced age I am still working as an engineer at the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture state inspectorate for supervising the technical state of the machinery and tractor pool and I head the rayon detachment of women machine operators. When I link together the stages of my life, I can say that the historic decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum were a new milestone for me, as they were for all Soviet people.

Of course, the Food Program is very important to me as a rural worker. It must be resolved in just the way defined by the CPSU Central Committee--by organization, discipline, the conscientious labor of each person, and the best use of the powerful equipment in which our countryside has become so rich.

We frequently hear that there is a shortage of manpower at plants, factories, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes. And this is explained scientifically: demography.

But why has this demography failed to affect the management apparatus? This apparatus is growing, and everyone can see it. There are no empty chairs in offices, trusts, administrations, or associations.

Surely this is not right. Would it not be more useful to first fill all work places where material values are directly produced? Let the complexities of demography be reflected primarily on the offices, and production will be provided with everything necessary--both manpower and materials.

I will also mention labor discipline. I think that you must do as much work as is needed for a matter. In the past you never saw people taking a day or even 2 days off during the harvest, taking a walk, or taking a vacation. Yet now at the busiest time of the harvest--the haymaking and bringing in of the harvest, when each minute is precious--in some places people only work one shift and rest every Sunday.

The raising of the question of strengthening labor and state discipline has been very well received among the people. Unfortunately, it is sometimes violated by the leaders themselves. People vigilantly follow the conduct of someone in a senior post and the slightest violation on his part provokes a rebuke. It must be said that some people have understood concern for cadres thus: Staying in one place, as they say, for decades, and thinking more about oneself than about business. It has even become difficult to move some leaders to other jobs.

The responsibility of parents for their children's labor education must also be enhanced. It is based on the experience of adults and their example. There is a reason why work is called labor. Work is laborious, and people must be accustomed to difficulties.

I have imparted my thoughts here frankly because for me there is no point in life except helping to the extent of my powers my beloved motherland and dear party in successfully resolving the set tasks.

The party's concern for the people's welfare is multifaceted; retired Major General M.D. Tashmukhamedov said in his speech. It can be felt by all strata of the population and extends to all republics and regions of the country. There is a reason why Tajikistan was profoundly moved by the news that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo had approved the measures to develop the municipal services of the republic's capital--Dushanbe. That is yet another graphic manifestation of Lenin's nationalities policy. Every decision of the party and all its plans and deeds have one objective--ensuring that working people live better.

We have had the happiness to build a new life. And your heart rejoices when you see how widely and confidently our people are advancing. The boldest plans, of which we ourselves could only dream, are being realized before our eyes. The Nurek Sea has stretched out in the mountains of my motherland, Tajikistan. A new giant is being constructed in Rogun. A tunnel many kilometers long is being bored through the mountain range. It will soon bring water to the Dangerinskaya steppe. And this is being done not by fairytale heroes, but by our own Soviet people.

A large part of my life, M.D. Tashmukhamedov continued, has been connected with the army and with political work. And I have seen much during my personal experience. When a platoon is marching and someone loses step and fails to keep in time, the whole formation breaks down. You have a talk with a soldier like that and it often turns out that the fault lies not in his legs, but in his head. His consciousness is weak and he lacks coherence and discipline. It is even worse when a commander or leader suffers from such a "weakness."

I can very well appreciate those measures that the party is taking to accelerate our progress by way of people's consciousness and of increasing their sense of responsibility good organization, and discipline.

As a military man, I often think about young people's military-patriotic education and about their readiness to defend the motherland. The situation in the world is such that our weapons must be kept ready every day and at every hour. It is important to convey to each young person that he is the defender of the motherland and that it is therefore incumbent upon him to be both morally and physically at full combat readiness. It is our duty to help young people in that respect.

Hero of Socialist Labor N.N. Golovatskiy, a CPSU member since 1931 and chairman of the "40 Let Oktyabrya" kolkhoz in Kazakhstan's Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, then spoke. I have the great honor, he said, to represent Soviet Kazakhstan here. Kazakhstan's working people, like all Soviet people, wholeheartedly approve and, by their tireless labor, support our party's Leninist course and its foreign and domestic policy. The decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums, which have aroused a high level of labor and political activeness among the masses, are being fulfilled.

I have been kolkhoz head for over 30 years, I have seen and experienced much in those years. The main concern now is to gather this year's harvest on time and without losses and to ensure the ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the 5-year plan targets as a whole. Our collective's efforts are also subordinated to these tasks. Each year we supply the state with over 4 million poods of grain. It is gratifying to report that the 5-year plan target for grain will be fulfilled in just 3 years. This year we have resolved that we shall supply the state with 7,000 tons of meat, that is, with two yearly plan targets. This is our specific contribution to the fulfillment of the Food Program.

We are aware that the successes that have been achieved could have been far greater. When preparing for this meeting, I gave much thought to what we still lack now. Primarily, we are concerned by the problem of fixing cadres in the countryside and of enlisting young people in social production. Many years of experience suggest that a love for the land and for growing grain and stock-raising work must be instilled in young men and women from an early age. The state system of education and the vocational and technical training of young people should be geared toward this. I fully support the proposals put forward by comrades who spoke earlier on this question.

Young people now entering industry for the first time clearly lack organizational skills and the ability to work with people. It would be right to institute

compulsory on-the-job training on the country's advanced sovkhozes and kolkhozes for young experts who are graduating from agricultural institutes and technical schools. That would help to instill in them the desire to work willingly in the countryside. Then, perhaps, there would not be the kind of aberrations where a young agronomist sells beer by the roadside or a livestock expert sells meat in a store. There is clearly a lack of legal measures in this matter. One cannot help wondering: Why does it suit a specialist to do less skilled work?

We expect much from scientific institutions now. On our kolkhoz, for example, many kinds of work in the cultivation, harvesting, and grading of grain are done manually and that is unproductive. We have little specialized equipment. The tasks facing agriculture are great. We practical and scientific people must be responsible for fulfilling them together.

Allow me to give the assurance, N.N. Golovatskiy said in conclusion, that we shall spare neither effort nor energy in ensuring that the party's word always becomes reality and a living deed and is embodied in the new achievements of developed socialism.

Ya.D. Chanyshhev, a veteran of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, also spoke. I have been in the party since 15 March 1917, and was in the heroic Red Army for 45 years, he said.

I had the good fortune to meet with Lenin on two occasions: once at a rally and once at the 10th party congress. Under the great Lenin's leadership, our party and our people won a victory under very difficult conditions against internal counterrevolution and the interventionists and began to create the foundations of socialism. How was this successfully achieved? I shall mention just two things. First, Vladimir Illyich was constantly concerned about strong discipline within the party and about the vanguard role of Bolshevik party members. Second, Lenin made strict demands on leading communists.

We tend to say that Lenin was a kind man. And that was indeed true. But whenever it was a question of the interests of the party and the people, he allowed no one to be sympathetic with those who acted against those interests.

We are very satisfied that the leadership of the party Central Committee is conducting matters in a Leninist and Bolshevik way, and we would ask you not to be liberal with those who do not think about the common good or about work but who only think about their own personal prosperity.

Yu.V. Andropov: We promise you that (prolonged applause).

I, comrades, Ya.D. Chanyshhev continued, often visit military units. There are remarkable young people in our army, they are well educated and courageous. But military work is very difficult. After all, in just 2 years one has to master modern equipment and to be ready, both morally and physically, as they say, to defend the motherland. And we veterans must spare no effort in helping to prepare young people for service in the Soviet Army and to elevate the prestige of Soviet officers and soldiers.

Hero of Socialist Labor T.V. Fedorova, deputy chief of Moscow's Metrostroy, took the floor. This year, she said, marks the 50th year since 10,000 Moscow Komsomol members attended that unique and unprecedented construction project--the building of the Moscow subway. We are now fortunate that our four times order-bearing collective has reared many remarkable people and that there are many subway construction administrations and subway lines already in operation in our country.

Metrostroy in Moscow and Leningrad now receives Komsomol members from the army and from other oblasts and cities. These are remarkable young people. They are the descendants of the Komsomol volunteers of the thirties. They must be treated with increased attention. They have earned it. Primarily, this means providing them with housing promptly, particularly those who have decided to settle down. This would help young people avoid many of life's problems and, ultimately, would help them to work better, more productively.

A second point. Those comrades who said here that one must have a moral right to lead people are correct. And then there are leaders who are caught red-handed acting improperly. What moral right can a person have who exploits his position and builds himself a dacha, gets rich at the enterprise's expense or is simply corrupt? We must be implacably severe with such people.

In conclusion, I should like to say, on behalf of working class veterans, that we have always been with the party as its true militants and will always make every effort to help to fulfill the decisions taken by the Central Committee--after all, those decisions are so vitally important for our country and for our people.

The party veterans who attended the CPSU Central Committee meeting laid a wreath on V.I. Lenin's Mausoleum on 16 August.

They also visited the "V.I. Lenin Office and Domicile" Museum of the V.I. Lenin Central Museum.

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CSO: 1802/1

MEETING WITH PARTY VETERANS AT THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 17-18

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee passed a decree on the results of the meeting between Yu. V. Andropov and the CPSU Central Committee secretaries and party veterans on 15 August 1983. The decree states the following:

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo deems that this meeting is an important sociopolitical event and the convincing confirmation of the monolithic unity of party ranks and all generations of Soviet people in the struggle for the triumph of the communist ideals, their loyalty to the CPSU and the great Leninist cause. It proved the party's profound respect for the great guard of veterans and its continuing concern for the safeguard and multiplication of the revolutionary, combat and labor experience and Leninist traditions of party life and for strengthening ties with the masses.

It was emphasized in the course of the meeting that the steps formulated and implemented by the CPSU Central Committee to improve the management style and all aspects of life in our country, to upgrade cadre exigency and to strengthen discipline, organization and production intensification are consistent with the interests of all Soviet people and are having a beneficial influence on the development of the economy and the enhanced well-being of the people.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo highly rated the unanimous approval which the party veterans gave the CPSU domestic and foreign policy, their contribution to the struggle waged by the Soviet people for the implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums, and their fruitful activities in the communist upbringing of the working people, the young in particular.

The communist parties of union republics and the party kraykoms and obkoms have been instructed to secure the extensive dissemination and explanation of the proceedings of the meeting among party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and labor collectives and among the population at home. It has been recommended to the local party committees regularly to hold meetings with party and labor veterans and the representatives of the different generations.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has made it incumbent upon party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol and economic organs to make a thorough study of the questions raised by veterans and take corresponding steps and show their

constant concern for enhancing the role of veterans in all realms of production and social activities and make use of their great practical and political experience in organizational-party and ideological work and the education of the Soviet people in a spirit of loyalty to the ideas of Leninism and loyalty to the socialist homeland and the cause of the communist party.

The Central Committee Politburo considers it necessary for each party and trade union organization and state establishment and labor collective to develop an atmosphere of responsive, attentive and respectful attitude toward veterans and their needs and concerns.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has made it incumbent upon the editors of central and local newspapers, television, radio and the other mass information media to provide extensive coverage of the results of this meeting with veterans and to disseminate the stipulations and conclusions included in Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speech. The heroic pages in the struggle waged by the CPSU and the Soviet people for the triumph of the communist ideals must be described more vividly with the help of examples borrowed from the revolutionary, combat and labor activities of the veterans.

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CSO: 1802/1

AT THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PM311610 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian, No 13, Sep 83 (Signed to press 2 Sep 83)
pp 19-23

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have adopted the decree "On Measures To Accelerate Scientific and Technical Progress in the National Economy."

The decree notes that as a result of the CPSU's constant and unflagging attention to scientific and technical development our country has very quickly arrived at an advanced stage of progress.

In line with the course elaborated by the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses toward intensification of social production, the scale of the utilization of scientific and technical achievements in production has increased substantially. Scientific and technical cooperation with the socialist community countries is expanding.

At the same time the decree points out that the organization of this work in the country does not yet fully accord with the task set by the party of combining in practice the advantages of our socialist system with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. This question acquires highly optical significance because scientific and technical development has become one of the chief spheres of competition between the socialist and capitalist systems.

The decree notes that ministries, departments, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the State Committee for Science and Technology are not being as persistent as they should be in implementing a unified scientific and technical policy. In many ministries and departments, in associations, and at enterprises people are not displaying sufficient responsibility for the technical standard of production and the quality of products and are making poor use of the development of academy and sector institutes and VUZes. The production trial and experimental base of many enterprises fall short of modern demands.

The State Committee for Science and Technology is failing to make full use of the rights it has been given to coordinate and monitor the organization of scientific research and the introduction of its results into production. The State Committee for Standards is failing to make proper demands on ministries and departments concerning the quality of development work and strict observance of standards and its product quality control is poor.

The existing system of assessment of enterprises' and organizations' economic activity is not effective enough in terms of accelerating the creation of new equipment, materials, and processes.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers stressed that party, soviet, economic, trade union, and Komsomol organs have the very important task of fundamentally improving all work on accelerating scientific and technical progress. It is necessary, moreover, to be strictly guided by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums on questions relating to the fundamental improvement of labor productivity on the basis of the broad and accelerated introduction of the achievements of science, technology, and leading experience into practice.

The USSR Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Gosstroy, the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR ministries and departments and union republic councils of ministers, associations, enterprises, and organizations should proceed from the premise that in the next few years industry must ensure the manufacture of products as good as the best modern models and on this basis improve labor productivity in the national economy.

The State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, union republic academies of sciences, and sector academies of sciences must ensure that the results of research work are improved and that scientists' collectives activity promote the large-scale introduction of scientific achievements into production.

Ministries and departments must focus attention on questions relating to the retooling of production, the meeting of the national economy's demands for high-quality products, and the adoption of decisive measures to strengthen all units involved in the creation and introduction of new equipment. Special attention must be paid to the training of scientists and specialists and the implementation of economic and moral measures that will give all those involved in creating and introducing equipment and technology into production an interest in updating them.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have instructed the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Gosstroy, the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR ministries and departments, and union republic councils of ministers to implement measures to develop the network of large associations and enterprises and further concentrate the potential of scientific research, design, and technological organizations on the solution of tasks ensuring that the national economy's current and long-term needs are met. It is considered expedient that associations and enterprises extend the practice of organizing temporary scientific production subunits to tackle very important national economic problems. The setting up of similar collectives to solve intersectorial scientific and technical tasks is also envisaged.

The Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems, the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building and the Councils of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, and Latvian SSR are authorized to switch certain science-and-production associations to planning their activity along the lines of a "science and scientific services" sector.

It is planned to implement a complex of measures to accelerate the creation and equipping of experimental bases and production units. Targets for the construction (modernization) of the said facilities must constitute priority targets of 5-year and annual plans.

As of 1984 the USSR Gosplan, USSR ministries and departments, and union republic councils of ministers are obliged make provision in plans for the creation of reserve capacities for the preparation of production and assimilation of output of new types of equipment and materials.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers deemed it expedient to institute in certain large associations, at enterprises and in organizations the post of chief designer for main types and systems of machinery, equipment, and instruments.

The decree deemed it necessary to extend the use of targeted program planning of scientific and technical development. The 12th 5-Year Plan will see the commencement of the elaboration of all-union, republic (interrepublic), and sector (intersector) scientific and technical programs and also scientific and technical programs for regions and territorial production complexes whose main targets will be incorporated in 5-year and annual plans. To fulfill the said programs it is planned to ensure the priority allocation of resources and quotas for planning and research and construction and installation contract work.

The State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Gosplan are to approve and take into account when shaping the state plans for 1985 and subsequent years a list of the types of machine building products of very great national economic importance. As well as targets for the assimilation of new types of products, 5-year and annual plans will include targets for the manufacture of experimental prototypes of machinery and equipment of priority significance and also components and materials for them.

The USSR Gosplan, USSR Gossnab, State Committee for Science and Technology, and State Committee for Standards are instructed to elaborate the basic guidelines for the further expansion and deepening of intersector production specialization and coproduction in machine building for 1986-1990 and for the period through 2000 on the basis of the maximum standardization of units and parts.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers stated that one of the chief spheres of work on accelerating scientific and technical progress is the extensive automation of manufacturing processes on the basis of the use of automatic machine tools, machinery and mechanisms, standard equipment modules, robot equipment complexes, and computers. To this end the USSR Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, and the USSR Academy of Sciences are instructed to elaborate in conjunction with interested ministries and departments all-union programs for work in the sphere of creating flexible automatic production facilities and automated design planning systems and using them in the national economy. The USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, ministries and departments, and the USSR Council of

Ministers Academy of the National Economy must take steps to train and retrain cadres to set up and man the said production facilities and design planning systems.

To enhance the role of product consumers in the elaboration of plans for the creation and production of new equipment the chief USSR ministries and departments dealing with the types of products involved must elaborate and approve, in consultation with the main consumer ministries in question, promising types and systems of machinery, equipment, and other technology.

The approval of technical targets for the development of new or modernization of existing products used in several sectors and the presentation of proposals on the setting up of production and also on the discontinuation of production are carried out by the chief ministry in consultation with the consumer ministry. The initiator of an order is materially liable for a consumer's rejection of equipment which he asked to be made or for protracted commissioning of equipment.

The decree lays down that the ministry initiating an order is responsible for establishing in technical targets for the development of new types of products indicators that match the best modern models; a development organization is assigned by the consumer enterprises to elaborate technical proposals (preliminary plans) for machinery, equipment, and instruments of great national economic importance. A preliminary plan, approved by the development organization and the consumer, must exist before the development process can begin.

The ministries and departments that are the main ones for various types of machine building products have been instructed to develop, in conjunction with client ministries, differentiated normatives for the deadlines for their product's renewal (modernization). As of 1986, in state 5-year plans and annual plans, targets for creating and assimilating the production of new types of machinery, equipment, and instruments and the modernization of existing ones and also targets for discontinuing the production of obsolete machine building output are defined on the basis of these normatives.

As of 1984 industrial output will be certified on the basis of two categories of quality--top and first class. Articles not certified as belonging to one of these categories are liable to be removed from production. The USSR Gosplan has been given the right to authorize, exceptionally, the production of output not certified as top or first class for no more than 2 years.

The decree stipulates that the fulfillment of plans and targets for the development of science and technology is among the most important indicators by which the assessment of the results of the economic activity of associations (enterprises) is primarily made and the results of socialist competition are summed up. When these targets are underfulfilled and when output is produced after the normative deadlines for its renewal (modernization), bonuses to leading workers of associations (enterprises) for the basic results of their economic activity are reduced by at least 25 percent.

The USSR State Committee for Prices is given the right to institute incentive increments of up to 30 percent of wholesale prices for new, highly effective

output and deductions of up to 30 percent of wholesale prices for industrial output whose production is liable to discontinuation.

As an exception ministries and departments can authorize the enterprises and organizations under their jurisdiction to transfer part of the assets from the material incentive funds formed from deductions from profit to enterprises, organizations, and VUZes taking part in the fulfillment of all-union scientific and technical programs.

The State Committee for Science and Technology has been apprised of the need to improve scientific organizational and methodological leadership of the activity of ministries and departments in accelerating scientific and technical progress. For additional financing of operations performed in accordance with all-union scientific and technical programs, a reserve of funds is being created for the use of the State Committee for Science and Technology through annual deductions from the unified funds for scientific and technical development of the USSR ministries and departments.

The decree stresses that the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries must step up the leadership of invention and rationalizing activity and the monitoring of the speediest introduction of inventions into the national economy and improve the supply of patent information to the designers of new technology.

The State Committee for Standards must enhance the exactingness displayed toward USSR ministries and departments for the preparation of technical standards documentation and its practical use and their objectivity in assigning output to quality categories and it must take steps to improve and simplify the procedure for drawing up and coordinating technical documentation.

The attention of ministry and department leaders has been drawn to the need for the prompt implementation of projects undertaken on the basis of international agreements and for the improvement of work on the use of the CEMA countries' achievements in the sphere of science and technology.

From 1985 through 1987 it is deemed necessary to effect the transition of associations, enterprises, and organizations in agriculture, construction, transport, communications, geology, and material and technical supplies to the financially autonomous system of organizing work on the creation, assimilation, and introduction of new technology.

With a view to enhancing the material interest of those taking part in creating and assimilating highly effective equipment, technology, and new materials, lump-sum bonuses to USSR ministries and departments and union republic councils of ministers of R3,000-R40,000 each are to be introduced beginning in 1985.

USSR ministries and departments and union republic councils of ministers have been granted the right to authorize the payment of bonuses to leading and engineering and technical workers and other specialists over and above the set limits for developing and introducing new equipment and progressive manufacturing methods and materials that accord with or surpass the present

technical and economic standard, and for increasing the proportion of new, highly effective, output in the overall production volume.

Measures have been determined for stepping up the propaganda of scientific and technical achievements, making extensive use of the press, radio, television, cinema, and other mass media.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have expressed the conviction that the workers and employees, scientists, and engineering and technical workers in scientific research, design, planning, planning and design, and manufacturing organizations, associations, and enterprises will do everything necessary to successfully execute fulfillment of the tasks set by the party for accelerating scientific and technical progress in the country's national economy.

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CSO: 1802/1

YU.V. ANDROPOV'S ANSWERS TO PRAVDA QUESTIONS

PM261628 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian, No 13, Sep 83 (Signed to press 2 Sep 83)
pp 24-27

[PRAVDA, 27 August 1983]

[Text] Question: On the eve of the new round of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, we would like to know whether there is any correspondence with reality in the claims currently circulating in the West that at the previous round of these talks the U.S. side put forward some kind of flexible proposals making it possible to hope for progress?

Answer: No, there is not. So far there has been no progress at the talks, and unfortunately, there are no grounds for hope for it while the present U.S. position is maintained.

The entire "flexibility" of the U.S. position boils down to the following:

Previously the United States proposed that the USSR reduce to zero, in other words destroy, all its medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Eastern part of the country (which is altogether irrelevant to the subject matter of the Geneva talks), while nothing at all would be destroyed on the NATO side--not a single missile, not a single aircraft--or, to put it figuratively, their reduction would be zero. This is the meaning of the U.S. "zero option"--zero missiles for the USSR and zero reduction for NATO.

And yet now the United States is agreeable, you see, to the USSR retaining a certain number of its medium-range missiles, but in this case the United States would not only again fail to reduce by a single unit its medium-range nuclear forces but would, in addition, acquire the "right" to deploy in Europe--in addition to the British and French missiles already existing here--new U.S. missiles in numbers equal to the number of retained Soviet missiles. In other words, it is not enough for us to unilaterally reduce our arsenal of medium-range nuclear forces, we must also give our blessing to the deployment of new U.S. missiles targeted on us and our allies.

To speak of this as flexibility can be done only as a mockery of common sense.

If we are to speak of flexibility in the real, constructive meaning of this word, throughout the talks it has been manifested by the Soviet Union, but in no way by the United States.

It was the Soviet Union that proposed not a false but a real zero option for Europe: to destroy all nuclear facilities, both medium-range and tactical. But the United States is unwilling to even talk about this.

Since the West is not prepared for such a radical solution--and our readiness for it remains in force--we proposed another, not so radical option, but also a far-reaching one: to give up the deployment of any new medium-range facilities in Europe while reducing all existing ones by two-thirds, leaving for the time being, 300 units of such facilities for the USSR and for NATO.

In connection with Western claims about the injustice of this option, since the USSR could allegedly retain more missiles within the limit of the permitted 300 units than exist on the NATO side, we declared our readiness to retain in Europe, after the reductions as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France possess.

Correspondingly, the sides would also retain an equal number of aircraft delivery vehicles for medium-range nuclear weapons.

Then some people mounted a new "hobbyhorse": They began maintaining that, given the sides' equal number of missiles, the Soviet Union will have the advantage in terms of the total number of warheads on its SS-20 missiles. But they could not keep astride this "hobbyhorse" for long either, as the Soviet Union voiced its consent to reach agreement on equality both in terms of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and in terms of the warheads on them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have considerably fewer of both medium-range missiles in the European zone and warheads on them than before 1976, when we did not have any SS-20 missiles at all, which, according to the NATO version, was the spark that set the forest on fire.

So what, then, one wonders, is unfair and unacceptable in our position? It is an honest, consistent, and at the same time flexible position founded on the principle of the sides' equality and identical security. If the United States and its NATO allies were to get the slightest wish to really reach agreement on equal terms, things would go quite differently at the Geneva talks and we would not have to wait long for an agreement.

Question: Apart from the U.S. and NATO dodges which you have mentioned, people in the West frequently maintain that in agreeing to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country, the USSR intends just to transfer them to the eastern regions. What would you say about that?

Answer: Such allegations are a deliberate lie. There is no stratagem here. We ourselves proposed some time ago that the dismantling and destruction of medium-range nuclear arms should be the chief method of reducing them in Europe. At the talks we bluntly told the Americans: Let us agree what will be destroyed on both sides and how. They even evade this.

Today I can report our readiness to take one more big step.

In the event of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, including the U.S. abandonment of the deployment of new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, in reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of British and French missiles, would liquidate all the missiles so reduced. In this case a considerable number of the most sophisticated missiles, known in the West by the name of SS-20, would also be liquidated.

There is hardly any need to emphasize the exceptional importance of this new display of goodwill by the Soviet Union.

First, this removes any grounds from under the allegations being disseminated in the NATO countries that the Soviet Union in fact intends to retain the SS-20 missiles liable to reduction by simply redeploying them from Europe to the east.

Second, the concern currently being voiced by China and Japan regarding the possibility of such a redeployment [perebazirovaniye] is also deprived of any foundation.

From all that has been said it must be clear to any unprejudiced person: The Soviet Union has done and is doing everything incumbent upon it to find an outcome at the talks, to achieve a mutually acceptable accord which would avert another--and extremely dangerous, moreover--spiral of the nuclear arms race in Europe.

Whether or not there is such an accord depends on the United States, on NATO as a whole. The upcoming round of negotiations beginning 6 September will be decisive in this respect.

Throughout the talks the Soviet Union--I wish to stress this once again--has displayed a constructive and flexible approach. But I would also stress something else: There are limits to our flexibility--they are dictated by the interests of the security of the Soviet state and its allies.

If the U.S. position at the talks continues to remain unconstructive and one-sided, and matters get as far as the actual deployment of the American Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe, we will naturally have to adopt corresponding countermeasures to preserve the balance of forces on regional, European, and global scales alike. Nobody must be at all unclear on this point.

Question: In connection with your reference to China in the context of nuclear weapons in Europe, I would like to ask what is the PRC's position on questions of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament as a whole?

Answer: As is known, the PRC has its own nuclear potential; it is gradually growing. As yet China is not taking any part in talks on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. As we understand it, the PRC leaders now seem to be displaying interest in certain questions relating to nuclear and other weapons under discussion at the United Nations and in the Geneva Disarmament Committee. If this trend develops there is no doubt that China could make a considerable contribution to the solution of problems linked with averting nuclear war and ending the arms race.

Question: Would you like to say something about Soviet-Chinese relations?

Answer: We considered and continue to consider the state of Soviet Chinese relations over the last two decades abnormal.

Certain positive trends have been perceptible in our relations recently. Political consultations are being conducted between the two countries at special representative level; their next round will begin in Beijing on 6 October. The volume of trade is increasing and contracts are gradually developing in a number of other fields.

However, the present level of bilateral relations is still far from the level that, we are convinced, should exist between such major and, furthermore, neighboring powers as the Soviet Union and the PRC.

A great deal can be done in the sphere of expanding trade and organizing economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and in the fields of cultural, sporting, and other ties. An improvement in the atmosphere in relations between the two countries would be promoted to a considerable extent by the joint elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures in the Soviet-Chinese border region.

We also prepared for political dialogue with China on fundamental questions of world development, primarily questions of strengthening peace and international security.

Of course, we have considerable differences with China in terms of approaches to certain important international problems and relations with individual states. But we proceed firmly from the premise that Soviet-Chinese relations must be built in such a way that they do not harm third countries. We also expect this of the Chinese side.

The normalization [ozdorovleniye] of relations between the USSR and the PRC is assuming particular importance and urgency in the context of the current exacerbation of the international situation. We are confident that objectively the Soviet and Chinese peoples' interests do not diverge as regards eliminating the war danger and strengthening peace. Even without mentioning that peace is the ideal of socialism, both our countries have major long-range economic tasks which require favorable external conditions to be carried out successfully.

Thus, both our countries would benefit from the positive development of Soviet-Chinese relations, and this would undoubtedly be advantageous for the entire international situation.

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CSO: 1802/1

RARE EDITION OF KARL MARX'S BIOGRAPHY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 28-32

[Text] The "Severnoye Izdatel'stvo V. O. Zheglinskogo" [V. O. Zheglinskiy's Northern Publishing House] was organized in Vologda in 1908. It lasted 6 months, in the course of which it published 28 open letters with photographs and short biographies of outstanding revolutionaries, public figures and writers. This was no whim. By the turn of the 20th century many revolutionaries were exiled to Vologda Guberniya following the routing of a number of "alliances for the struggle for the liberation of the working class."

The following short biographies and portraits were published in the biographical series of "Severnoye Izdatel'stvo:" K. Marx, F. Engels, M. A. Bakunin, V. G. Belinskiy, E. Valliant, J. Guede, A. I. Hertzen, M. Gorkiy, T. N. Granovskiy, A. S. Griboyedov, N. A. Dobrolyubov, F. M. Dostoyevskiy, K. Kautskiy, P. G. Kakhovskiy, P. A. Kropotkin, P. L. Lavrov, F. Lassalle, P. Lafargue, N. K. Mikhaylovskiy, N. A. Nekrasov, I. S. Nikitin, R. Owen, P. I. Pestel', D. I. Pisarev, G. V. Plekhanov, A. N. Radishchev, K. F. Ryleyev, and N. G. Chernyshevskiy. Today these editions are exceptionally rare and no single library in the country has the complete set.

Each edition was a postcard 90 by 140 millimeters and a pamphlet with a short biography, 65 by 80 millimeters. The portrait was on the face of the card on the left. The pamphlet was glued on the right side (14 to 24 small pages). In many of the biographies, the last two or three pages contained a list of recommended reading materials--works by the person or about him.

The biographical series was published legally. All pamphlets were officially recorded in the "book chronicle." V. O. Zheglinskiy's publications were sold in Vologda as reported in the August 1908 issue of the Vologda newspaper SEVER.

The authors wanted to remain anonymous. Half of the biographies (K. Marx, F. Engels, A. I. Hertzen, P. L. Lavrov, F. Lassalle, G. V. Plekhanov, N. G. Chernyshevskiy and others) were written by K. Za-nko, whose true name remains unknown.

Viktor Osipovich Zheglinskiy, the publisher of the biographic series, was a social democrat and member of the Kiev "Alliance for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class." He kept a clandestine library and the metal press of the Kiev "Alliance." He was exiled to Vologda at the end of

1901. In its 1 July 1903 issue ISKRA reported that he was no longer under police supervision (23 May 1903). Zheglinskiy remained in Vologda until the autumn of 1908.

A few copies of Karl Marx's short biography have been preserved. The full set with his portrait and pamphlet may be found in the Vologda Oblast Regional Museum. Copies are exhibited in the K. Marx and F. Engels Museum in Moscow. The second copy known to us, without the postcard with the portrait, is stored at the Scientific Research Department of the History of Books and Rare and Particularly Valuable Editions (the Book Museum) of the USSR State Library imeni V. I. Lenin.

The following is printed on the pamphlet's cover: "Karl Marx. (Short Biography.) Published by V. O. Zheglinskiy, Vologda, 1908." The pamphlet has 15 pages. A familiar photograph of Marx sitting in an armchair, taken in August 1875 by London photographer John Maylor, has been printed on the left. Marx's photograph and the cover are an unusual and noteworthy presentation of a book. No other such presentation existed in Russia.

The publication of the biography was timed for the 25th anniversary of the death of the founder of scientific communism. This original edition of Karl Marx's short biography with his photograph on a postcard is valuable above all for its propaganda importance and recommended bibliography.

Here is what the anonymous brief biography of Paul Lafargue, published within this series, stated on Marx's influence: "The unusually strong intellectual influence which the great mind of the author of 'Das Kapital' had on the people around him soon affected Lafargue as well. It gave a definitive direction to his historical-economic views and aspirations which made him one of the best and most capable supporters of Marx's theory...."

The typefaces of the copies of Karl Marx's biography found in Vologda and Moscow are different. We conclude from this that V. O. Zheglinskiy printed additional copies.

The publication of this postcard with a photograph and a short biography of Karl Marx is an outstanding event in the history of the legal revolutionary press in the provinces. The text of the biography has the characteristics of the period and, to a certain extent, meets the requirements of the censorship during the reactionary period. There are inaccuracies. Thus, for example, the assessment of the reasons for Marx's struggle against Bakuninism and the correlation between Marx's political economy and the legacy of the classics of bourgeois political economy are inaccurate. Nevertheless, it was unquestionable that this publication contributed to the dissemination of Marxism. Following is the text of Karl Marx's short biography, prepared for publication by U. M. Spektor.

Karl-Heinrich Marx

(5 May 1818--14 March 1883)

Karl Marx, the great economist and sociologist, was born in Trier on 5 May 1818. His father was a lawyer who, together with his family, converted to Protestantism in 1824.

Marx entered the university in Bonn in 1835, subsequently transferring to the university in Berlin where he began to study law. Soon afterwards, however, he dedicated himself to the exclusive study of history and philosophy. In 1841 he received his doctorate and returned to Bonn where he was offered a professorship. However, he refused to take over a chair when Bruno Bauer, his friend, docent at the theological faculty, lost his docentship because of his political convictions.

It was during that period that Marx began his publicistic activities. He became the principal associate and, subsequently, editor of the RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, which was published in K^oln (where he moved). It was at that time also that he married Jenny von Westfalen, the sister of a Prussian minister.

In the course of his newspaper work Marx had to deal with economic problems and immediately he realized the inadequacy of his knowledge. After the RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG was closed down he moved to Paris to fill this gap. Here, together with Arnold Rugei, he founded the journal DEUTSCH-FRANZOSISCHE JAHRBUCHER, which came out in two issues only, because of basic differences between the publishers. Soon afterwards, having become a socialist, Marx definitively parted company with Rugei, who remained a political radical, and became close to Friedrich Engels. Their friendship lasted until Marx's death.

Together with Engels, Marx wrote a pamphlet aimed at his former friends and like-minded people--the brothers Bauer and others. He sharply criticized the ideological views of German post-Hegelian philosophy represented by the Bauers.

Because of Marx's cooperation with Bernstein¹ in the publication of the newspaper VORWARTS!, in Paris, which sharply criticized the Prussian government, the latter succeeded in having Marx expelled from Paris by Guizot.

After moving to Brussels, where he was soon joined by Engels, he engaged in active propaganda work among local and German workers. In 1847, together with Engels, he joined the secret international "Alliance of Communards,"² on the instructions of which the two of them drafted the "Communist Party Manifesto" in 1848.

Following the February events, on the request of the provisional French government, Marx returned to Paris. In March he left for K^oln where he resumed the publication of the RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG under the title of NEUES RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, which lasted about a year. He was taken to court for an article published in the newspaper but was exonerated by the jury.

Following the definitive triumph of the reaction in Germany, Marx, who had lost his Prussian citizenship while in Brussels, was expelled from Germany

and moved to Paris. Soon afterwards he was forced to leave Paris and settled permanently in London. Strained financial circumstances forced him to write for various newspapers. It was in London that Marx wrote his "Critique of Political Economy," which subsequently was reworked and became "Das Kapital." Starting with 1864 he actively participated in the founding of the "International Association of Workers,"³ which was the first attempt to rally the social democrats⁴ within a single international party the purpose of which was to disseminate Marx's social democratic program and to prepare for a social revolution. It was also Marx who drafted the association's program and bylaws.

The association, which gave itself the name of "International," included members of other socialist trends as well, such as anarchists and communists like Bakunin and revolutionaries like Madzini,⁵ who believed in the possibility of a social coup carried out through violent means and possible in the immediate future. Marx opposed them fiercely and was able to expel the anarchists, headed by Bakunin, in 1872.

The first congress of the association was scheduled to be held in Brussels in 1865 but was banned by the government; the subsequent congresses were held in Geneva (1866), Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868) and Bonn⁶ (1869). No congress was held in 1870 because of the Franco-Prussian War. Subsequent congresses were held in The Hague (1872), Paris (1882),⁷ Brussels (1891), Zurich (1893), London (1896), Paris (1900), Zurich (1903),⁸ Amsterdam (1904), and Stuttgart (1907).

Although Marx was able to purge the alliance of anarchist groups, he also deemed it convenient to interrupt for a while its activities (1873-1889) and thus stay away from practical matters in order to undertake the theoretical development of his economic theory.⁹

Marx's theory may be divided into his "theory of value"¹⁰ and "Theory of the Essence of the Process of Economic Development and the Role of Capital as a Historical Category." In ascribing to economic relations a primary role in the history of human societies and acknowledging them as the base of all social and political systems, Marx focuses his entire attention on the discovery of economic laws which, in his view, are of a purely historical nature and are subject to the same process of change as controlled phenomena. In the course of his study of economic laws on the basis of which contemporary society develops, Marx found out that a characteristic feature of the latter was the capitalist production method and the domination of exchange relations. Therefore, the study of exchange values and their origin and forms is necessary in order to understand the totality of economic phenomena.

In terms of economic views Marx is very close to the classical school the main theoretician of which is Ricardo. Marx's theory is the basis of the programs of the German and Russian social democratic parties. In Germany, it was rivaled by Lassalle's sociopolitical doctrine for a long time. Until 1891 the latter was an integral part of the program of the German social democratic movement and it was only that year that Marx's theories finally gained the upper hand at the Erfurt congress.

K. Marx died on 14 March 1883, and this year (1908) the proletariat the world over will be commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of the greatest fighter for its interests, the fighter for socialism, who proved that socialism is an economic necessity whereas the other socialist leaders proved no more than its desirability.

The size of the present edition does not allow the full enumeration of everything written about Marx, for which reason we shall limit ourselves to what we consider a necessary selection.

In addition to Marx's own works, his economic theory is found in a brief description of his doctrine, written by K. Kautsky (see Kautsky, "K. Marx's Economic Theory." Molota Publishing House. 30 k.). Kautsky is the author of volumes 1 and 2; the third volume was written by Bernstein and published by Ivanov, Kiev, 40 k.

Marx's theory is described in the following works as well: L. Slonimskiy, "K. Marx's Economic Theory," 1902, 1.25 r.; G. Devil, "Das Kapital. Presentation of the First Volume of Marx's 'Das Kapital'." St. Petersburg, 1907, 75 k.; G. Gross, "K. Marx's Economic System in an Easily Understandable Presentation." St. Petersburg, 1906, 15 k.

The following works offer an adequate idea of K. Marx's personality and life: Kautsky, "Karl Marx." Znaniya Publishing House, 5 k.; Fr. Mehring, "K. Marx's Young Years," Moscow, 1906, 15 k.; S. Bulgakov, "Marx as a Religious Type," 1908, 25 k.; W. Liebknecht, "Karl Marx. Short Biography." St. Petersburg and Odessa, 20, 25 and 30 k. (also "Recollections of Marx," Odessa, 20 k.).

Worth reading among Marx's critics are K. Kareyev, "Old and New Studies of Economic Materialism," St. Petersburg, 1891, 1 ruble; V. Chernov, "Marxism and the Agrarian Problem." Russk. Bog. Publishing House, Part I, 75 k. Ibid., "Marx and Engels on the Peasantry," Nov. T-va Publishing House, 25 k. Ibid., "The Peasant and the Worker As Economic Categories." Nov. T-va Publishing House, 15 k.; Nikolay, "A Few Words on the Fundamental Concepts of K. Marx's Theory" (Russk. Bog., 1897, 1 k.); Kudrin, "On the Level of Objective Truth" (Russk. Bog., 1895, 5 k.).

The complete collected works of K. Marx are as yet to be published in Russia. In this year of 1908 an attempt is being made to publish them as an appendix to the journal VSEMIRNYY VESTNIK but we have no idea as to how successful this undertaking will be; following is an attempt at their enumeration: "Das Kapital. Critique of Political Economy," Vol I, St. Petersburg, 1907, 2 r.; 1908, 2.50 r.; Vol II, Moscow, 1907, 2.50 r.; Vol III, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1.75 r. Part II of the third volume is being prepared for printing; "Theory of Added Value," ed. by Professor Zhelezov, Kazan, 1907, 1.25 r.; St. Petersburg, 1.50 r. (a St. Petersburg 1906 edition exists, translated from Kautsky's edition with a preface by Plekhanov, 1.50 rubles); "Collection of Historical Works," 1906, 1 r.; "Critique of Some Concepts of Political Economy," Moscow, 1896, 1 r.

The following works by Marx in inexpensive editions are available: "The Jewish Problem," Kiev, 1906, 10 k.; "The Class Labor Movement in England,"

St. Petersburg, 1906, 10 k.; "Critique of the Gotha Program," St. Petersburg, 1906, 8 k.; "Keri, Bastia and Marx on Art," St. Petersburg, 1905, 10 k.; "Hired Labor and Capital," Moscow, 1905, 5 k.; St. Petersburg, 1906, 10 k.; "Poverty of Philosophy," St. Petersburg, 1906, 20 k.; "First Manifesto of the International Association of Workers," St. Petersburg, 1906, 2 k.; "Speech on Free Trade," Odessa, 1905, 8 k.; St. Petersburg, 1906, 8 k.; "Louis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire," Moscow, 1906, 20 k.; "The Civil War in France (1870-1871)," Odessa, 1905, 15 k.; "The Class Struggle in France (1848-1850)," Odessa, 1905, 15 k.; Moscow, 1905 and 1906, 20 k.; "The Liberals in Power," St. Petersburg, 1906, 8 k. "Facing the Court Jury," St. Petersburg, 1906, "Addressed to the Kolin Court Jury," St. Petersburg, 1906, 10 k.; "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany," St. Petersburg, 1907, 25 k.; "The Kolin Communist Trial," 1906, 20 k.; "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the Law." Odessa and St. Petersburg, 6 k.; "Letter to Kugelman, Member of the International," 10 k. Marx is also the author of a number of works written in cooperation with Engels, published as a collection entitled "Literary Heritage," Vol I, 2.25 k., Moscow, 1907; and "The Communist Manifesto," Moscow, 1906, 3 k. (a fuller edition costs 12 k., entitled "The Bourgeoisie, the Proletariat and Communism," 20 k.). Za-nko.

FOOTNOTES

1. Reference to Heinrich Bernstein, a German merchant and owner of the newspaper VORWARTS! Contributors to the newspaper included Heine, Bakunin, Burghers, Ewerbeck, and Engels; it was Marx who determined the actual line of the newspaper.
2. Reference to the joining of the "Alliance of the Just," which Marx and Engels joined and which, under their influence, was reorganized and renamed into the "Alliance of Communists."
3. Reference to the International Association of Workers--the First International.
4. In this case the author improperly uses a term which became popular later.
5. Madzini himself did not join the International but several Madzinists participated in the founding of the International Association of Workers.
6. The 1869 congress took place in Basel and not in Bonn.
7. Here and subsequently reference is made to the congresses of the Second International.
8. Error. There was no congress of the International in 1903.
9. Erroneous assessment. Until his very last days Marx remained not only the theoretician of the international worker movement but its fiery leader and organizer.
10. Reference to the theory of value.

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THE USSR FOOD PROGRAM--A NEW STAGE IN THE PARTY'S MODERN AGRARIAN POLICY

PM200810 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83)
pp 33-46

[Article by K. Bogolyubov]

[Text] The improvement of developed socialism is the main element in the party's and the people's activity at the present stage. This was indicated with renewed force by the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which examined topical questions of ideological and mass political work in close relationship with the tasks of securing further progress in Soviet society's production forces and production relations. In his plenum speech, Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, describing the basic directions for the preparation of the new edition of the CPSU program, emphasized: "...The party program under contemporary conditions must be, above all, a program for the balanced and comprehensive improvement of developed socialism, which means for the further advance toward communism."

The improvement of mature socialism presupposes the solution of major nationwide tasks that determine the substantial progress of society's base and superstructure. A special position among them is occupied by the range of measures combined with the USSR Food Program. The CPSU Central Committee June Plenum noted the pressing need to ensure the uninterrupted supply of high-quality food products for the population. The Food Program is aimed at resolving this problem.

I

The USSR Food Program has its own characteristics, typical of countries with a highly developed economy. For the USSR this is mainly the problem of the structure of consumption. There can be no question at all of any "overall food deficit" with reference to our country. For a long time now the Soviet Union has been one of the top 10 countries in the world in terms of calorific value of food products consumption per capita. The socialist system of agricultural production precludes the emergence of a food problem in the form in which it exists in "Third World" countries and in many developed capitalist states, where social contrasts are highly accented, including the gap in consumption levels between different strata of the population. Nevertheless, there still exists in our country a need to improve nutrition, increase the output and consumption of the most valuable food products, and eliminate interruptions in their supplies.

The task of supplying all working people with food according to scientifically determined norms has been set in the Soviet Union. In this matter we proceed from the instructions of V. I. Lenin, who noted in a December 1919 letter addressed to the well-known scientist and statistician P. I. Popov dealing with the RSFSR population's consumption before and after the October Revolution, that the norm must be "the scientifically determined amount of bread, meat, milk, eggs, and similar products that man needs, in other words the norm not of calorie amounts but of the quantity and quality of food" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 342).

As regards the calorific value of food, matters in this respect stand as follows: According to data published by the FAO (the UN Food and Agriculture Organization), the overall calorific value of food consumed in the USSR amounts to an average of 3,440 calories per day per capita, which is in line with the level of economically developed countries in the world and with physiological standards.

The diet, however, involves shortages in the consumption of animal products, vegetable oils, vegetables, fruit, and berries. The structure of nutrition needs improvements in this respect.

How is this task to be implemented? Instructions for this are contained in the CPSU Central Committee May and November 1982 Plenum decisions and subsequent party and government resolutions. They emphasize the comprehensive nature of the necessary measures, which is reflected in the 26th Party Congress documents and in the Food Program that is currently under implementation.

The elaboration and implementation of the Food Program comprise a qualitatively new stage in the development of the country's entire agroindustrial complex. It reflects the main element of the party's economic strategy for the 1980s--the transition of the country's national economy to a predominantly intensive path of development. Under contemporary conditions, only a comprehensive intensification can make it possible to increase the yields from agricultural crops and the productivity of animal breeding, wage an efficient struggle against losses, sharply step up the industrial processing of agricultural raw materials, and increase the output of high-quality finished products.

The Food Program cannot be implemented without consolidating the economic methods of management. Financial autonomy and its elements--costs, prices, profits, profitability, and the material interests of workers in high end results of labor--are the main levers for boosting agricultural output and the other sectors of the agroindustrial complex. Foremost significance in this attaches to the stable and balanced economic conditions of management. There must be no breaches in the equivalence of exchanges between kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and the enterprises servicing them, no disregard of price parity between agricultural produce and means of production supplied to rural areas, and no instances of expenditures exceeding purchase prices.

The measures taken recently by the party are aimed at liquidating such inconsistencies and contradictions. Purchase prices have been increased and

supplements to them have been established for output, produced under poor conditions or on unprofitable or low-profitability farms. The debts of low-profitability or unprofitable kolkhozes in terms of USSR Gosbank loans have been written off, and state assistance is available to economically weak farms for the construction of projects for social and cultural purposes. This is thus the first time that countrywide measures have been taken to create equal opportunities for kolkhozes and sovkhozes operating under different natural or economic conditions, and to improve the activity of lagging farms and help them consolidate their production.

Much work is being done to regulate the economic mutual relations between all links in the agroindustrial complex. The principled condition and starting position in this work is that what is advantageous for kolkhozes and sovkhozes should be advantageous for their partners--maintenance workers, construction workers, land reclamation workers, agricultural chemical services workers, and procurement workers. And vice versa. Furthermore, the results of agricultural production and the output of finished products must be considered in parallel with the provision of services as the basis for evaluating the activity of organizations serving the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution in July 1983 on improving the mutual relations between agriculture and the other sectors of the national economy.

From now on, the growth of agricultural produce output on the farms served, the fulfillment of contractual obligations, and the reduction of the costs of work and services will be the main criteria for the work of enterprises and organizations of the USSR Goskomselkhoztekhnika, the Soyuzselkhozkhimiya association, and the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, as well as for the determination of their material incentives funds. The fulfillment of the plan for agricultural produce purchases will be the basic indicator for the activity of procurement organizations. The resolution defines measures to ensure stable economic conditions for expanded reproduction on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Amendments are introduced to the existing order for planning and utilizing the profits of enterprises and organizations providing services for agriculture. Greater financial interest in the attainment of high end results from agricultural labor is established for the procurement and other links of the agroindustrial complex. There will be stricter control over the correlation between the purchase prices of agricultural produce and the wholesale prices of industrial products delivered to kolkhozes and sovkhozes. It is envisaged that the determination of purchase prices should be based on the need to ensure sector norms for overall profitability in agricultural production.

This will result in the creation of new conditions in rural areas. In order to make fuller use of it, great attention must be paid to economic work on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in the other links of the agroindustrial complex. Everything that has been and is being done by the party and the government on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee May and November 1982 Plenum decisions and the recommendations of the April 1983 conference of first secretaries of union republic communist party central committees and of party

raykoms and obkoms on agricultural questions, held at the CPSU Central Committee, makes it possible to substantially improve the economic conditions on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This requires persistent daily work on the questions of introducing financial autonomy, effecting savings of labor and material resources, and making more efficient use of the entire production potential. The insistent requirement of the times is to eliminate instances of departmental separateness, resolutely get rid of the elements of administration by mere injunction, and encourage the economic initiative of workers, their independence, and a creative approach to the matter in hand based on profound economic analysis.

II

The economic mechanism for the Food Program's implementation and successful functioning are closely linked with the further improvement of distributive relations and the system of the material and moral incentives for labor. The distributive relations and the strictest control over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption must be at the party's focus of attention. And the CPSU is constantly concerned to ensure that the principle of socialist distribution according to the quantity and quality produced is implemented everywhere and strictly and is applied better and more fully in practice. If it is breached, we have to deal with unearned incomes, drifters, loafers, and slipshod workers who take from instead of giving to society and have a negative effect on the economy.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum: "All people in our country have equal rights and equal obligations before society. But complete equality in the sense of equal utilization of material benefits will be possible only under communism. We still have to go a long way before that. It requires much higher standards both in the economy and in people's awareness."

Today, disregarding a certain part of the consumption of social funds, each citizen in our country is entitled only to so many material benefits as correspond with the quantity and quality of his socially beneficial labor. Only to so much. What is needed are strict observance of and strict adherence to this principle.

This principle is adhered to only when wages have been truly earned, when work time is fully utilized, and when labor yields high quantitative and qualitative results. This precisely is the basis of the resolution recently adopted by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the AUCCTU "On Stepping Up Work To Consolidate Socialist Labor Discipline." By providing for enhancing workers' and employees' responsibility for absenteeism, lateness, and other breaches of discipline, and slipshod work and making officials more accountable for the organization of production and for people's working and daily living conditions, the resolution is helping to increase labor productivity, reduce cadre turnover, and thus improve production relations in general and distributive relations in particular.

The forms of distribution are closely linked with the forms of labor organization and incentives. The better these latter are, the more efficiently the

principle of distribution according to labor will operate. Thus, the progressive form of labor organization that is the collective (team, link, group, and so on) contract offers broad and real opportunities for the material and moral encouragement of truly conscientious labor. Conceived in industry and in construction, it is now spreading more and more widely in agriculture too, ensuring a considerable increase in the efficiency of arable and livestock farming.

The teams, links, and other subunits working on collective contract methods successfully combine the individual interests of workers and the collective as a whole with the common tasks of the farm and, consequently, of the whole of society. By scoring high indicators, the members of those collectives receive higher wages. Many other problems are also successfully resolved: The absence of individual responsibility for utilizing land, equipment, and material resources is eliminated and a permanent master [khozyain] emerges in each specific field. Workers and kolkoz members are involved in the management of affairs, participate in the discussion of production questions, and determine themselves the wage system in their subunit. These collectives, as a rule, establish firm labor discipline and mutual exactingness and responsibility, develop the creative element of labor, and nurture a proprietorial attitude to the whole people's wealth. Young people are more willing to work in them, acquire their training and production habits more quickly, and grow firmer roots in rural areas.

All this makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the collective contract, in comparison with piece-rate wages, ensures higher end results. Under today's conditions this is the most efficient of all means that have been found to intensify the link between the material incentives for kolkoz members and sovkhoz workers and the results of their labor, as well as being an understandable and efficient form of financial autonomy. The CPSU Central Committee requires party organizations to step up their work on introducing collective contracts in kolkoz and sovkhoz production, considering this one of the most important means to enhance the labor activity of rural workers, consolidate discipline and financial autonomy, and successfully implement the Food Program.

III

The economic backup for the Food Program and the solution of the tasks set by it are directly dependent on the size and rational utilization of capital investments. Investments in agriculture and the other sectors of the agro-industrial complex have constantly increased since the CPSU Central Committee March 1965 Plenum, which marked the beginning of the party's modern agrarian policy, and annually account for a multibillion sum of money.

Nonetheless, increasing funds are required: tasks are becoming more complex, the volume of work is growing, and there are higher requirements for quality indicators. Under these conditions the thrifty and careful utilization of capital investments and the enhancement of their efficiency acquire foremost significance.

It was noted at the 26th Party Congress that major financial and material resources will continue to be allocated to agriculture, that the sector's balanced transition to an industrial basis will continue, but that from now on the center of gravity--and this is a distinguishing characteristic of agrarian policy in the 1980s--will shift to return on capital investment, increased agricultural productivity, and deeper and better links with all sectors of the agroindustrial complex. The CPSU Central Committee November 1982 Plenum drew attention to this fact. It pointed out that the workers in the agroindustrial complex must increase their efforts daily and must work to ensure that the enormous funds channeled into the solution of the Food Program produce yields today, and even larger yields tomorrow.

And the funds that are allocated are truly enormous. In the 11th Five-Year Plan alone, 233 billion rubles' worth of capital investments have to be assimilated in all links of the agroindustrial complex. Furthermore, it is planned to allocate over 13 billion rubles--20 percent more than in the 10th Five-Year Plan--for the development of sectors connected with the initial processing, procurement, and storage of agricultural produce. In 1986-1990 investments in the agroindustrial complex will comprise 33-35 percent, and direct investments in agriculture--27-28 percent, of the total volume of capital investments. In this way 1 ruble out of every 3 invested in the national economy is channeled into the Food Program's implementation.

Financial policy is structured so as to ensure faster development for the machine building sectors and for enterprises and services in the production and social infrastructure of the agroindustrial complex. While capital investments in the agroindustrial complex as a whole will increase approximately 30 percent during the 10-year period, they will more than double in tractor and agricultural machine building and in the manufacture of livestock and feed production equipment, almost triple in machine building for the food industry, more than triple in municipal services, and almost double in road construction. These proportions reflect the concern to eliminate the weak spots in the food production line and raise agricultural production output rates.

The structure of capital investments in agriculture is improving. They will be channeled mainly into increasing soil fertility and establishing a stable feed base for livestock raising and capacities for the initial processing of produce. A considerable part of these resources will go to the construction of warehousing and storage facilities and the reconstruction and expansion of livestock breeding premises and other projects. Large sums are being allocated to the social development of rural areas. In this way, the investment policy pursues the goal of consolidating the decisive sectors of agricultural production, reducing losses, and improving working people's working and living conditions.

The growth of capital investment is giving a powerful impetus to the industry that processes agricultural raw materials. During the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans the sectors of the food, meat and dairy, hulling and milling, and combined feed industries will be technically reequipped. This will correspond with the objective process of constantly increasing the volume of plant

and livestock produce delivered for industrial processing, as well as with the requirements for better correlation between what the fields and farmsteads produce and what industry is capable of turnout into marketable food goods. The processing enterprises will be oriented toward end results--increasing the output of finished products and improving their quality and variety.

The structural changes in capital investments will increase the opportunities for effectively combatting wastage of food. It must be emphasized that this problem is becoming extremely urgent, given the constantly expanding scale of agricultural production. Unfortunately, grain losses are still high at all stages of its production, transportation, and storage. Large quantities of sunflowers, sugar beets, vegetables, potatoes, and fruit are also wasted. The improved storage of produce and the reduction of losses comprise a task of foremost importance. Unless it is resolved, there is no sense in working to increase the output of food goods: the more we produce, the more will be lost.

We are speaking about the size of capital investments and their structure. It must, however, be borne in mind that the colossal funds allocated by the state must be promptly and efficiently assimilated and that the returns on capital must be increased in all links of the economy's food sector. Maximum attention must be given to the prompt commissioning of those agroindustrial complex projects that make it possible to produce the greatest increase in food products output in a brief period of time. This becomes even more necessary as plans for commissioning enterprises for agricultural machine building and the chemical industry, stockraising complexes, mechanized warehouses for the storage of mineral fertilizers, silage installations, combined feed enterprises, and food industry and trade projects are not being completely fulfilled. The party is calling for a resolute change in attitudes to agroindustrial complex construction projects and for them to be considered as national shock work projects.

IV

The satisfaction of the technical requirements of agricultural production--the basic link of the agroindustrial complex--is important not only for increasing the volume of food but also for resolving the largest social task, which consists in gradually eliminating the substantial differences between cities and rural areas, between industrial and agricultural labor. During the coming decade the fixed production capital of the agroindustrial complex will increase considerably and will provide the basis for completing the comprehensive mechanization of arable and livestock farming. The qualitative characteristics of equipment are improving.

The machinery system elaborated by scientific, technical, and other institutions for 1981-1990 and containing over 3,000 items must be the basic guideline in agricultural machine building. This system ensures the comprehensive mechanization of basic and auxiliary work, including transportation and loading and unloading operations, which involve a large proportion of manual labor. About 2,000 types of machine are currently in production. This

determines the scale and development prospects of agricultural machine building. In order to replace manual labor in plant cultivation alone we require the development of 200 new items of machinery. The comprehensive mechanization of stockraising also has acute needs.

The Food Program envisages the accelerated development of production capacities and the manufacture of the necessary quantity of machines for the introduction of soil protection technology. It also envisages the increased output of combined units, heavy-duty disk implements, single-seed drills, sugar beet loaders, and other equipment necessary for the introduction of industrial technologies in the cultivation of sugar beet, corn, potatoes, vegetables, and other agricultural crops. This is a very important trend in scientific and technical progress in both the production and social fields.

Industrial technologies make use of high-yield crops of intensive varieties, ensure the application of optimal doses of mineral fertilizers and herbicides, and do away with the need for mechanical interrow cultivation of crops. They preclude the use of manual labor, and this is an indisputable sign of its industrialization.

Agricultural machine building is becoming the increasingly firm basis for the industrialization of agricultural production. The special resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted last April defines the volume of output and delivery of machines and equipment to agriculture necessary to cover the basic needs of kolkhozes and sovkhozes for highly efficient technology. The emphasis in this work is placed on the preferential increase in the output of machines to be mounted on or hooked to high-powered tractors, as well as of equipment for the introduction of energy-saving production. Economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with CEMA member countries in this sphere is expanding.

It is planned that enterprises of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building will assimilate the production of no fewer than 600 types of new and modernized highly efficient machines, and enterprises of the Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production--no fewer than 300 types. The flow of machines to rural areas will constantly grow, just as in the past. Since the CPSU Central Committee March 1965 Plenum, fixed assets in agriculture have increased fourfold, the availability of power to labor, and mineral fertilizer deliveries have more than tripled, and the area of reclaimed lands has increased 1.7 times.

Nevertheless, the increased opportunities are not always efficiently utilized. Many kolkhozes and sovkhozes experience a shortage of machine operators. The service and storage base is being established slowly, and a large quantity of machines are written off ahead of time. It is, of course, necessary to improve the quality of agricultural machines, Yu. V. Andropov said at the April 1983 conference at the CPSU Central Committee, but it is above all necessary to significantly improve the organization of their exploitation. The decisions taken on questions of developing the base for storage, repairs, and technical servicing are being unsatisfactorily fulfilled at times. This must be corrected, and without delay.

This task is fully attainable under today's conditions, when industrial professions are emerging more and more in rural areas. The machine operator has already become the central figure there. In 1965-1982 the proportion of kolkhoz production workers with specialized training increased from one-third to one-half. Workers representing over 160 professions are working in our villages today. There is no doubt that this process will intensify and the grain grower will have more and more to do with complicated machinery, electricity, chemistry, and agrotechnical and zootechnical sciences and will constantly improve his professional training and cultural standards. This is a reflection of the dynamics of the practical transformation of agricultural labor into a variety of industrial labor.

V

The Food Program sets and indicates the ways to resolve production and social tasks in their unity and interdependence. This unity imbues the development of all sectors of the agroindustrial complex, but it acquires particular significance in agriculture--the main source of food resources. The growth of urban population and the numerical decline in the numbers of rural inhabitants persistently dictate the need to accelerate the processes of the social transformation of rural areas so as to significantly improve the demographic situation there.

It must be noted that major positive changes have occurred in the villages over the last three five-year plans. The character of agricultural labor is being actively transformed, acquiring more and more features of industrial labor. The material well-being of rural workers has increased, in the form of higher wages, higher real incomes for kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers, and improved pension benefits for them. Housing and social amenities construction is taking place on a large scale in rural areas, and the services sphere is being consolidated.

Quite a lot has been done to enhance the prosperity of rural workers, and the achievements are obvious and indisputable. Unresolved problems still remain, however. The CPSU Central Committee May and November 1982 plenums obliged the party, Soviet, economic, and public organizations to give them greater attention. The introduction of new technical and technological systems in agricultural production, the application of industrial technologies in crop cultivation, the servicing of complex machines and equipment on livestock farms and complexes, and much else besides that is linked with the utilization of predominantly intensive factors of agricultural production growth require the necessary numbers of highly qualified workers. And there is a shortage of them in many places.

In order to secure cadres for the rural areas it is necessary to seriously improve the housing conditions and cultural and consumer amenities on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The great attention given to the social needs of the countryside is, of course, not limited only to the needs of production, although they are, indisputably, taken into account. The concern for the fullest solution of social questions reflects the principled basis of party policy, which considers man's interests and the improvement of man's well-being as paramount. This goal is profoundly embodied in the Food Program.

The current decade will see the implementation of a social program that, in its multifaceted nature and scope, will surpass everything that has been done in rural areas until now. It will encompass all aspects of the rural workers' life, including extensive construction of housing and social amenities, measures for the balanced development of the individual, and comprehensive improvements in the services sphere. The scope and goals of the planned works are so great and important and will bring about such major changes that the CPSU Central Committee May 1982 Plenum defined their meaning and significance by the term "social transformation of rural areas." This means a determined, profound, and, it can be said, fundamental transformation of the entire rural way of life. This will be indeed a change in the external appearance of the countryside and in its internal, substantial aspect. But the attractive characteristics, particular features, and traditions of rural life, linked with the closeness to nature and its inimitable and ennobling beauty, will remain untouched and indeed--this is very important--will be enriched.

The principled line of the communist party and the Soviet state in housing and amenity construction in rural areas proceeds from the fact that the nature of rural settlement must correspond with the level attained in the development of production forces. At present many of the country's regions lack such correspondence: the highly collectivized and concentrated production is forced to make do with a highly deconcentrated work force living in small villages. This hinders the further progress of agriculture and prevents unification in the sphere of social services for the inhabitants. Both production and social needs dictate the necessity of constructing major central farmsteads on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, as well as well-appointed housing complexes in units and teams. This kind of settlement helps, on the one hand, better utilization of manpower and improved production management and, on the other, the faster solution of social questions.

In the larger settlements it is economically more advantageous, technically easier, and practically justified to construct consumer services centers, polyclinics, surgeries, hospitals, cultural centers, stadiums, and modern housing with main water supply, sewage system, and central heating, kindergartens, and creches--in one word, the entire complex of consumer services that renders rural life compatible with urban life in terms of amenities. The opposite also applies: this type of construction is simply impossible in farmsteads and small villages consisting of a dozen or so homes. This does not, of course, mean that smaller settlements should not be provided with amenities. Until such time as we manage to fundamentally change the system of rural settlement (and this will take years and years), all the existing opportunities must be utilized to the maximum to meet the social needs of small villages.

The policy of improving rural settlement is embodied in the plans to develop population centers and in regional planning schemes. Such schemes are being developed everywhere and becoming the basis for the distribution of production forces and for improving the system of consumer services and transport communications. Housing designs have been elaborated which take into account the traditions and living conditions of rural workers and satisfy the

requirements of all population groups. These consist mainly of one- or two-story farmstead homes. Unfortunately, in many places the specifics of rural areas are insufficiently taken into account and multistory buildings are designed, resulting in considerable difficulties in running individual subsidiary plots.

The proportion of construction work done under the contract method is being increased so as to accelerate and improve the quality of work in rural areas. In 1990 the construction and other ministries and departments will use this method to construct 75 to 80 percent of rural projects. The USSR Ministry of Rural Construction, the main state contracting organization in villages, will consolidate the material and technical base of its subordinate construction and assembly subdivisions and will be providing for the execution of works worth up to 7 billion rubles a year by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan.

The union republic councils of ministers and the USSR ministries and departments provide for the utilization on average of 15 percent of urban housing construction combine capacities for the construction of housing, schools, and preschool establishments on kolkhozes and sovkhozes when elaborating their five-year and annual plans for capital construction. The union republic councils of ministers have been given the right to channel up to 10 percent of capital investment funds allocated for the construction of nonproduction projects in cities and industrial centers into the construction of housing and cultural and consumer projects on economically weak kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

A total of 160 billion rubles is allocated to the social needs of rural areas in the 1980s. In addition to this, it is envisaged that additional funds for nonproduction construction on kolkhozes and sovkhozes should be sought when drawing up the annual and five-year plan by reallocating their total amount to the benefit of the countryside. All this amounts to an enormous sum, large funds which will make it possible to consistently resolve the task of gradually eliminating the substantial differences between city and countryside. This is the historical significance of all measures aimed at the social transformation of rural areas.

When examining the various aspects of social development in rural areas at the present stage, it is impossible to overlook private subsidiary farming by kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers. It serves as a substantial support in the production of meat, milk, and several other products.

During the 10th Five-Year Plan the subsidiary sectors produced one-third of the meat, milk, and eggs, 30 percent of vegetables, and over 50 percent of the country's total output of potatoes, fruit, and honey. Most of this output is consumed by the producers themselves. Thus, the peasants' subsidiary farms play a significant role in self-sufficiency in food products.

The individual subsidiary farm is more than just a matter of additional tons of meat, milk, potatoes, and vegetables. What is important is that it helps the better utilization of labor resources: pensioners, people with limited working capacity, and adolescents can all work on it. This is a good school

for cultivating labor habits among children, nurturing love for agricultural professions, and enhancing their prestige. Another substantial economic aspect of this type of farming consists in the fact that all possible resources --grasses from unsuitable land and forest meadows--are brought into use, and that food scraps, various plant tops, small potatoes, etc. are used to feed the livestock.

The party and the government encourage the development of individual subsidiary farms. In January 1981 the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On Additional Measures To Increase the Output of Agricultural Produce From the Citizens' Private Subsidiary Farms," which provides for the creation of material and moral conditions that enhance the population's material interest in running subsidiary farms, rearing livestock and poultry, and growing vegetables, fruit, and other produce. This is the party's firm line.

This resolution is aimed mainly at ensuring that the rural subsidiary farms produce more plant and livestock products. At the same time--and it is important to stress this--it consolidates and develops the socialist character of private subsidiary farming, which is a productive form and inseparable part of the social, socialist sector of the economy. Furthermore, it is based on the social sector. This takes the form of free use of land and water and preferential prices for the supply of young animals and poultry, feed, fertilizers, electric power, transport services, various other services, and so on.

The development of private subsidiary farms is an important task for party, soviet, and economic organs. Not everywhere, however, is due attention paid to this matter. Yu. V. Andropov said at the conference of union republic communist party central committee and party kraykom and obkom first secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee: "Local resources for improving food supplies to the population are not being fully utilized in a number of oblasts, krays, and republics. This applies particularly to the potential of the population's private subsidiary farms. There can be no justification for a situation where many people who live in rural areas keep no livestock of their own at all."

Broader assistance on the part of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to private subsidiary farms, the development of contract relations that stipulate both sides' responsibility for the fulfillment of these contracts, the inclusion of products bought from these farms under contracts in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz state sales plans, and other measures promote these farms' integration in the social production sector, ensure the socialist character of their development, and prevent various private ownership malpractices from springing up.

VI

The implementation of the Food Program makes it necessary to further improve the management of the agroindustrial complex. Continually improving management is the fundamental condition for creating a new society.

We are justified in saying that the way to victory leads through good management. Yu. V. Andropov again drew attention to this fact at the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum. He said: "...Ensuring the well-coordinated and uninterrupted functioning of the entire economic machinery--this is both a present-day necessity and a future program task. It is an integral part of the overall process of improving our social system."

After the Central Committee May 1982 Plenum, a great deal of work was done in setting up the new agroindustrial complex management organs and staffing them with highly qualified cadres. As from the beginning of this year, these new management organs exist everywhere and have started functioning. On the whole, the formation of the associations was carried out in an organized fashion. Party, soviet, and economic organs at local levels displayed great interest and responsibility in this important matter. A total of 3,100 rayon agroindustrial associations have been set up; they comprise all kolkhozes and sovkhozes, as well as enterprises and organizations servicing agriculture and connected with the procurement and processing of agricultural products.

Rayon agroindustrial association councils have been set up, with kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz directors forming the majority--54 percent--of these councils' overall membership in the country as a whole. This is of fundamental importance, since it ensures priority for kolkhoz and sovkhoz interests. Enterprise and organizations and institutions related to the countryside are represented on the councils. As a rule, highly qualified specialists with experience in economic and leadership work have been nominated as council chairmen. Out of the total, 72.5 percent are agronomists, animal experts, or veterinary surgeons, 6.3 are economists, 19.1 percent are engineers, and 2.1 percent are other agricultural specialists. More than two-thirds of council chairmen have actually worked in agriculture for more than 10 years. All of them are also first deputy chairmen of rayispolkoms and chiefs of rayon agricultural administrations.

A total of 156 oblast, kray, and autonomous republic agroindustrial associations have been set up, comprising the corresponding agroindustrial complex organizations, subordinate enterprises, and rayon associations. The councils of oblast, kray, and republic (ASSR) agroindustrial associations are headed by first deputy chairmen of oblispolkoms (krayispolkoms) or first deputy chairmen of autonomous republic councils of ministers.

In the process of the formation of the agroindustrial associations more than 3,200 trusts, associations, and other parallel or duplicate organizations have been abolished. As a result administrative staff has been reduced by almost 95,000. Most of the specialists thus released have been sent to work on kolkhozes and sovkhozes or to staff agroindustrial associations.

Work on the selection of cadres for rayon, oblast, and kray agricultural administrations and autonomous republic agriculture ministries, which form the working apparatus of the agroindustrial association councils, has been completed in the main. Here, particular attention is being paid to strengthening the economic services--the subdivisions for planning, accounting, and accountability, and labor and social questions, as well as the procurement, marketing and processing of agricultural products.

We are able to note with satisfaction that many agroindustrial association councils have tackled vigorously the solution of the economic tasks entrusted to them. They are focusing their main attention on questions aimed at ensuring the coordination and smooth functioning of all the association's enterprises and organizations and the fulfillment of plan targets for increased production and purchases of food and agricultural raw materials.

It is becoming indicative of the activity of the new management organs that priority is given to the examination and resolution of problems in enhancing the efficiency of the utilization of capital investments, material and technical, and financial and labor resources, and in deepening intersector ties. Concrete measures are being adopted to expand the network of procurement and processing centers and arrange the collection of products directly on farms.

Many rayon associations, in an effort to ensure the even development of agro-industrial complex sectors, are setting up centralized capital stocks and trying to reduce the cost of work carried out on kolkhozes and sovkhozes by service enterprises and organizations. The association councils are paying special attention to developing the economies of loss-making and low-profit kolkhozes and sovkhozes, introducing progressive forms of labor organization and incentives, and strengthening discipline and financial autonomy. Much is being done to tackle social questions in rural areas.

Under the associations, the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agroindustrial complex enterprises and organizations have begun to operate under a unified system, governed by the interests of the most important, decisive production sectors and are coping more promptly with day-to-day matters. Thus, for instance, this year preparations for the spring were carried out better, field work was carried out in a more organized fashion, feed procurement and harvest work are progressing more successfully, and associations and their councils are beginning to affect the development of the agrarian sector favorably. Livestock numbers and productivity increased in the first 6 months of this year. In comparison with the corresponding period of 1982 livestock and poultry purchases increased by 8 percent, milk by 13 percent, and eggs by 4 percent. Thus, the first steps in the associations' activity prove convincingly the correctness and timeliness of the measures adopted by the party to improve the management of agriculture and of the whole agroindustrial complex.

An important role in the improvement of management is to be played by the USSR Council of Ministers resolution, adopted in June 1983, on planning, economic incentives, and material and technical supply procedures in the system of the country's agroindustrial complex. It aims at ensuring that the activity of all ministries and departments that are part of the agroindustrial complex is planned as a single whole with the active participation of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and agroindustrial associations.

Provision is made for the corresponding union and republic organs to pass on the control figures for the development of the agroindustrial complex to agricultural, industrial, and other enterprises and organizations, bearing in mind that at all levels of planning control figures relating to capital investment limits, delivery volumes for mineral fertilizers, agricultural

machinery, and other indicators must be passed on simultaneously with targets with the volumes of agricultural product purchase and industrial goods output. In this way production targets are balanced against material resources.

The plans for material and technical supply to kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agroindustrial complex organizations will become an integral part of the ministry, department, and union republic five-year and annual plans and will be based on farm requests which have been examined by the agroindustrial associations beforehand. This procedure will contribute to the timely and full satisfaction of farms' needs in terms of material and technical facilities.

It follows that important preconditions for the associations' successful work are being created. However, in a number of places the restructuring is taking an unreasonably long time, and infringements of the established procedure for forming and staffing agroindustrial associations and their councils are being tolerated.

Some rayon agroindustrial associations do not include enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and the USSR Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry. At the same time there are cases in which organizations having nothing to do with the agroindustrial complex have been included in the associations. In certain rayons the stipulation that kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz directors should form the majority in the association council has not been met.

Substantial shortcomings exist in the structure and staffing of rayon agriculture administrations. In a number of rayons their structure remains virtually unchanged and preference continues to be given to technical subdivisions, while attention to strengthening economic services is poor. In Voronezh Oblast, for instance, no provision has been made in the rayon administrations for important sections such as planning and intersector ties. There are many vacant posts, particularly in the subdivisions that are supposed to deal with intersector ties, procurement and marketing of products, and the organization of economic relations among partners in the agroindustrial association.

Practical experience shows that by no means all the associations are developing their work in the spirit of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee May and November 1982 and April 1983 plenums and the conference of union republic communist party central committee and party kraykom and obkom first secretaries at the CPSU Central Committee. Many associations have not explained clearly enough the essence of the restructuring that is taking place or the rights and obligations of the new management organs. In the work of the agroindustrial association councils quite often the proper initiative and efficiency are not displayed, and passiveness and the tendency to wait for orders from above are manifested. A number of councils duplicate the work of the agriculture administrations, attend mainly to day-to-day affairs, spend much time listening to reports by sovkhoz and kolkhoz leaders and specialists, intervene in the solution of questions outside their sphere of competence, and send a great number of recommendations and instructions of all kinds to farms without there being any particular need for them. Meanwhile little attention is paid to fundamental problems in the development of the

agrarian sector, to the elimination of loss-making and promotion of profit-making in agricultural production, to the improvement of economic relations and better coordination of the activity of all the components of the agro-industrial complex.

The CPSU Central Committee, as is known, drew the attention of local party and soviet organs to the need, from the very beginning of the functioning of the agroindustrial association councils, to help them choose the correct direction in their activity and to ensure that the new organs in rural areas pick up momentum as quickly as possible and tackle the solution of tasks entrusted to them in businesslike fashion. However, this demand is by no means being met everywhere. Many party raykoms and rayispolkoms are slow in monitoring the activity of the economic organs and kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders and specialists, they continue to take on the solution of diverse economic questions in place of the agroindustrial association councils.

It is obvious that the organization of the new system of management--along-side indubitable achievements--also has considerable shortcomings. The agroindustrial associations are taking their first steps, and workers in the countryside are convinced that they are steps in the right direction, that the associations will gain momentum with each day and organize the harmonious joint work of all the agroindustrial complex components to obtain the biggest possible amount of high-quality products.

The new system of management is tackling and will resolve the task it is faced with. But it needs the help of both soviet and party organs. Party committees are called on to intensify organizational and political work directly in the labor collectives of the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agro-industrial association enterprises. The main attention of the CPSU raykom agricultural sections that have been newly set up everywhere, and of the primary party organizations, must be focused on strengthening party, state, and labor discipline and on enhancing the personal responsibility of leaders, specialists, and all workers in the agroindustrial complex for the fulfillment of plan targets for increasing the production and purchases of food and agricultural raw materials. An important task of theirs is stepping up work on selecting, placing, and training leading cadres, in particular in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, regarding this matter as their paramount duty.

Yu. V. Andropov noted in this context at the April conference at the CPSU Central Committee. "Under present conditions particular importance is attached to the question of work with leading cadres on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The complex tasks facing agriculture, increasing utilization of the achievements of science and technology, and the changeover to progressive forms of organizing work payment make high, and in many ways new, demands on leading cadres. It is necessary to take care that they constantly widen their horizon and increase their specialized knowledge. The party must firmly hold the reins of work with cadres."

The communists and all Soviet people are working intensively on the implementation of the USSR Food Program. The party's Central Committee is paying the closest attention to this most important matter. Questions relating to the

implementation of the Food Program are being discussed at practically every session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo or Secretariat. Close monitoring of the implementation of the Food Program has been organized and represents one of the decisive factors in promoting the success of this most important cause of the whole people.

The Food Program calls for maximum contributions from every union republic, kray, oblast, and rayon, as well as from virtually all sectors of the economy, and from urban and rural labor collectives. It represents a fundamental shift toward addressing the needs of agriculture and of the entire agroindustrial complex. Acting as a catalytic agent in economic development, as it were, the Food Program will secure the attainment of important political and social goals. It serves the further enhancement of the people's welfare, the strengthening of our country's might, and the still greater consolidation of the Soviet society's sociopolitical unity. Its successful implementation will open up new opportunities for conducting an active peace-loving foreign policy and stepping up the struggle against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and for international security.

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CSO: 1802/1

COLLECTIVE CONTRACT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 47-57

[Article by A. Iyevlev, USSR deputy minister of agriculture]

[Text] The agricultural workers must work a great deal in order successfully to resolve the comprehensive problems included in the Food Program. Above all, they must improve the efficiency of the already developed extensive production-economic potential and find means for the more efficient utilization of capital investments and material and technical facilities channeled into agriculture, the volumes of which are increasing with every passing year. Each farm must be managed on a scientific basis. This presumes the mandatory application of regional farming systems which improve land fertility and the extensive practical utilization of the achievements of agricultural science and progressive practical experience. It is also a question of improving production management and manpower utilization.

Each of these trends is exceptionally important. Nevertheless, we believe that production management and the organization and material incentive of the performers are just about the most important in enhancing the efficiency of the agrarian sector of the economy at its present development stage. New equipment, increased capital investments and greater deliveries of chemical fertilizers and other material and technical facilities can yield expected results only if paralleled by a high level of production organization, the conscientious and initiative-minded efforts of the rural workers, their high professional skill and organization and direct material interest in end results.

I

In recent years party, soviet and agricultural organs, primary party organizations and farm managers and specialists in many parts of the country have conducted an active search for new and more progressive forms of labor organization and wages. Their single objective was to enhance the labor and creative activeness of agricultural workers, eliminate anonymity in the use of the land and other productive capital, substantially strengthen labor and technological discipline, closely link the individual interests of the rural worker with those of the collective and society at large and achieve a significant production increase while lowering outlays per unit of output.

This long effort was successful. Practical experience proved that the collective contract is the most efficient form of labor organization and

wages in agriculture. Brigades and links operating on the basis of a contract reach, as a rule, from 10 to 30 percent higher output per unit area and achieve high labor productivity and a considerable lowering of outlays per unit of output. Last year about 55,000 brigades, units and links worked on the basis of contracts. Many of them have done so for more than 10 to 15 years. Such collectives may be found in all union republics and natural-climatic zones in the country.

The collective contract system became widespread and developed highly efficiently above all wherever both economic and party organizations paid steady attention to this type of labor organization and wages. Let us take Belgorod Oblast as an example. In 1980 the Belgorod party obkom bureau thoroughly considered the experience of contracting mechanized link at the Kolkhoz imeni Frunze, Belgorodskiy Rayon, headed by the experienced mechanizer A. N. Kolesnik. Convinced of the high efficiency of the contracting labor organization method, the obkom party bureau drew to this problem the attention of the oblast party organizations. Whereas during the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan 54 links worked on a contract basis in Belgorod Oblast, their number rose to 414 in 1981 and 550 in 1982. The cost-effective links and brigades working on a contract basis were assigned one-third of the plowland. Clearly, it was no accident that Belgorod has the best indicators among the oblasts in the Central Chernozem Zone.

Let us also refer to the experience of the Glazunovskiy Rayon party committee, Orel Oblast. Starting with the autumn of 1980, on the initiative of T. N. Konovalova, the rayon's first party secretary, literally the entire rayon party organization undertook thorough preparation for the application of the collective contract method. A regulation and a standard contract were drafted. Extensive explanatory work was conducted among mechanizers. Seminars were held for heads of farms, specialists, brigade and link leaders and primary party organization secretaries. On the basis of the principle of voluntary participation in the formation of brigades and links, the party raykom and the primary party organizations saw to it that they included party members. Whenever possible, party or party-Komsomol groups were set up in these collectives and party organizers were named. All rayon farms converted to the new form of organization and wages in 1981.

Although no more than 2 years have passed since the new method was adopted, some of its results can already be summed up. For the past 2 years Glazunovskiy Rayon has placed first in the oblast competition for the sale of grain and sugar beets to the state. Many farms, whose managers previously complained of manpower shortages, are now refusing to hire workers from the outside and manage with their own forces. The attitude of the mechanizers toward the land has changed noticeably and their feeling of responsibility for end results has become stronger. In 1982, compared with the average annual indicators for the 10th Five-Year Plan, the grain crop here increased by 3.8 quintals and sugar beets by 48 quintals per hectare; the other work indicators improved as well. "The main result is that the fields acquired real owners," was T. N. Konovalova's assessment of the results of the application of the brigade contract method.

Uzbekistan is another example. The successes achieved by the republic's cotton growers are known throughout the country. During the 10th Five-Year Plan they averaged sales to the state of 809,000 tons of cotton more than during the 9th. In the first 2 years of the current five-year plan, despite difficult weather conditions, the production of the "white gold" in the republic increased by an annual average of 307,000 tons. This success is largely explained by the extensive application of collective forms of labor organization and wages. Five or six years ago the collective contract in Uzbek cotton growing was practiced only by individual links and brigades, whereas thousands applied it in 1982. Such brigades accounted for 42 percent of the overall number of intrafarm subunits. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Namangan Oblast were the first extensively to apply collective forms of labor organization and wages. Here as well, it was the party organizations, the oblast party committee above all, which took the initiative.

The experience of Nikolayev, Kherson, Cherkassy, Gomel and Rostov oblasts, Krasnodar Kray and many rayons in the country confirms the high efficiency of the collective contract and the great attention which the party organizations pay to it. The collective contract has become firmly established in agriculture and the number of its supporters is increasing with every passing year.

Last March the CPSU Central Committee Politburo approved the experience of the country's kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the application of collective forms of labor organization and wages and instructed the party, soviet and agricultural organs to intensify their organizational work for the application of the collective contract in agricultural production.

An all-union conference was held in Belgorod at which the results of the many years of practical use of the collective contract were summed up. The report submitted by M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, and the statements from the various areas convincingly proved, with the help of live and vivid examples, the high economic efficiency of the collective methods of labor organization and wages. Their tremendous educational importance and influence on taking an active life stance in every working person were noted.

The members of brigades and links working on a contract basis develop as collectivists. Relations of comradeship and mutual aid are established. Reciprocal respect and principle-mindedness in assessing individual work are displayed. The member of the collective enhances his professional skill and develops a stronger feeling of ownership of his kolkhoz or sovkhoz and his country. The collective forms of labor organization and wages help the people to become more fully aware of their duty to the homeland and teach them how to think like statesmen and to work honestly and with total dedication.

The general conclusion arrived at at the Belgorod conference may be formulated as follows: the period of experimental testing of the collective contract has ended and the time for its extensive application and further improvement has come. The possibility of turning the collective contract method into the predominating form of organization of production, labor and wages by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan is entirely realistic. We should bear in mind

that the application of the collective contract on a broad scale will require extensive daily organizational, mass-explanatory and economic work which must be done on the basis of acquired practical experience in order to prevent a repetition of errors committed in previous years, which, unfortunately, were numerous.

Today the collective contract is the most advanced form of organization of production, labor and wages. It presumes permanent labor collectives (brigades, units, links) to which productive capital (land, equipment, productive capital and others) has been assigned on a long-term basis, granting brigades and links operative-economic autonomy, collective wages based on end results, distribution of total earnings within the collective on the basis of the actual contribution of the individual to end results, common material interest in lowering contractually stipulated production outlays, material liability for their overrun and strict cost-effective relations among intrafarm sub-units.

The main feature which distinguishes the collective contract from other forms of labor organization is the direct and total dependence of the collective's wage on the quantity and quality of the output. It is not the volume of work completed but the end result and it alone, nothing else, which determines the size of the earnings of the collective as a whole and the individual worker.

As was already noted, the application of the collective contract demands of farm managers and specialists efficiently organized preparatory work. Technological charts must be drawn up for each crop within the crop rotation system. The optimal size of brigades and links must be defined. The equipment must be efficiently allocated among intrafarm subunits. Initial data for the conversion of brigades to an intracost-effective system must be prepared. Stable ratings per unit of output must be computed and several alternatives for the distribution of the joint earnings must be provided on the basis of existing experience, to be offered to labor collectives converting to the contract method.

II

Practical experience convincingly proves that the success of brigades and links operating on the basis of a collective contract depends above all on the properly structured distribution relations. On the surface everything seems simple: the work of the collective is assessed on the basis of end results and the quantity and quality of the output determines the amount of the wages paid to the collective. Therefore, the more the collective produces the more it will earn. This wage principle is generally easy to understand.

However, a number of problems arise in its practical implementation, which require a thorough study and profoundly thought-out solutions. It was this aspect which was pointed out by most of the brigade and link leaders and farm managers at the all-union Belgorod conference, on the basis of their long years of experience in labor organization based on the collective contract. Their remarks must not be ignored.

Unfortunately, we still find in practical work frequent cases of simplistic noneconomic approaches. Some farms try to build distribution relations on a purely arbitrary basis, not burdening themselves with economic computations or taking into consideration the labor contribution of individual brigade (link) members in achieving end results or the opinion of the collective itself. As a rule, in such farms the first year of work of a brigade or link under collective contract conditions is also the last. Everything goes back where it started, i.e., to the morally obsolete incentive methods and wages based on the volume of work done. There is nothing astounding in this, for the collective contract system was not laid on a solid foundation and was doomed to failure from the beginning as a result of arbitrary administrative decisions made in the field of distribution relations.

The advantage of the collective contract is that it combines the common interest of all brigade (link, unit) members in high end labor results with the material interest of the individual worker in increasing his personal contribution to such results. In other words, the collective contract is the systematic implementation of the basic socialist principle "From each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." In his article "Karl Marx's Theory and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, pointed out that "work and work alone, its real results, rather than anyone's subjective wish or good will, should determine the level of well-being of the individual citizen."

This means that the distribution of collective earnings under contract conditions should be based on the precise determination of the actual contribution of the individual worker in achieving collective end results. What should be the criterion determining this actual contribution? Previously, it was the indicator of the volume of work done which, however, was rejected by reality. In agriculture, more than anywhere else, performing a certain amount of work is insufficient in terms of producing something. Such work must also be done within optimal periods, on a high-quality level and in accordance with specific weather conditions. Here a comprehensive assessment of the work is mandatory.

Many farms in our country, with long years of experience in organizing production on the basis of the collective contract, make extensive use of the labor participation coefficient (KTU) in such assessments. It is precisely with the help of KTU that the individual differences among workers are established and a comprehensive evaluation of the labor contribution of the individual member of the collective in overall end results is provided.

The Kolkhoz imeni Shchors in Chernobayevskiy Rayon, Cherkassy Oblast, has acquired interesting experience in this area. Two mechanizer brigades in the farm have been operating on a contract basis since 1976. The brigades are large. Each one has its field and feed crop rotation systems. In order to ensure the just distribution of collective earnings, the kolkhoz specialists developed a method for computing the KTU, which was approved by the collectives of both brigades and passed by the board. It is as follows: the base coefficient of the labor participation of the individual mechanizer is the

unit. The KTU is increased or lowered depending on the class and group of serviced equipment, complexity of the work, combination of skills and several other indicators. Thus, 0.2 is added to the base coefficient of first-grade mechanizers and 0.1 to second-grade mechanizers; it is raised by 0.05-0.15 for mechanizers operating caterpillar or power-saturated tractors; depending on the complexity of the work, based on the average grade for the year, the KTU is amended within a range of -0.1 to +0.25; up to 0.2 is added for the combination of skills; based on the percentage of fulfillment of the shift output norm on an annual average, the KTU may be lowered or increased from -0.1 to +0.2. Furthermore the brigade council has the right to correct the estimated KTU by increasing or reducing it within a 10 percent range. Each mechanizer has a quality stub in which the kolkhoz chairman and the chief specialists enter proper remarks on work quality which also may change the KTU.

The thus-established coefficient plus the amount of time worked make it possible to determine quite accurately the actual contribution of the individual mechanizer to end results and, on this basis, allocate wages, in cash and in kind. In the view of the kolkhoz's specialists, this procedure ensures the interest of the mechanizers in upgrading their professional training, mastering more power-saturated tractors and complex and skilled operations, combining work with different types of tractors and combines, achieving higher quality, strictly observing labor discipline and actively participating in production management.

Practical experience knows of other variants of distributing end results and determining the advance wages paid to members of collectives operating on a contract basis. For example, in a number of Belgorod Oblast farms hourly wage advances are based on grade. Furthermore, a correcting coefficient is applied to hourly wage advances for work with toxic chemicals and ammonia and operating combines at harvest time.

A number of farms distribute collective earnings only on the basis of the length of time worked. For example, two links work on a collective contract basis at the Mir Kolkhoz, Torzhokskiy Rayon, Kalinin Oblast. The individual members of the link are issued an equal hourly advance for the workday while the full wage is allocated on the basis of annual results and the amount of the advance. Clearly, this distribution principle is possible in small sub-units staffed by people with equal skills, who can replace one another whenever necessary and are equally conscientious in doing their work.

Regardless of the various methods used in computing advance payments and settling final accounts, there are demands the observance of which is equally mandatory for all forms of brigade contracting. Above all, the principle governing the allocation of collective earnings must be approved by the collective itself. This is its exclusive right. Equally necessary is a strict consideration of the real contribution of the individual to the common results. It is only under such circumstances that stability and high efficiency can be achieved in the work of brigades, units and links operating on a contractual basis. The effectiveness of the method greatly depends on the size of the advance, particularly in crop growing collectives. Here, as we

know, the work and the production periods do not coincide and the labor results are shown once a year--at harvest time. Practical experience indicates that the collective contract method is most effective wherever no more than 65 percent of the computed wage fund for output is paid, while the balance (35 percent or more) is received in the final settlement of accounts. Conversely, wherever advances are excessively high and the amounts paid on the basis of annual results are minute, the workers' interest in end results drops sharply. As we know, the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum approved measures aimed at enhancing the material interest of brigades and links working on a collective contract basis. Farm managers have now been given the right to set up stable rates for contract brigade and link members for a period of up to 5 years and to raise the wage rate by as much as 150 percent, depending on the farm crop level or cattle and poultry productivity. Furthermore, now sovkhoz and kolkhoz managers have been given the right to combine the funds stipulated in current wage regulations, including additional payments for output and high work quality and bonuses and set graded wage rates per unit of output.

In accordance with the decisions of the May Plenum, as we may see, radical changes have been made in the material incentive system. They affect both methods for computing earnings and their level. It is particularly important under such circumstances to achieve on the basis of increasing material incentive the type of increased output which would unquestionably ensure the faster growth of labor productivity. In no case should we allow wages to increase faster than the growth of labor productivity.

This is worth bearing in mind, for some managers and specialists in local agricultural organs, sovkhozes and kolkhozes believe that increasing wages is just about the main prerequisite for the use of the contract method. This could hardly be described as something other than a case of dependence.

If we think of the interests of the state, the use of the collective contract must be accompanied by measures for the efficient utilization of the wage fund. They must include a reduction of unproductive working time outlays to a minimum, the application of progressive production norms, the elimination of figure padding, which frequently occurred in the past, the mechanization of production processes in all intrafarm subunits and releasing unnecessary workers, reducing the administrative apparatus, and so on. Today the wage fund based on above-plan output is computed in accordance with the 0.8 norm coefficient. Under these circumstances, problems of additionally increasing this fund with the application of the collective contract virtually disappear in the case of many farms.

It may happen that farm managers, while converting brigades and links to a collective contract method, continue to give material incentives during the year to individual workers for quality work and timely performance of the work, motivating this by citing the need to enhance labor activeness during the most stressed and important work periods. As a rule, such practices do not yield desired results. On the contrary, they harm the interests of the brigade as a whole, hinder the increased cohesion of the collective and frequently demoralize its ranks.

III

The collective contract is most effective and enables us to make fuller use of the potential of the brigade organization of labor providing that internal cost-accounting is applied at the same time. This is entirely natural, for the main purpose of internal cost accounting is the same as that of the collective contract--to ensure maximal output with lowest possible outlays. Like the collective contract, cost-accounting calls for establishing a direct correlation between wages and end labor results. Furthermore, intrafarm accounting adds material interest to the responsibility of the collective. It calls for correlating results with production outlays. Internal cost-accounting is one of the decisive factors in increasing the volume of output and reducing production costs and enhancing the efficiency of agricultural output.

For more than 10 years the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin, Berdyanskiy Rayon in Zaporozhe Oblast, has made active use of the contracting method of labor organization and internal cost-accounting.

The five contracting brigades in the kolkhoz have been converted to internal cost-accounting. The kolkhoz board issues each labor collective its plan indicators: assignment on gross output in kind and value, wage fund, rates per unit of output, outlay norms for technical servicing and repairs of tractors and agricultural machinery, outlays for fuels and lubricants, and ceilings on other outlays the size of which can be really influenced by the collective.

Estimated prices of products, work and services exchanged among economic subunits play an important role in the internal cost-accounting system at the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin. A checking system for settling accounts has been introduced, the task of which is objectively to reflect the work of the collectives, take into consideration all production outlays and enable the kolkhoz board to compare the actual level of outlays of each brigade with the stipulated norm or plan indicators. The recomputation is based on the economic analysis and comparison between actual and planned outlays. Thus, for example, last year the third kolkhoz brigade saved 6,969 rubles compared with planned outlays, 1,392 rubles of which were distributed among the collective.

The actual rather than formal internal cost-accounting was not the least important factor which enabled the kolkhoz to reach higher production indicators compared with the other rayon farms operating on the basis of equal natural and economic conditions. Thus, during the 10th Five-Year Plan the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin increased its agricultural output by 16 percent, while the rayon as a whole by 7.1 percent only. The farm's gross income increased by 13.2 percent while that of the rayon farms at large by 1.7 percent only; the net income earned by the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin increased by 8 percent, whereas it declined by 12.3 percent among its neighbors which had not applied the collective contract and internal cost-accounting. A number of similar examples may be cited throughout the country.

- ✓ Under the conditions of the collective contract, based on internal cost-accounting, a stricter regimen of savings is ensured and the work of the collective is assessed more accurately and without errors. On the level of the primary collectives cost-accounting is an efficient instrument in harnessing the creative initiative of the workers and involving them in active efforts in reaching high agricultural production indicators.
- ✓ The cost-accounting brigades, units and links working on a collective contract basis must be granted certain operational-economic autonomy. We must factually ensure the active participation of the primary labor collective in production management. This interpretation of the problem is based on the very nature of our socialist system. Creative activeness, initiative and the labor enthusiasm of millions of people are characteristic of socialism. The party's course of further agricultural intensification and enhanced efficiency requires the identification and utilization of all reserves and possibilities in each farm, in each labor collective and at each individual workplace. However experienced a kolkhoz chairman or sovkhoz director may be, he cannot be aware of all reserves. High production efficiency can be guaranteed only by systematically combining the knowledge and experience of managers and farm specialists with the experience and initiative of the primary labor collectives.

Reality has convincingly proved that wherever a labor collective becomes involved in production management the people display their full capabilities, initiative and quickness of mind, and actively struggle for the implementation of plans and assignments.

The production subunit councils, which are created in large contracting brigades and units, play a great role in exercising the right to participate in production management, as confirmed by practical experience. The councils are elected by the members of the collective through open vote and consist of the most prestigious and highly skilled workers who are fully accountable to their collectives.

For example, the council of the mechanizers brigade at the Pobeda Kolkhoz, Berezanskiy Rayon, Nikolayev Oblast, headed by L. Ya. Shlemin, has gained positive experience. Here the brigade council resolves all problems of relations with the kolkhoz board. It systematically provides a detailed analysis on the way the brigade is implementing its production program and finds additional reserves. The council determines for each separate mechanizer the amount of advance wages for the past month on the basis of his real contribution. It makes decisions on awards and penalties, on dismissal from the brigade or acceptance of new members. It approves the leave schedule and organizes the use of free days based on a sliding schedule. The council actively supports the good traditions developed in the collective: it organizes collective recreation during free days, uses the force of the entire brigade to help those who have begun to build a new house or outbuildings, and so on. In the final account, it is all of this that has made possible the success of the collective. The brigade works rhythmically, without rushing. It is distinguished by its high labor and technological discipline. In 1982 its harvest was higher than the rayon's average as follows: grain crops, by 4.9

quintals per hectare; leguminous, 6.3; sunflower, 2.3; and corn, 8 quintals of grain per hectare.

Naturally, as a rule no council is elected in production subunits operating on a contract basis whose size does not exceed 10 persons; instead, a link or brigade leader is nominated. This nomination, however, does not mean in the least that the role of the entire collective in managing labor processes has been reduced. The power of the collective contract lies precisely in the fact that, while actively participating in production and management, the individual working person becomes more clearly aware of the usefulness of his efforts. He feels his involvement with the affairs and plans of his kolkhoz and sovkhoz and the state at large.

The activeness of brigade and link collectives operating on a contract basis is greatly determined by the attitude of the managers and chief farm specialists toward it. It is important not to harass the collectives needlessly or exercise petty supervision. Greater trust must be shown in them and the executive functions of the link or brigade leader should not be interfered with unnecessarily; administrative measures should not take the place of the educational role of the collective. In such cases, both managers and specialists would gain greater opportunities of concentrating their efforts on resolving long-term farm development problems, improving intrafarm production planning, organizing a more efficient interaction among intrafarm production subunits, and so on. This approach alone can upgrade the creative activeness of labor collectives and their responsibility for end results.

IV

Practical experience indicates that the efficiency of the work of contracting collectives is largely determined by the level of its organization.

In undertaking the use of the collective contract, the farms must above all resolve the question of the size of brigades and links. In this case the substantiated recommendations of agrarian scientists would be quite pertinent. Unfortunately, however, so far they have failed to provide practical methods which, in each specific case, would make it possible to determine the optimal size of farm subunits.

In recent years a number of articles have appeared in the press on the brigade contracting method. What is striking is that some authors unconditionally support only small contracting brigades and links numbering 10 to 12 members at best. No question, the smaller the collective the simpler becomes the solution of all problems related to its activities and internal interrelationships. We must not forget, however, that the country has thousands of farms, not hundreds but thousands, which use the nine- and tenfold crop rotation systems, covering large fields intensively cultivated. On such farms a brigade consisting of 10 to 12 members would be unable to cope with the required fieldwork. The breakdown of crop rotation systems would mean falling behind scientific and technical progress. Furthermore, if the land is not assigned to a labor collective on a long-term basis, any discussion on developing a feeling of ownership of the land among the working people would

be useless. That is why, we believe, it would be an error to recommend for all farms throughout the country only small contracting brigades and links. No stereotypes should be used in this case.

Existing practical experience as well opposes such stereotypes. For example, in Nikolayev Oblast, the number of mechanizers in contracting brigades and links ranges from 17-20 or more people. Many such brigades and links have been at work for a number of years, successfully at that. Thus, the mechanized unit headed by V. M. Makhno, at the Kommunist Kolkhoz, Bashtanskiy Rayon, which numbers 21 mechanizers, has successfully practiced the contracting method for some 50 years. In the last 10 years grain crops have averaged some 30 quintals per hectare. Direct outlays per unit of output in this unit have remained unchanged or have been increased insignificantly for a number of crops contrary to an overall trend of increase throughout the country (as a result of increased wages and more expensive industrial services). During the 10th Five-Year Plan the unit's average annual labor productivity increased by a factor of 2.3 compared with the 8th, while average monthly wages increased by a factor of 1.7.

We already described the experience of the Kolkhoz imeni Shchors in Chernobayevskiy Rayon, Cherkassy Oblast. Let us point out that here the brigades which have worked on a contract basis since 1976 are even larger than in Nikolayev Oblast. It is true that each brigade has had to free from work the brigade leader and the tallyman, the wages of whom are also directly related to end results. The brigade collectives work in harmony and have achieved great successes. They are not concerned by their large membership. On the contrary, the farm believes that large mechanized brigades offer certain advantages: on the one hand, they could include specialized links; on the other, they offer favorable conditions for the better utilization of power-saturated tractors operating at high speed and using wide-span attachments, for the use of the large-group equipment utilization method, and so on.

However, the farms in Belgorod, Novosibirsk, Kalinin and many other oblasts have a large number of small links operating on a contract basis, raising one or two crops. The study of their experience indicates that they too have achieved good results.

What conclusion could be drawn from such practical experience? Above all, the numerical size of contract brigades and links must be based not on wishes or advice but on precise computations based on the production structure, planned volumes at work, optimal deadlines, availability of labor resources, their professional composition and experience, and a normal working and resting regimen. We must mandatorily take into consideration the wishes of the working people themselves, the farm traditional and other sociopsychological factors. Therefore, as the most advanced form of intrafarm production relations, the collective contract method requires comprehensive economic substantiation and an optimal solution consistent with specific production conditions. This approach to the organization of primary labor collectives alone could be successful.

Such success is also largely determined by the proper choice of brigade or link leader. Obviously, it is unnecessary to prove in detail the fact that

this must be a highly skilled person, exigent toward himself and his comrades, responsive to people and enjoying a good reputation. This must be an acknowledged rather than formal leader, as the sociologists say, whom everyone will obey on the basis of respect rather than coercion.

Let us cite an example at confirmation of this simple thought. At the end of 1980 Hero of Socialist Labor Ye. A. Yakovlev, who had already acquired great experience in managing a nonassignment link in the Experimental-Production Farm imeni V. I. Lenin of the All-Union Scientific Research Flax Institute, joined the Mir Kolkhoz, Torzhokskiy Rayon, Kalinin Oblast. Immediately afterwards two contract mechanized links were set up at the kolkhoz, and he was appointed the head of one of them. The young mechanizers saw in their link leader not only a master of his work but a good instructor. They trusted him and, under his guidance, energetically joined the struggle for the harvest. The year 1981 was difficult. However, with persistence and stubborn efforts, the collective headed by this experienced mechanizer surmounted all difficulties. It fulfilled its obligations and averaged 7.5 quintals of flax, 170 quintals of potatoes and 39 quintals of perennial grass per hectare. The link's harvest was double that of the average for the rayon. The collective harvested a good crop in 1982 as well. Unquestionably, the fact that a highly skilled worker was appointed to a managerial position and who, both officially and truly became its leader, had a tremendous impact on the enhancement of the collective's labor activeness.

However, it sometimes also happens that a person is made brigade or link leader not because of his practical qualities but based on the principle that "he will bring order." As a rule, however, nothing comes out of such managers. It becomes clear quite soon that neither order has brought in the collective nor is production increasing.

The experience of the work of contract brigades and links in previous years has confirmed that, as a rule, the most efficient are collectives in which any one member could carry out any technological operation and where total interchangeability is possible. This is no accident. Technological facilities in kolkhozes and sovkhozes are growing both quantitatively and qualitatively. New equipment is delivered to the farms and industrial technologies are becoming widespread. They can yield high economic results only if brigade and link personnel have mastered such equipment and the new technology and economic foundations to perfection.

That is why it is so important to organize in rayon agroindustrial associations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes the training and upgrading the skill of cadres in mass professions through the extensive use of the various ways and means of training such as tutorship, worker certification, reciprocal exchange of practical experience and courses based on special programs. The local press and radio must promote the contract system. In terms of professional training our cadres must become grain and beet growers and animal husbandrymen, rather than simply operators of one type of machine or another.

Available experience enables us also to organize the training of kolkhoz and sovkhoz managerial cadres. Such training is exceptionally important and

necessary. The point is that the application of the collective contract method requires a radical restructuring of all intrafarm organizational-economic relations. Intrafarm planning must be raised higher. It must rest on precise computations based on technological charts for amounts of agricultural operations and optimal deadlines. A more efficient formulation of relations among intrafarm subunits, improved labor norming and accounting and analysis of economic activities, and so on, would be necessary as well. Adding to all of this the fact that sociopsychological factors must be taken into consideration in the establishment of contracting collectives, the strict requirements which this faces leading cadres becomes clear.

Their training will be the more profitable the greater the attention paid to its organization by the local agricultural organs and comprehensively recently established agroindustrial associations.

In the course of such training each manager and specialist must suitably master the principles of the organization of labor collectives on a contractual basis and their management. He must master the system of distribution relations, learn how to make extensive use of internal cost-accounting in production organization, gain a clear idea on the expediency of the forms of participation of labor collectives in production management, and so on. We can only welcome the initiative of rayons where progressive experience courses are organized in one of its farms. Properly organized cadre training is a prerequisite for the successful application for the collective contract method in production.

The farm season is currently at its peak in the fields and livestock farms. The autumn not only crowns the work of the grain growers but marks the beginning of the struggle for the harvest and high livestock productivity the following year. This is the most suitable time for completing preparatory works and undertaking the extensive application of the collective contract system. No funds or capital investments are required to this purpose. All that is needed is an attentive and thoughtful approach to the organization of this most important work on the part of the agricultural organs and farm managers and specialists, along with painstaking organizational and political work on the part of party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations.

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CSO: 1802/1

ANTICOLONIALISM'S DIFFICULT ROAD

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 58-62

[Article by R. Mosebitse]

[Text] In the past 20 years of activities the Communist Party of Lesotho has covered the difficult path of struggle for national independence and its strengthening, democracy and social progress.

The imperialist colonial system entered a period of total breakdown on the African continent at the turn of the 1960s. In 1960 alone, which has entered the history of the liberation movement as the "Year of Africa," 17 countries gained political independence. This contributed to the further upsurge of the national liberation movement in the southern edge of the continent, in the Union of South Africa, where a considerable percentage of the Lesotho able-bodied population worked in mines, factories and farms. At that time, the authorities, frightened by the growth of the struggle, banned the activities of the African National Congress and many of its activists were forced to emigrate to neighboring countries, including the British colony of Basutoland (today Lesotho).

All of this influenced the growth of political awareness on the part of the broad masses in Basutoland itself.

A wave of strikes spread over workers and students in Basutoland in 1960-1961, which reached its apogee in March 1961, with a general strike which paralyzed the city of Maseru, the country's administrative center. The strikers raised not only economic but political demands. They demanded higher wages, a democratic education system and, above all, immediate independence. The movement for the liberation from the British colonial yoke, under the slogan of "Independence Now!" was headed at that time by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). However, as the scope and gravity of the struggle increased, the party was unable to play its formal role of organization which could rally all anticolonial forces. This led to a deep division within the party, loss of its mass nature and degeneration as a party of the petite bourgeoisie. The youth, the students and the progressive people increasingly turned to Marxism-Leninism, finding in it the answer of many of the arising problems of the liberation struggle, including those of organizational and tactical nature. What was particularly important was that the working class entered the country's political arena and confidently proclaimed its existence.

All of this contributed to the appearance of prerequisites for the creation of a Marxist-Leninist organization in the country. Communist cells appeared in a number of areas by the end of 1961. An organizational committee was set up, which published the party's draft program and bylaws in March 1962 and held up the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) on 5 May 1962. Members of all basic district organizations took part in the work of the congress. The bylaws and the initial program were discussed and approved, and a central committee, a politburo and a secretary general were elected.

The creation of the Communist Party marked the unification of the worker and national-liberation movements with the theory of scientific socialism. It became a significant event in the history of Lesotho's revolutionary struggle.

The first party program named British colonialism and its ally--the racist colonial regime in the Union of South Africa--"Enemy No 1." The struggle against colonial rule became the main task of the national revolution.

Guided by the strategic course of the struggle for national independence, the party raised the idea of establishing a broad national front which would include all the patriotic forces of the people, regardless of class affiliation or ideological views. It called for unity among workers, peasants, merchants, tribal leaders and intellectuals in the common struggle against the British colonizers. In their first proclamation on the creation of the party the communists called for cooperation and close alliance among the League of the Poor, the Basutoland Congress Party, the Marematlu-Freedom Party and trade union and student organizations. However, ignoring the national interests, the right-wing leadership of the BCP, blinded by the narrowness of nationalism and anticomunism, rejected the suggestion of the communist party on forming a united front of struggle. The right-wing nationalistic forces within the BCP unleashed a campaign of anticomunist terrorism in 1964.

The Second CPL Congress (1964) took place under difficult conditions. It dealt with problems of party strategy and tactics in the liberation movement and with organizational matters. The accuracy of the CPL course toward the creation of a united front of all political organizations in Lesotho on an anticolonial basis was asserted. The congress elected Comrade Jacob Khen secretary general.

The lack of unity in the national liberation movement, triggered by the anticomunist positions held by the leadership of the petit bourgeois parties, led to the grave defeat of the progressive forces in the 1965 elections. The elections were won by the National Party, which had taken an openly pro-South African position. The power remained in the hands of this party in October 1966, when the country gained its independence.

Under the changed political situation, the Communist Party charted a course of national democratic and anticolonial revolution. However, for a while the CPL was unable to dedicate itself fully to the implementation of this task because of an internal crisis created by the activities of the petit bourgeois, leftist and anarchist elements, the struggle against which had begun as early as the Second Congress.

The leftists disputed the party's conclusion to the effect that the domination of the country by neocolonialist forces was the determining feature of Lesotho's political and socioeconomic situation. The antiparty group was defeated ideologically, which brought about its isolation within the party. Its leaders were expelled from the party at the Third CPL Congress in March 1967.

The congress resolved to instruct the Central Committee to draft a strategy for CPL participation in the forthcoming general elections as an independent force. Instructions were also issued on initiating preparations for drafting a second party program.

The Fourth Congress (1968) approved the basic stipulations of the new program and the CPL manifesto on the general elections scheduled for January 1970.

Political work among the workers became significantly greater after this important party congress. Efforts aimed at popularizing the socialist alternative to the neocolonialist system were energized. Materials promoting the party's general line were published in the journal MOJAMOHO, the central organ of the CPL.

A great sociopolitical crisis developed in the country between 1966 and 1970. Mass discontent with the pro-South African foreign policy course of the regime and the capitalist orientation in the country's development and the lack of resolution of socioeconomic problems inherited from the colonial past increased. This led to the fact that the ruling National Party suffered a defeat at the first general elections after the gaining of independence.

The government's answer to this was to impose martial law. The results of the election were annulled, constitutional rule was abolished, leaders of opposition parties were arrested and the Communist Party was banned.

The outlawing of the CPL was a serious blow to the labor and national liberation movements in Lesotho. During the short period of legal activities (1962-1970), despite its small size, the party had exerted a significant influence on the country's political life. However, it proved to be insufficiently prepared for work under the difficult conditions of clandestinity. Its activities within the country were seriously disturbed and its contacts with the outside world became difficult.

A number of decisions on reorganizing the party's work in accordance with the new circumstances and restoring relations with the international worker and communist movements were made at the Fifth CPL Congress which was held clandestinely in 1976. However, the full implementation of these decisions was not accomplished. Nor did it become possible to strengthen the primary party organizations to the proper extent and to regain the previous party membership. An unsatisfactory situation developed in enhancing the ideological training of party activists. Communists are still insufficiently represented in the trade union and youth organizations and so far party contacts with the mass movement, the peasants in particular, have not reached the proper level.

The CPL considers as its most urgent organizational and political tasks the energizing of the growth of party ranks, while improving its social structure by recruiting workers and peasants above all; strengthening the primary organizations while simultaneously enhancing the ideological standards of all party members; improving party work in the mass organizations and thus broadening CPL influence among the masses and gaining the maximal support of the broad toiling strata for the party's political line, a line of struggle against neocolonialism and for strengthening political independence and leading the country on the path of social progress.

A new situation developed in the mid-1970s in the southern part of the continent. The struggle for the elimination of the last centers of apartheid and colonialism in Africa intensified. The racist Union of South Africa answered this with aggressive actions and efforts to destabilize its neighbors. In this light, the CPL believes that the most important task of the national liberation struggle of the Lesotho people is to strengthen its independence and defeat the South African neocolonialist plans.

Under the influence of internal and external factors, the government of the National Party was forced, as of the mid-1970s, to review its foreign policy course and, in particular, to engage in a consistent criticism of apartheid. It established diplomatic relations with the socialist countries. It is supporting the struggle waged by the peoples of southern Africa for their liberation and, as a whole, tries to pursue an independent policy in the spirit of nonalignment; the Union of South Africa answered this with increased economic, political and even military pressure.

The antiracist position taken by the government is unquestionably a positive phenomenon consistent with the interests of the peoples of Lesotho and the liberation movement of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia. However, no substantial changes were made in its domestic policy.

Lesotho remains a classical example of an economically backward country. Some 95 percent of the population still lives in the countryside. As in the past, agriculture is unable to support the majority of the population which, for that reason, is tremendously dependent on contract work in South African mines. In the 17 years which have passed since Lesotho gained its independence, it remains the main source of South African manpower. Wages within the country are miserable, the living standard of the majority of working people continues to decline and the gap between rich and poor is widening. The majority of the Lesotho population is deprived of democratic rights and freedoms.

The CPL, which firmly opposes the government's domestic policy, has always supported its positive foreign policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the country's sovereignty and independence. Major contradictions between a progressive foreign policy and a reactionary and antidemocratic domestic policy are the weakest feature of the present regime, which explains its lack of popularity among the broad masses. The conservative provisional National Assembly and the right-wing National Party oppose the pursuit of a democratic domestic policy.

To this day the right-wing forces within and outside the government are basing their political course on an alliance with the racist Union of South Africa. Anticommunism is the main weapon of these forces. With its help, they are ready to sell out the Lesotho economy and to farm out the country to the fascist-racist South African regime. The patriotic and democratic forces are fighting against the dangerous plans of the right-wing forces which are steadily relying on Pretoria's support. The attack which South African commandoes mounted on the homes of activists of the African National Congress in Maseru in December 1982, in which 42 people died, including 12 citizens of Lesotho, confirmed once again that Pretoria does not shy at any means when it comes to pressuring our country. However, this barbaric action strengthened even further the resolve of the people to defend their sovereignty and contributed to the consolidation of all patriotic forces.

The right-wing activities dangerously threaten the independent development of our homeland. Unfortunately, we are forced to note that the main opposition parties are not offering an alternative program for strengthening the country's democracy and independence. On the contrary, they themselves are sliding toward the right-wing camp, engaging in an unrestrained anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign, opposing the African National Congress and trying to cooperate with the South African racists.

The Communist Party believes that the South African intervention and aggression against Lesotho and the activities of the right wing within the country can be countered through the creation of a broad front of patriotic forces, based on a democratic program and international support of all progressive and peace-loving people on earth. The task and program of the front should include the elimination of all antidemocratic institutions and the full participation of the people in all power organs. The participation of workers and peasants would be of particular importance; a political rather than military approach to the present political crisis in the country; abrogation of laws banning the activities of progressive organizations and, above all, the legalizing of the Communist Party of Lesotho; economic reforms aimed at creating conditions for achieving economic independence; immediate agrarian reform and, above all, the development of democratic cooperativization and scientific management of agriculture; universal free education; and free medical services.

At the present stage of the struggle, the CPL considers the harnessing of all patriotic forces of the nation for the creation of such a front its immediate task.

The preservation of the country's independence means, above all, ensuring the concern of all true Lesotho patriots, regardless of their class, ideological and religious views.

The CPL program considers the future revolution in Lesotho to be national democratic. Its main content will be to replace the neocolonial regime with a revolutionary-democratic power of workers and peasants, which would pursue an independent development course toward socialism. Socialism is the final objective of the CPL, the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working people in our country.

As to the immediate future, we repeat, the CPL calls upon all patriotic organizations in the country for unity based on a common program for strengthening national independence, gaining political democracy, creating an independent national economy, enhancing the people's living standard and pursuing an independent foreign policy.

However difficult the circumstances in the country, southern Africa or throughout the world may be, the CPL firmly marches under the banners of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It is confident that the great cause of the struggle for national independence, democracy and social progress will triumph in Lesotho as well.

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CSO: 1802/1

WHAT IS BEHIND 'WESTERN SOLIDARITY?'

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 63-74

[Article by V. Nekrasov]

[Text] Mankind is experiencing an alarming period. Deprived of their ability to decide the destiny of the world, and losing one after another their various positions in the world, facing a deep and long aggravation of crisis processes in the private ownership society, the rulers of monopoly capital have charted a course of involving in the ruling system of the Western countries members of the most reactionary wing of bourgeois political forces. The latter hasten to take the path of a sharp aggravation of the confrontation with the socialist world and intensive preparations for settling their historical accounts with them through violence. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, emphasized at the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum, "an unparalleled aggravation of the struggle between the two global social systems has developed. However, the efforts to resolve the historical dispute between these systems through a military confrontation would be fatal to mankind."

The extreme reactionary forces of American imperialism are the main motive force in such dangerous development of the situation. It is precisely the ruling upper crust in the United States, whose purpose is to gain unquestionable military superiority over the socialist world and to obtain the possibility of dictating to it its conditions and, in the final account, to restore the global positions of imperialism, that is developing one after another new programs for an unrestrained arms race, thus leaving the nations on the brink of catastrophe. At the present stage accelerated preparations for the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and the other members of the socialist commonwealth hold the center of Washington's feverish military activities. Such plans are already being drafted for the Far East as well. Concealed behind the propaganda of the need for "Western solidarity" (Japan's geographic location is ignored, for it has long been considered part of the "West" based on its social affiliation), in the face of an imaginary "aggressiveness of Moscow," American capital is clearly trying to turn Western and Central Europe and, after it, the Far East, into a forward position for an initial exchange of nuclear strikes. The subsequent stage in the preparations made by the reactionary U.S. circles for a nuclear confrontation with world socialism is also gradually becoming clear. It involves hopes for putting together a universal antisocialist alliance with the participation of the NATO countries in the West and Japan in the East.

The reactionary forces in the countries allied to the United States are displaying a willingness to follow unquestioningly the course taken by the promoters of a nuclear conflagration on the other side of the ocean. Exclusively guided by selfish and egotistical interests, and concerned only with the preservation and multiplication of their own superprofits, they are relying on the ability of the American military to turn back the course of world history. These are the aspirations which willingly and, sometimes, one could say by coercion, are being promoted in the governmental circles of the leading capitalist countries. As a result, the foreign policy orientation of the respective governments is made consistent with Washington's stipulations and the governments essentially become trapped by the policies of the most dense reactionary circles. Such is the true meaning of "Western solidarity" in its current manifestations.

Such "solidarity" or, more accurately, unification of efforts and actions on the part of the ruling classes of the capitalist world in their opposition to real socialism, was born, as we know, neither today nor yesterday. It saw the light in November 1917, when the Great October Socialist Revolution drew a most profound line in international relations, which became the watershed between the forces of the old social order and the forces of the future which were to replace them. The interventionist collective campaign mounted by imperialism against the young Soviet republic and the "anti-Comintern pact," concocted by the Hitlerites, as well as the Munich conspiracy of the heads of the imperialist countries and the creation of closed military alliances in the West in the postwar period are all phenomena of the same order.

Today the ruling circles of American monopoly capital have assumed the role of the principal guarantor of the continued existence of the doomed social system, under circumstances in which the peoples of the world are following increasingly faster the path of national liberation and broad socioeconomic change. It was they who, soon after World War II, undertook to put together aggressive imperialist blocs the purpose of which was to crush world socialism. It was they who initiated the nuclear arms race, looking at nuclear armaments as the "doomsday weapon" against socialism as well as a tool in subordinating to their interests the remaining nonsocialist world. They have now set themselves the task of uniting the capitalist countries behind an anticommunist "crusade" for the sake of restoring the omnipotence of monopoly capital.

One of the practical manifestations of "Western solidarity" as well as an indicator of its present condition was, unquestionably, the meeting of heads of the seven leading capitalist countries, which was held in the American town of Williamsburg last May. It was no accident that some people in the West considered this a major step toward the creation of a "super-Atlantic institution," the idea of which had been promoted over the past decade, and the establishment of some sort of political and strategic directive organ for the NATO countries and Japan under the aegis of the United States.

Under the influence of the shifts and changes in global circumstances, "Western solidarity," as a manifestation not only of a specific trend but a practical foreign policy activity of reactionary imperialist forces, acquires a

new specific shape. The question of its meaning, given the current dangerous stage in international developments, or, more accurately, the correlation between the political course taken by the American capital and that of its allies, its moving force and the possibility of directing the course of events in this connection, and the trends toward unification or division in the camp of the leading capitalist countries becomes one of the topical problems of the contemporary international situation.

I

The overall picture of foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. ruling circles (as of those in the other capitalist countries), which, on the surface, looks quite complex and, sometimes, even conflicting, can be easily unraveled if considered in the context of the intensification of the general crisis in capitalist society. "It is becoming increasingly clear that imperialism is incapable of coping with the social consequences of a scientific and technical revolution of unparalleled depth and scale, in the course of which millions of working people are doomed to unemployment and poverty," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Militarization is the type of basic means to which the monopoly leadership turns in order to counteract the crisis processes and retain its superprofits. Turning to the outside, beyond state boundaries, is a mandatory prerequisite for the existence and blossoming of militarism triggered by imperialist development. It is precisely in the international arena that imperialism would like to find a solution to the aggravated domestic and foreign crisis.

After experiencing of late a series of major defeats in the struggle against liberation forces, American imperialism is trying to block through military means progressive changes in the life of mankind. As J. Kirkpatrick, one of President Reagan's loyal supporters and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has said, "the use of force has always been a part of the historical process and we should not fear it." Using armed violence, to which they have always been ready to resort anywhere, the ruling U.S. circles would like to maintain the further functioning of a socioeconomic system which has already outlived its usefulness. Illusions on the feasibility of plans, including the possibility of waging nuclear war which would bypass U.S. territory, are largely the product of a factor such as the distance separating America from the main centers of military upheavals in our century, which has secured its safety for a long time. The imminent laws governing the development of capitalism lead to the conversion of the scientific and technical revolution into a primarily military-technical one, while the subjective ideas of its American political captains, largely triggered by their unfamiliarity with the realities of the "big world," lead to the formulation of doctrines of "limited" or "protracted" nuclear wars, and the adoption of negative positions on matters of armament limitations and restrictions.

Not so long ago a correspondent of the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU wrote that "in Washington one cannot avoid the feeling of seeing an increasingly powerful and uncontrollable military machine running faster and faster." The question which arises is what does this refer to above all? Does it refer to gamblers who are losing all realistic perception of events?

Or is it a question of some kind of blind, all-destructive instinct which has gripped at least some of the members of the private ownership class which is leaving the stage?

As we know, Marxism emphasizes the essential importance of both the objective and the subjective sides of the historical process. "People write their own history," K. Marx wrote. "However, they do not write it as they wish or have not chosen themselves, but under circumstances which exist, which they have inherited from the past" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 8, p 119). The current U.S. leadership has inherited from the past the irrePRESSIVE class hostility of the American monopolists toward the first state of workers and peasants in the world, in which they immediately saw the most important obstacle on the way to the implementation of their global claims, whatever their manifestation--the so-called "open door" policy, which was characteristic of the first decades of the 20th century, or the postwar dreams of "pax Americana," based on nuclear power. It remains a fact that the United States did not recognize the existence of the Soviet state for a longer time than any of the other great capitalist powers (16 years!). As early as 1921, Ch. Hughes, then-U.S. secretary of state, formulated the line to be followed in relations with the land of the soviets, which has an amazingly contemporary sound. Normal relations between the two countries, he said, are possible only if "fundamental changes are made in the Soviet socialist system."

The ruling U.S. elite found it painfully difficult to adapt to changes in the global situation, brought about by the process of detente. The upper American social strata were unwilling to part with the illusion of U.S. omnipotence. The reactionary representatives of U.S. monopoly capital inherited from their predecessors imperial manners and the aspiration to talk to other countries and peoples from a position of power, and rejection of military parity with the socialist world, like symptoms of an old disease. They found in President Reagan and his retinue political leaders who were largely consistent with their views on global problems and were not noted by their ability to draw proper conclusions from contemporary historical experience.

Thinking almost exclusively in terms of militaristic categories is a characteristic feature of the approach to world affairs on the part of those who are setting the tone today in Washington. "President Reagan," we read in the recently published White House Public Relations Office Report, "came to power confident that the way to resolving America's problems is to increase its basic power, both economic and military." In elaborating ever-new military programs, their authors prefer to ignore the possibility of any agreement with the Soviet Union based on the principles of equality and identical security. They reject any considerations in favor of reinterpreting the current foreign policy course. This is increasingly disorganizing the mechanism stipulated in international law for resolving topical problems through mutually acceptable decisions and agreements.

The general direction of Reagan's foreign policy course has already been manifested quite clearly: reaching strategic superiority and acquiring both freedom of action in the international arena in peacetime and the possibility

of risking a military crisis for the sake of reaching desired political results and, if so resolved, to wage war on all levels after guaranteeing survival. The cutting edge of this course is aimed at the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. However, this policy is also aimed against all the rest of the world.

In their desire to impose their will on other nations, its initiators even accept the possible death of tens of millions of Americans in a war conflagration. They take even less into consideration the innumerable losses which would be suffered by other countries, including those in Western Europe and other U.S. allies. The self-sacrifice of the "partners" for the sake of the joint "mission" of crushing socialism is actually considered as something self-evident. The fate of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world is made directly dependent on the hegemonic claims and adventuristic plans of America's monopoly leadership.

The fact that the worsening of the current circumstances has assumed a global scale is precisely a consequence of the general course followed by the White House. However, today the situation in Europe, which is an area of direct confrontation between the main military groups of our time, is a subject of particular concern from the viewpoint of a potential threat to universal peace. Stubbornly working for the fastest possible deployment of the new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western European countries, American capital is pursuing above all strictly selfish objectives aimed at lowering the risk of a nuclear devastation of American soil, as is groundlessly estimated on the other side of the Atlantic. "...We are in Europe," openly states Republican Sen Ch. Percy, for example, "to defend and protect our own security and way of life."

Is this frank admission not true? Sixty-five years ago John Pershing (that same Pershing after whom the new American missiles are named), who commanded the American expeditionary corps on the battlefields of World War I, told his subordinates that "we have come here not for the sake of the Europeans but the Americans, for our own sake. Remember well that America's front line of defense runs through European soil! You can forget everything other than America!" Today Adm A. Sanguinetti, former French commander of the Mediterranean fleet, tells of the following conversations with American officers in NATO headquarters: "They told me quite frankly that one of these days the Americans will have to think about the destruction of Europe. For you (the Western Europeans--the author) are to a large extent our main competitor."

In rejecting the policy of detente as allegedly harming the interests of the "free world," the Reagan administration is persistently imposing this viewpoint as a common platform for all countries allied with Washington, regardless of the obvious advantages which detente brought all European countries, regardless of their social system. One of the basic objectives of the Williamsburg meeting of the heads of the seven leading capitalist countries was Washington's desire to tighten up the political reins even further, and to mobilize its main allies in strictly following the Pentagon's strategic plans. Under the influence of a concentrated pressure, combined with a variety of promises, the United States was able to reach its objectives in

Williamsburg, which was expressed in the "Political Declaration on Security Problems," drafted by the White House. This was a kind of militaristic manifesto which proclaimed the "indivisibility" of the safety of all the "seven" as the base of their solidarity with the course charted by Washington of increasing tension and unrestrained arms race. Paris was involved in this "solidarity," although 17 years ago it was pulled out of the military NATO organization by DeGaulle precisely with a view to safeguarding for France the freedom of choice in foreign policy decisionmaking. No less significant is the official involvement of Tokyo in NATO's "concern," turning Japan into a direct participant in the aggressive activities of the North Atlantic bloc. By accepting the American plans, the governments of the participants in the Williamsburg meeting, and in the NATO council session which was subsequently held in Paris, thus assumed a considerable share of the responsibility for the further worsening of an already tense situation.

II

The situation which has developed in the world is more critical than ever before. It demands from all sides a manifestation of the political willpower and maximal efforts to turn international relations back to the channel of a crisis-free development and shift them to the level of normal, stable and good-neighborly contacts without outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries or the threat and use of armed force; for the sake of stopping the latest and most dangerous round in the arms race and, through talks, based on the principle of equality and identical security and without any efforts at diktat and power pressure, to reach an accord on reducing the nuclear arsenals of both sides; and to seek and find mutually acceptable solutions to disputes.

However, the influential ruling circles in the leading capitalist countries prefer to follow the course of increasing the arms race and militarization of all international life, dictated by Washington. They are ignoring the constructive proposals submitted by the USSR and the members of the socialist commonwealth, aimed at achieving equitable agreements. They ignore the serious warnings issued by the peace-loving forces of the dangers threatening mankind. In general, this is not a new line, for it has long been the base of the notorious "Atlantic solidarity," which has been preached by the NATO leadership ever since that military bloc was created. However, under circumstances of objectively increased responsibility on the part of the individual governments and countries for the very fate of mankind, the following of Washington's destructive policy by the heads of other Western countries has stood out with particular clarity. It is true that for the sake of achieving their objectives the U.S. ruling circles make use of a number of levers for exerting political, economic and other pressures on their allies. However, equally true is the fact that the extremist policies pursued by the Reagan administration have turned to the right the entire system of capitalist alliances not only as a result of coercion.

The trend toward a unification of imperialist forces under the circumstances of a growing class struggle waged by the working people and in the face of the radical social changes which have taken place in the world's situation is

one of the characteristic phenomena of today. Now, when the policy of each imperialist country is defined more than ever before by the objectives of the common struggle against world socialism, the national liberation revolutions and the communist and worker movements, this trend is manifested with increasing clarity. With the aggravated disorder in the capitalist world, the war "of all against all," which even on the eve of World War II was typical of intergovernmental relations in the West, would have serious consequences to the capitalist system as a whole. That is why considerations of class solidarity are becoming increasingly apparent in the approach which the capitalist countries take to global problems. Furthermore, relations among these countries are today taking place above all within the framework of military-political blocs and alliances. Their mechanism, which serves joint strategic imperialist purposes, makes it possible to bypass more easily one interest or another of individual countries and to counter their separate actions under the slogan of protecting the main interests of the "free world."

The factors which aggravate the crisis in the capitalist system trigger similar sociopolitical processes in the United States and the other Western countries. Losing one world position after another, monopoly capital in the different countries is forced to seek ways of adapting itself to the new reality. One of the main forms of such adaptation is the accelerated internationalization of capital and its integration, the growth of multinational monopolies and the aspiration to coordinate the economic policy of the capitalist countries. The growing coordination of activities of financial oligarchies, accompanied by the further aggravation of the competitive struggle among them, leads to the formation of international political relations similar to purely economic cartel agreements which were characteristic of imperialism during the first decades of its existence. The activities of the military-industrial complexes in the leading capitalist countries are also following the course of internationalization.

The extreme reactionary circles of American imperialism, which are currently in power in the United States, are hastening to use circumstances they consider favorable in order to consolidate and strengthen their leading role in all matters affecting the capitalist part of the world. The right-wing imperialist circles of other countries, which have now come to the proscenium of political life, guided by considerations of class solidarity as being the main and determining factors, are meeting these aspirations of the overseas moneybags. In the view of these circles, in order to preserve the existing socioeconomic order and their privileged status in our current "troubled" times, they can count only on the overall capitalist system, with the mandatory support of their strong "senior partner" represented by American imperialism. One may say that this is the first and determining explanation of the readiness shown by influential monopoly forces in other Western countries to "more actively coordinate" their policy with the United States and the reason for which they are accepting the global strategy of the American ruling elite. Fear of the future is increasingly growing among the bourgeoisie as a class, making its right-wing and stubborn nucleus to cling particularly strongly to reciprocal solidarity but, above all, solidarity with Washington, which is considered a means for saving all they consider precious. As THE WASHINGTON POST sarcastically noted during the Williamsburg meeting, frequently the speeches of the participants sounded like the rediscovery of the

familiar statement dating from the American Revolution: "Either we all hang together or we all hang separately."

The people on the other side of the ocean are perfectly aware of the present dominance in the political thinking of the international bourgeoisie, its right wing in particular, and are doing everything possible to put it in the service of their own interests. The use of the "Atlantic solidarity" theme in all its variations has long played an important role in the arsenal of American diplomacy and propaganda. The concept of the "main burden," allegedly imposed on America by just about Providence itself, is being intensively disseminated. It is being claimed that any hesitations or retreats from the line of unconditional support of all U.S. initiatives would turn into general defeats for the West and that the United States could do without its allies but let the latter just try to do without U.S. support. The American leaders do not miss the opportunity to instill in their allies that the USSR is trying to achieve a political and, what is even more "base," psychological undermining of Western unity. They are being persuaded that the Soviet objective is to create a "divided and unprotected Europe separated from America." At the same time, an idea which is popular among the ruling circles of the capitalist countries that the West has adequate economic potential to win through joint efforts in a confrontation of any kind with the forces of real socialism is being persistently promoted.

Washington does not miss any opportunity to strengthen "Western solidarity" not only on the general political but on the strictly practical level. It has set the example, demonstrating its solidarity with Great Britain by actually joining the conflict started by the latter in the Falklands (the Malvinas). By involving its allies in the participation of NATO's so-called "multinational forces" in the Middle East and in the various military exercises, and encouraging France to interfere as extensively as possible in the civil war in Chad, the American leadership is trying to rally its allies even more closely in support of its aggressive course in global affairs and active indiscriminate participation in a most dangerous provocative action such as the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles on European soil. These days particular attention is being paid in the American capital to the international consolidation of right-wing forces spiritually related to the Reagan administration. Thus, U.S. Vice President Bush most actively participated in June 1983 in the creation of the "international democratic alliance" of 19 Western conservative parties, which was justifiably christened by the press as the "black international."

The compliance of Western governmental circles with the aggressive line followed by the extreme reactionary circles in Washington and their unwillingness to take an independent approach to a radical problem of our time such as limiting and reducing armaments, is facilitated by the imperialist nature of the power in these countries, which considers war and armed conflicts as natural as serving the selfish interests of monopoly capital while armaments and armed forces are considered a most important political instrument. The basic interests of the popular masses are essentially considered by the ruling circles of these countries as an irritating obstacle to the implementation of their own plans and intentions. For example, as the British SUNDAY

EXPRESS, the Western political and military strategists are "horrified" by the possibility of a decisive influence which the mass peace movement may exert on defining the foreign policy course. A characteristic feature in the current stage in the active involvement of reactionary forces in the ruling circles of the Western European allies of the United States and Japan with Washington's foreign policy course is the increased intensiveness of political and propaganda activities aimed at disorienting the international public and the broad popular masses in the Western countries and weakening and dividing the antiwar movement, which has acquired unparalleled scope, with a view to depriving it of its active power. The intensification of military hysteria and anti-Soviet psychosis, mainly through the dissemination of the myth of the "Soviet military threat," the systematic distortion and concealment of the real content of the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the members of the socialist commonwealth as a whole, concealment from the public of the real scale, pace and objectives of material preparations for war, manipulations with the figuring and refiguring of the military-strategic potential of the two sides and speculative fabrications regarding a possible line of behavior on the part of the USSR in the face of Western policy of accomplished facts are all being used.

The scope which the right-wing circles in NATO countries and Japan have given to measures of political-propaganda support of Washington's aggressive actions proves that it is a question of their adoption in principle of the idea of a military coalition among the basic imperialist countries, aimed against the USSR, the other socialist countries and all democratic and progressive forces.

III

If we take a broad view of the plans of the reactionary imperialist forces for setting up a worldwide antisocialist alliance, we can easily reach the conclusion that they conceal above all the desire to cut the Gordian knot of domestic and intergovernmental antagonisms, upheavals and conflicts in which contemporary imperialism has become entangled with a single blow. Unquestionably, a contributing factor to the birth of this idea was the currently noted process of shifting the axis of political life to the right, which is characteristic of the situation in the leading Western countries, starting with the United States. However, although the foreign policy of any capitalist state is determined by domestic considerations and the class objectives of domestic policy, the connection is not one of rigid simplicity.

The system of international relations is distinguished by a considerable multiplicity, flexibility and variability of its components. These relations have their objective logic of development and specific laws. Foreign policy, which is related to the domestic socioeconomic and political situation, does not always and everywhere strictly follow the development of circumstances in one country or another. Furthermore, the variety of countries maintaining international contacts and, above all, the growing role of the countries of real socialism, make the international arena an area of political relations in which imperialism has been unable to establish the dominating climate on a monopolistic basis for quite some time. This is clearly and tangibly manifested in the circumstances of the military-strategic balance between the two

opposite social systems. The course of rigid confrontation with the socialist world, reflecting the subjective aspirations of the circles currently in power in a number of leading capitalist countries, headed by the United States, is encountering the powerful opposition of forces which are firmly struggling for normalizing international relations and making them consistent with the basic interests of the nations and the objective requirements of the social progress of mankind. Furthermore, the line followed by the reactionary imperialist forces itself is experiencing conflicting influences, particularly that of intensifying interimperialist contradictions and the sharp economic competition between the individual countries and the main contemporary imperialist centers.

The inner nature of bourgeois society is such that it is unable to exclude war from its life through its own efforts. Nevertheless, a number of politicians may be found in the capitalist countries who can realistically assess the situation in the international arena and who understand that irreversible changes have already taken place in the world. It is they who with increasing resolve and on the level of various governmental institutions, including those in the Western European NATO countries and Japan, are questioning the very sense, the consistency between the main interests of the capitalist society and the actions of the Reagan administration. They are proving that continuing to follow the channel of obsolete prenuclear concepts of military action means moving toward a catastrophe which would affect the entire world, including the West. A nuclear war, as has been justifiably pointed out in circles of soberly thinking politicians, cannot be "limited" either in nature or in consequences. It cannot resolve any problem, be it territorial, socio-economic or ideological-political.

Therefore, countering the prowar faction in the ruling camp of the capitalist world is an organized and influential political faction of opponents of the aggravation of international situation, who tend to consider more seriously the realities of the nuclear century and the developing overall ratio of forces in the world. On their side is not only the fact that they essentially act as defenders of the true national interests of their respective countries but the very course of development of the international situation.

A number of soberly thinking Western politicians are expressing their serious concern today as to the nature of controlling the new U.S. nuclear missiles with the help of which the United States intends to achieve its objectives. According to available information, the decision regarding their use will be made not in London, Bonn or Rome but in Washington or, more specifically, the Pentagon. "The decision to use nuclear weapons in Europe," said retired U.S. Rear Adm J. Laroque, currently director of the American Information Center on Military Problems, "belongs to the United States and to it alone. One of the greatest European myths is that the NATO countries will be granted, one way or another, voting rights as to whether or not the United States would use nuclear weapons. They will not be given this right."

Therefore, control will remain in the hands of the American authorities, whose common-sense approach to international problems, not to mention willingness to take into consideration the vital interests of the Western

Europeans are being increasingly doubted by political circles in various countries. It was no accident that Reagan's proclaimed intention to start making plans for "space warfare" was taken by many people in Western Europe as proof of the unwillingness to give serious thought to the fate of the allies should a nuclear conflict break out. The result of all this is that the pressure exerted by the Reagan Administration, the influence of the "NATO solidarity" factor and the firm anti-Sovietism in the views of an influential stratum of the ruling elite in Western Europe are being with increased obviousness opposed by an elementary sober analysis of the situation by many of its members, and the deeply felt need to take into consideration the level of antiwar feelings displayed by the broad public circles.

The people's diplomacy, V. I. Lenin said, has frequently "dulled the wedge of militant imperialist policy" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 134). The current unprecedented upsurge of the antiwar movement in the leading capitalist countries has become a most serious factor of their political life, which can put limits to the militancy of reactionary circles. Even the more far-sighted members of the military faction of the bourgeois world have good reason to be concerned today: the intensifying disparity between the course taken by the leaders of NATO countries and the demands of the broad social forces could, in their view, totally undermine and even entirely destroy the mass base of the militaristic policy of "Western solidarity" with all long-term consequences stemming from it. The official authorities hope in vain that, having withstood the pressure of mass actions, they will divide the ranks of its participants and, after instilling in them a feeling of helplessness, will be able to reduce the upsurge of the popular struggle and pursue their projects unhindered. It is obvious already today that the tempestuous flood of antinuclear actions--a characteristic feature of 1983--will continue to affect increasingly tangibly the situation in the Western countries.

What makes the role of the antiwar movement all the more real and effective is the fact that the memory of the beneficial impact which the detente processes, characteristic of the 1970s, had on the climate of international relations remains fresh in the mind of the nations. Whereas they did not have any major effect in the United States, during that period the understanding of the need for and reciprocal advantage of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems was substantially strengthened in Europe; the concept of the impossibility of ensuring the safety of one party of the continent at the expense of and against the other was instilled.

It was no accident that the reaction of the ruling circles in Western Europe to the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist commonwealth is noticeably different and considerably more thoughtful than that of the United States. Here the Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons met with greater understanding and attention. continues to be drawn to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact members made to the NATO countries to conclude a treaty on the reciprocal nonuse of military force and to maintain relations of peace.

In turn, the neutral and nonaligned countries in Europe are doing everything they can to preserve and strengthen cooperation in the spirit of the European

conference, although they, in the words of Finnish president M. Koivisto, realize that "they have only limited possibilities of influencing decisions on main problems of international politics." They played a major role in achieving positive results at the Madrid meeting of the representatives of the 35 countries which had signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975.

The European continent--an area with rich history and specific geographic, economic, political and military problems--has, in the view of the majority of Europeans, the unquestionable right and sufficient strength to launch independent initiatives within the framework of the global efforts to strengthen the peace and security of all nations and to influence the political course of the United States. "It is time for the United States," says A. Papandreu, the Greek prime minister, "to review its obsolete egocentric position toward the rest of the world and understand the signals which history, with its experience and perspective, is sending...."

The existing European situation "demands more than ever before the joint efforts of the countries with a view to a systematic pursuit of a policy of detente, peace and disarmament," stresses the Prague political declaration of Warsaw Pact members. This appeal for unity among all countries and nations encountering the threat of nuclear devastation is meeting with a response in the West as well, including political circles in NATO countries.

The prevention of a nuclear war and securing a stable peace is the most important and most difficult task which history sets mankind today. Its difficulty is due to the fierce opposition which the reactionary imperialist forces, headed by the United States, rallied on an international scale, are trying to provide to the progress of human society on the way to social and national liberation. The willingness demonstrated by these forces to resort under certain circumstances and for purposes of social revenge to any means, including the use of nuclear weapons, makes the situation even more stressed and worsens the possibility of keeping it under control. The new circumstances most clearly confirm Marx's conclusion to the effect that "social forces which have outlived their time...and nominally still possess all the attributes of power, although the foundations of their existence have long decayed,...facing their agony, are making once again a final effort to turn from defense to offense. Instead of avoiding the struggle, they themselves are calling for it, trying to draw the most extreme conclusions from postulates which are not only being questioned but have long been condemned by history" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 11, p 338).

Fortunately for mankind, however, during such a crucial time, it has not been left to the mercy of the destructive instincts and ambitions of imperialism. With all its aggressiveness, imperialism is nevertheless forced to take more seriously into consideration the forces of social progress opposed to it. Being organically incapable of consciously controlling international relations, today modern capitalism is increasingly losing the possibility of exerting any kind of decisive influence on them. The historical achievements of real socialism, the increased prestige and influence of the global communist and worker movements, the progressive development of the countries which

have rejected the yoke of colonial oppression, the victories of the national liberation struggle and the tremendous scope of the antiwar movements are assuming increasing importance in determining the further course of global events.

Under circumstances in which the resolve of the nations and all progressive and peace-loving forces to put an end to the policy of force and confrontation, to ensure the preservation of the peace and to strengthen international security is manifested with increasing persistence and firmness, the leaders of the Warsaw Pact members expressed at the Prague Conference of the Political Consultative Committee their firm conviction that "however difficult the situation in the world may be, possibilities of surmounting this dangerous stage in international relations exist. The present course of events must and can be stopped and such events may be channeled in a direction consistent with the expectation of the peoples." No part of this conclusion has been disproved by subsequent events.

Together with the other members of the socialist commonwealth and all peace-loving forces, the Soviet Union believes that under the current circumstances its prime task is the struggle for the prevention of a further threatening development of the circumstances and for strengthening peace. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted in his talk with a group of American senators on 18 August 1983, the Soviet Union considers as its main foreign policy objective the strengthening of peace and international security and ensuring a tranquil life of the nations, above all by lifting the threat of nuclear war. It will continue to act in this direction persistently and consistently, displaying its readiness for fruitful and mutually profitable cooperation and interaction with all countries, including the United States.

The Soviet Union is convinced that the peoples of the world have all objectively necessary prerequisites to live under conditions of safety and cooperation. Experience indicates the possibility of reaching agreements given political will, respect for the legitimate interests of all sides and observance of the principles of equality and identical security. However, the conversion of this possibility into firm reality requires the efforts of all countries, including those which are currently directly involved in the vicious circle of the unattainable hopes of the reactionary imperialist circles for achieving military superiority over socialism. This requires their respective reassessment of the imaginary values of the notorious "Western solidarity," a reassessment based on supreme national and all-human interests.

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MARX'S GREAT CONTEMPORARY: CHERNYSHEVSKIY, HIS TIME AND REVOLUTIONARY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 75-85

[Article by Dr of Historical Sciences R. Konyushaya, honored worker in science of the RSFSR]

[Text] Soviet science has extensively studied the life and works of N. G. Chernyshevskiy. His very rich literary legacy has been collected, published and scientifically commented on. Fundamental works have been written on his outlook, political program, revolutionary activities, philosophical, socio-economic, historical, ethical and aesthetic views, theoretical and literary-critical legacy and his relevance today. The 150th anniversary of Chernyshevskiy's birth, which was widely celebrated in 1978, became a significant landmark in the comprehensive scientific consideration of his revolutionary ideas and accomplishments. A summarizing picture of the studies recreating the overall character of this great personality was provided in the collective work of the USSR Academy of Sciences "N. G. Chernyshevskiy i Sovremennost'" [N. G. Chernyshevskiy and Contemporaneity] (Moscow, 1980; M. T. Iovchuk, responsible editor), which opens with a report submitted by P. N. Fedoseyev, USSR Academy of Sciences vice president, at the solemn anniversary session. The report offers a profound study and evaluation of Chernyshevskiy's contribution as a philosopher and revolutionary, convincingly proving that his supporting creative activities continued to "work for socialism." "...It would be no exaggeration to say," the report stated, "that Chernyshevskiy is both our predecessor and our contemporary, a loyal fellow worker in the struggle for the same ideas and moral values which inspire the builders of the communist future. Together with him, we repeat his words: '...The future is bright and splendid. Love it and aspire toward it, work for it, make it come closer, and borrow from it for the present as much as you can carry....'"

The collective monograph "Revolyutsionnaya Situatsiya v Rossii v Seredine XIX Veka" [The Revolutionary Situation in Russia in the Mid-19th Century] (Moscow, 1978), which was written by a group from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History, directed and edited by Academician M. V. Nechkina, was a major scientific contribution to the interpretation of the period which created Chernyshevskiy. The book is a study of the revolutionary situation in Russia at the beginning of the 1860s. At a time of ripening crisis of the entire feudal-serfdom system, after the defeat of tsarism in the Crimean War, the Russian popular masses became increasingly aware of the

class struggle. This is confirmed by such an authoritative contemporary of the events as Marx, who reported in 1859 to the readers of his articles in the popular democratic NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE of the tsar's fear of the "enraged peasants" and the fact that "the uprisings of the serfs against their landowners and managers have become an epidemic phenomenon" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 12, p 701). A revolutionary situation had developed in Russia by the end of the 1850s. All of its three objective features were present, as formulated by V. I. Lenin: "1. The impossibility for the ruling classes to preserve unchanged their domination... 2. Unusual aggravation of the needs and calamities of the oppressed classes. 3. A significant increase in the activeness of the masses for these reasons..." (see "Poln. Soch." [Complete Collected Works, vol 26, p 218]).

The introductory chapter to this collective work describes the revolutionary situation in Russia at the beginning of the 1860s thoroughly and concretely, covering historical events and phenomena most widely. The scientists' efforts have led to the creation of the first basic work in historiography on the revolutionary situation in the country at the time of the fall of serfdom.

It was within the creative atmosphere of this scientific collective that the new work was born and gradually took shape: "N. G. Chernyshevskiy vo Glave Revolyutsionerov 1861 Goda. Nekotoryye Itogi i Perspektivy Issledovaniya" [N. G. Chernyshevskiy at the Head of the 1861 Revolutionaries. Some Research Results and Prospects] (Moscow, 1981; V. I. Neupokoyev responsible editor). This work deals primarily with Chernyshevskiy's less-studied practical revolutionary activities. In this respect it organically supplements the collective monograph on the first revolutionary situation. This is an original comprehensive study made by two authors: historian N. N. Novikova (author of the introduction, the first chapter, parts of the second and third chapters, and the conclusion) and mathematician B. M. Kloss, who used the mathematical linguistic method for the stylistic analysis of the text of the 1861 proclamation (in Chapter 2). The work considers the clandestine activities of the leader of the revolutionary democrats during the period of the fall of serfdom; it discusses the way Chernyshevskiy organized the practical aspects of the revolutionary struggle and his contribution to the unification of the people's "mass" which did not read SOVREMENNIK and without which he could not conceive of any firm success, change or revolutionary struggle (see p 19).

The authors of the new study on N. G. Chernyshevskiy concentrate on the shaping of the Leninist concept of his role in the revolutionary movement, the most important problems of his clandestine revolutionary activities to ensure the success of the people's uprising by the "action party," difficult in terms of source availability, Chernyshevskiy's conspiratorial discussions with the KOLOKOL editors in the summer of 1859 aimed at consolidating the leading forces within the revolutionary movement, the planning and implementation of the 1860-1861 "proclamation plan," addressed to various population strata, the drafting of the programmatic document-proclamation "Regards to the Landowners' Peasants From Their Well-Wishers," the clandestine newspaper-proclamation VELIKORUSS and others. The work plan covered a decade (1854-1864). It included all the stages of Chernyshevskiy's revolutionary activities during the period of the ripening and development of the first revolutionary situation.

As we read in the introduction, actually the topic covers the study of the class struggle, the role of the organizations and parties, and their leaders in the revolutionary struggle, in which the interpretation of the experience of Lenin and the CPSU in the study of their predecessors and the use of scientific achievements in the communist education of the Soviet people are considered among the most important tasks facing Soviet historians. The study is based on the profoundly adopted Leninist concept of "Chernyshevskiy's epoch and his revolutionary exploit" and the "revolutionaries of 1861" he headed. The ideological-methodological basis of the work is Lenin's conclusion in his work "The 'Peasant Reform' and the Proletarian-Peasant Revolution": "The revolutionaries played the greatest historical role in the social struggle and in all social crises even when such crises directly led only to halfway reforms. The revolutionaries were the leaders of the social forces which create all changes; the reform is the by-product of the revolutionary struggle.

"The 1861 revolutionaries remained alone and, obviously, suffered a total defeat. It was precisely they, however, who were the greatest activists of that age and the more time passes the more clearly we see their greatness and the more obvious becomes the miserable and mediocre nature of the liberal reformists of that time" (op. cit., vol 20, p 179).

The authors of these works, who developed an accurate concept, based on historical science, of the reality of the mid-19th century, refute those who fail to see during that revolutionary period of the beginning of the people's struggle, the then-great efforts of the revolutionaries to go on with this struggle and to introduce within it elements of consciousness and organization. Chernyshevskiy's main revolutionary activities took place precisely during the period of the first democratic upsurge, when the feudal-serfdom system broke down and the capitalist socioeconomic system was established.

The then-few revolutionaries did everything they could for the reason that their leader and ideologue properly assessed his own time and the tasks it set for the revolutionaries. Headed by Chernyshevskiy, the "revolutionaries of 1861" did not hope for better times. They not only heroically but with a very instructive skill accepted the combat with forces hostile to the people and left to subsequent generations a living example, priceless experience and revolutionary tradition. The features of the time and the upsurge of the struggle for the right cause created the necessary people. Chernyshevskiy was by far not alone on the battlefield. Together with N. A. Dobrolyubov, within a short time he was able to rally around SOVREMENNICK an entire cohort of outstanding revolutionary activists such as N. V. Shelgunov, M. I. Mikhaylov, N. A. and A. A. Serno-Solov'yevich, N. N. and V. A. Obruchev and others. Led by the "horse-holders of the democratic movement" (Lenin's expression), an ideological-political consciousness was developed among the "revolutionaries of 1861," along with their study of revolutionary conspiracy and the ability to address the masses in their language.

Lenin called the revolutionaries of the time of the fall of serfdom "the lonely ones," less because they were still few than, mainly, because they had been unable to establish ties with the masses before the enemy had moved on to

the offensive. However, Lenin also described the revolutionaries who had remained "alone" (not through their own fault) as "great personalities of the age" precisely because all of their activities in the creation of a clandestine organization with a view to centralizing the efforts to prepare for a peasant, a people's revolution and because the organization of extensive agitation and other revolutionary work was aimed at securing and strengthening ties with the masses and participating in and leading the nationwide uprising against autocracy and the landowners. Courageously Chernyshevskiy and his closest fellow workers, who had been seized by the tsarist authorities in July 1862, were able to protect the first clandestine organization which, according to the investigators, numbered some 3,000 people and to rescue from total defeat the revolutionary-democratic movement which had appeared in Russia and which, after withstanding most severe repressions, was able to pass on the baton to the new generation of revolutionaries.

Some of the revolutionaries led by Chernyshevskiy went into foreign exile, quickly found their place in the International Association of Workers, and supplied its leaders, Marx and Engels, with information on the revolutionary exploit of their teacher. Thanks to this development of circumstances Chernyshevskiy was presented to the world revolutionary public by Marx and Engels not only as a "great Russian scientist and critic" but also as the "head of the revolutionary party." "An entire phalange of publicists, a large group of officers and students rallied around him" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 18, p 432).

The effort of the researchers to find the sources for Lenin's basic conclusions on the revolutionary activities of Chernyshevskiy and the revolutionaries he headed is a special accomplishment found in the new works. The historians worked a long time to gain an idea on the sources for such information used by Lenin. The fact that this was a special kind of information--secret and conspiratorial--and could not be found in printed sources made it necessary to turn to possible verbal information sources. In following M. V. Nechkina in this exceptionally important promising direction, N. N. Novikova was able to discover a number of facts of objectively possible information acquired by Lenin as a result of his contacts with the still-living direct participants in the movement during the period of the revolutionary situation at the beginning of the 1860s, or else individuals who were close to them. The chapter "V. I. Lenin on the Role of N. G. Chernyshevskiy As the Head of the 1861 Revolutionaries" includes most valuable data on the Ul'yanov and Krupskiy families, such as their attitude toward the "Chernyshevskiy epoch," the 1861 revolutionaries and their contacts with Chernyshevskiy's fellow workers. This part of the work is valuable by itself because of the material it contains and the study of Lenin's views on Chernyshevskiy and historiographic aspects which lead us into Lenin's creative laboratory as a historian of the Russian revolutionary movement.

The problems related to the study of Lenin's legacy and the new aspects in their development in the course of the further study of the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, including Chernyshevskiy's activities, as the head of the 1861 revolutionaries, are extensively discussed in the summing-up work of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History

"Izuchenije Otechestvennoj Istorii v SSSR Mezhdu XXV i XXVI S"yezdami KPSS" [Study of USSR Domestic History Between the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses] (Moscow, 1982; S. S. Khromov responsible editor). Let us note that this study also considers "one of the achievements in the study of N. G. Chernyshevskiy's work" the work by N. N. Novikova and B. M. Kloss (see p 530 and pp 479, 482 and 485).

Lenin always considered the profound study of past experience, the experience of the revolutionary movement in particular, a primary task in the formulation of a scientific strategy, tactics and forms of organization of the current and forthcoming revolutionary-political struggle. In her work "V. I. Lenin--Istorik Revolyutsionnogo Dvizheniya Rossii" [V. I. Lenin--Historian of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia], M. V. Nechkina emphasizes that the period between 1900 and 1914 was one of "particularly intensive development and essential formulation of his concept of the revolutionary struggle during the 19th century. It was the period between the works 'Persecutors of the Zemstva and the Hannibals of Liberalism' and 'From the Past Worker Press in Russia'" (in the book "V. I. Lenin i Istoricheskaya Nauka" [V. I. Lenin and the Science of History]. Moscow, 1968, p 42; M. V. Nechkina responsible editor). In her studies N. N. Novikova analyzes Lenin's summing-up assessments and views on the first revolutionary situation in the country, to which he referred in the creation and managing the newspaper ISKRA and the journal ZARYA and in the period of drafting the RSDWP program and writing "What Is To Be Done?" a great work the title of which reminds one of Chernyshevskiy's novel-testament.

It was precisely on the eve of the Second Party Congress that Lenin turned most frequently to the stormy period of the fall of serfdom and the "revolutionaries of 1861." He literally absorbed the experience of the revolutionary "age of Chernyshevskiy" the experience of the pressure which his "party" exerted on tsarism, the publication of its militant legal organ and the clandestine proclamations to the people. As Lenin said, Chernyshevskiy's political novel gave him a "lifetime charge." "He drew strength," N. K. Krupskaya wrote, "from Chernyshevskiy's example...." Throughout his entire great activities, the leader of the proletariat "consulted" not only Marx and Engels but Chernyshevskiy as well.

Let us recall a fact of particular interest in this respect. After the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution, Lenin wrote "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" in order to defend the truly scientific outlook of the proletariat and strengthen the party on a firm Marxist ideological base. He also turned to Chernyshevskiy's philosophical legacy. Lenin considered it "extremely important to pit Chernyshevskiy against the Machists" and wrote a special "Addition to the First Paragraph of Chapter IV. From What Side Did N. G. Chernyshevskiy approach his critique of Kantianism?" Meanwhile (second half of March 1909), the book's manuscript was already in print and Lenin suggested that this addition be put "at the very end of the book, after the conclusion, in a different script, such as brevier, for example" (see op. cit., vol 18, p 423). "... Chernyshevskiy is fully on Engels' level, for he blames Kant not for his realism but for his agnosticism and subjectivism; not for allowing "things within themselves" but for his inability to give us knowledge

on the basis of this objective source..." Lenin pointed out (ibid., p 382), ending the addition to his main philosophical work as follows: "Chernyshevskiy is the only true great Russian writer who was able, from the 1850s to 1888, to remain on the level of a purposeful philosophical materialism and to reject the pitiful nonsense of the neo-Kantians, positivists, Machists and other muddle-headed people. However, Chernyshevskiy was unable or, rather, he could not, by virtue of the backwardness of Russian life, rise to the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels" (ibid., p 384).

The elaboration of an overall concept of the history of the all-Russian revolutionary movement and a turn to its sources clarified historical prospects, strengthened the awareness of the continuity of the liberation struggle waged by revolutionaries of different generations and helped to shape a scientific Marxist outlook among revolutionary cadres during the period of creating a party of a new type, on the eve of the imminent first Russian revolution.

It would be impossible to overestimate the personality of Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevskiy. He was a great revolutionary democrat and socialist on a global scale. He was a most talented scientist--a philosopher-materialist and dialectician, economist, historian, art theoretician and critic, writer and master of revolutionary publicism. With all of this he was also a political leader, the inspirer and head of the revolutionary movement. Chernyshevskiy inspired to great revolutionary struggle the young Lenin, who had felt the tremendous beneficial impact of his "powerful sermons" and of his novel-program "What Is To Be Done?" Lenin, who rated A. I. Hertzen exceptionally highly, emphasized that Chernyshevskiy had "taken a tremendous step ahead compared to Hertzen. Chernyshevskiy was a far more consistent and militant democrat. The spirit of the class struggle glows from his works" (op. cit., vol 25, p 94). Lenin remembered throughout his entire life Chernyshevskiy's revolutionary exploit. He revered him and considered him a brilliant personality. We know of Lenin's attitude toward him from his works, many documents and the testimony of N. K. Krupskaya and other leaders.

Much less known and studied is the attitude toward Chernyshevskiy of the founders of Marxism. Yet a large number of sources are available which express specifically, directly and clearly the attitude of Marx and Engels toward the great Russian philosopher and revolutionary, who was their contemporary. This includes public statements found in published works and speeches and, above all, in "Das Kapital." Secondly, the letters written by Marx and Engels which describe Chernyshevskiy's works and activities. Let us also name relatively new most valuable sources (not published in their entirety as yet), such as draft manuscripts by Marx about Russia and the various Russian publications preserved in his library, with notes and remarks on the margins made by him during his study of these works, including Chernyshevskiy's main political-economic work and others. Books and other printed works were not the only sources Marx and Engels used in their study of Chernyshevskiy's life and works. Their direct contacts with Russian sociopolitical personalities played a major role in this area. More than 30 of the best people coming from Russia visited Marx and Engels at their homes. Some of them were Chernyshevskiy's students and fellow fighters. Their reports and stories enabled Marx and Engels to acquire a more vivid and specific concept of character and the importance of his activities to revolutionary Russia.

The life, activities and incredibly hard fate which befell Chernyshevskiy who, at the peak of his powerful talent became a prisoner for life of tsarism, triggered a lively and warm response in Marx and Engels. They studied most thoroughly the rich spiritual life of this Russian philosopher and rendered their due to the rare comprehensiveness and depth of knowledge, strength and innovational nature of his works and his dedicated revolutionary activities in the defense and interest of the oppressed people. They ranked him among the most noted scientists and sociopolitical personalities of his time.

Chernyshevskiy was of exceptional interest to Marx in two most important respects. To begin with, he was the embodiment of the then-revolutionary forces in Russia, its revolutionary credo and banner in the struggle for the liberation of the working people. Secondly, as a scientist he tried to resolve problems of political economy, a science which was the base of Marx's scientific specialty. Marx was the first in Western Europe to become familiar with the new and progressive direction in economic thinking developed by Chernyshevskiy--his political economy of the working people. In the postface to the second edition of the first volume of "Das Kapital," he considered especially necessary to emphasize that it was precisely Chernyshevskiy, "the great Russian scientist and critic," who had proved the bankruptcy of bourgeois political economy in a masterly fashion. This brings to mind Lenin's familiar statement that Chernyshevskiy "was an outstandingly profound critic of capitalism despite his utopian socialism" (op. cit., vol 25, p 94).

In studying Chernyshevskiy's works, Marx became convinced that the revolutionary philosopher was not limited to criticizing the Russian autocratic-serfdom system and the capitalist system in Western Europe and the United States. Marx was very interested in Chernyshevskiy's program for struggle against autocracy and serfdom through a popular revolution and social development, bypassing the capitalist stage and moving toward a socialist society. This is eloquently confirmed by his study of Chernyshevskiy's "Critique of Philosophical Prejudices Against Communal Ownership." The main thing on which Marx focused was the exceptionally specific formulation of the concept of the advantages of the collective compared to private ownership of productive capital.

Marx was perfectly aware of the fact that, in defending the small peasant farm against landed estates and in opposing capitalist farming in the West, Chernyshevskiy did not call for going back: he countered feudal serfdom and capitalist society with socialist production achieved through associations of working people. As we know, Marx was highly enthused at the thought expressed by Chernyshevskiy in his main theoretical work on the historically transient nature of society based on exploitation and, consequently, the inevitability of the fall of capitalism and the victory of socialism. Considering the conditions of that period and the level of Russian development at that time, Chernyshevskiy could not name the actual historical forces which could ensure a future socialist development in the country. However, Marx highly valued the fact that Chernyshevskiy raised exceptionally important problems of social development and awakened and mobilized progressive thinking for the solution of the most topical problems of social reorganization. The importance of Chernyshevskiy's new historical formulation of a

problem such as the possibility (under proper circumstances) of bypassing the barbarically cruel capitalist way of development, painful to the toiling masses, is unquestionably great. This is an exceptionally vital problem facing a number of peoples throughout the world today. This problem was studied by Marx and Engels and, subsequently, by Lenin. Today it is being theoretically and practically resolved by communist, worker and revolutionary-democratic parties in many countries.

Marx, as well as Lenin after him, again and again returned to Chernyshevskiy's assessment of the 1861 reform as the most accurate and profound. The accurate assessment of this turning point in Russian history predetermines the proper analysis of the subsequent history of the country which entered the path of rapid capitalist development and the mass establishment of a working class as the leading force of social progress.

The philosophy of revolutionary democracy developed by Chernyshevskiy, the overall materialistic and dialectical nature of his views, the political economy for working people he developed, and his theory of socialism with the elements of a proper view on the role of classes, the class struggle and the features of the future society, along with other creative accomplishments of this great democrat and socialist directly served the cause of ideological preparations for the dissemination of Marxism in our country. The study of Chernyshevskiy's philosophical works helped the Russian revolutionaries to master the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, while his works on economics prepared them suitably for understanding the meaning of "Das Kapital."

Chernyshevskiy was the direct and most important predecessor of the Russian revolutionary social democratic movement as a philosopher and practical worker in the class revolutionary struggle of his time. As Chernyshevskiy's contemporaries, Marx and Engels maintained close contacts with his fellow workers. They were well-familiar with the content of the propaganda of revolutionary ideas in Russia during the period of the fall of serfdom. The main organ and leading center of this propaganda was Chernyshevskiy's *SOVREMENNICK*, which was the most widely read militant journal published within Russia. They could not fail to admire Chernyshevskiy's perfect understanding of the importance of disseminating revolutionary ideas from an open rostrum, in a printed organ controlled by revolutionaries, who were turning to the masses and trying to unite the best forces in the country to ensure the success of the revolutionary movement. They perfectly realized the incredible difficulties which the head manager of *SOVREMENNICK* faced in publishing his journal, which only increased their admiration for the dialectical flexibility of Chernyshevskiy's mind, political experience and gift of using the language of fables, thus brilliantly, ably and cleverly bypassing tsarist censorship and invariably and firmly defending the basic interests of the people's masses.

Marx and Engels could not fail to note as an exceptionally positive fact in Chernyshevskiy's revolutionary practical activities that in addition to publishing a legal organ he had become the head of a secret organization which had appeared thanks to the fully deliberate efforts of Chernyshevskiy himself and the revolutionaries raised in the spirit of his ideas. One could easily imagine the importance which Marx and Engels ascribed to both given their

experience in creating the first revolutionary newspapers and organizations of the working class.

Being perfectly informed of all essential features related to Chernyshevskiy's life and work, Marx and Engels could confidently determine the overall importance of his activities in the country's historical development and in Russian and world-wide social thinking. In their view, Nikolay Chernyshevskiy was "a great Russian scientist and critic" on a global scale, the greatest revolutionary writer who had totally subordinated his entire work to the topical tasks of the political struggle and the explanation of the final objective of the social movement--the building of a new and just society. He was also a skillful, courageous and dedicated agitator of rare persuasiveness; he was the "ideological inspirer" of the revolutionary movement developing in Russia.

Marx and Engels were not the only ones outside Russia who wrote of Chernyshevskiy's great accomplishments. A great deal of new and exceptionally important information is provided in this respect by the collective work prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy (see "N. G. Chernyshevskiy v Obshchestvennoy Mysli Narodov Zarubezhnykh Stran" [N. G. Chernyshevskiy in the Social Thinking of Peoples Abroad]. Moscow, 1981; edited by V. Ye. Yevgrafov, L. A. Kogan and L. V. Polyakov). We already had the occasion to cite the French historian A. Leroi-Beaulieu who made a serious study of post-reform Russian and visited the country a number of times to do his research on the spot. In his "The Tsar's Empire and the Russians," published in French, he wrote that Chernyshevskiy's contemporaries saw in him a "giant of human thought," the "greatest pioneer of the future" and even "another Karl Marx." This is an outstanding testimony which Marx recorded in his notebook.

Chernyshevskiy's appearance, sources of brilliance and wealth of intellectual creativity and contribution to the development of global science cannot be understood outside the trend of his time, both within the country and abroad, and without taking into consideration his study of Western European reality, world social thinking and the works of Marx and Engels. As a person of phenomenal and universal education, he could not fail to be familiar with the works of the greatest men of his century. The topic of the familiarity of the great revolutionary democrat in Russia with the works of the founders of scientific socialism has already been reflected in Soviet historiography and fruitful research on this topic is continuing. Such studies were originated by historians V. N. Shul'gin and I. M. Romanov in the 1950s. A true scientific discovery--Chernyshevskiy's assessment of "Das Kapital," the main Marxist work, was made by political economist V. M. Korochkin in his works "Was N. G. Chernyshevskiy Familiar With Marx's 'Das Kapital'?" (VOPROSY ISTORII, No 3, 1968); "Ekonomicheskaya Mysl' N. G. Chernyshevskogo na Puti k Marksizmu" [N. G. Chernyshevskiy's Economic Thinking on the Way to Marxism] (Moscow, 1978); and "On N. G. Chernyshevskiy's Assessment of Marx's 'Das Kapital'" (VOPROSY ISTORII, No 3, 1980). The author of these works proves that Chernyshevskiy was not only familiar with the works of Marx and Engels but throughout virtually all of his creative life he spoke of them (without naming them) as the founders of the "new direction" of social thinking in Western Europe. In his "Outlines of Gogol's Period in Russian Literature" he

claimed that "it was only through the works of the latest German thinkers that philosophy was given a content consistent with the stipulations of the exact sciences and, as a natural science, was based on a strict analysis of facts."

V. M. Korochkin deserves credit for determining the true meaning of the eight long (over 10,000 printer sheets) letters written by Chernyshevskiy in an Aesopian style, written in March-April 1978 in Vilyuysk. Chernyshevskiy himself described them as "dissertations," presenting them as explanations to his sons of a variety of scientific problems. Nevertheless, the authorities confiscated the letters which were published only in Soviet times, in 1950, in Vol XV of N. G. Chernyshevskiy's "Complete Collected Works." These letters were obviously directed at his like-minded friends, his contemporaries and his descendants. In an effort to mislead the censorship with distracting materials discussing astronomy and mathematics, and using the names of Newton and Laplace, Chernyshevskiy discussed in a strictly conspiratorial manner the social science of the "new direction" and its creators. He admired the greatness of the theory of the scientist he called Newton. This theory "is of tremendous scientific significance.... It offers unquestionably reliable knowledge." He added that "I reached truly accurate and tremendously important conclusion in defiance of everything..." (see Korochkin, op. cit., p 184).

Chernyshevskiy's highest possible rating of the works of Marx and Engels is important in itself. At the same time, it encourages the critical reviewing and refining of a number of conclusions made before the students and commentators of Chernyshevskiy's literary legacy reached this fact. The interpretation of the content of the letters of the Vilyuysk prisoner does not give us grounds, in particular, to write that he had lost his spiritual strength. Tsarism was unable to kill this great mind during his lifetime. Chernyshevskiy continued to participate in the social struggle against tsarism and reaction during his Vilyuysk exile as well (see "N. G. Chernyshevskiy i Sovremennost', " pp 106-111). From his Vilyuysk jail he tried to draw the attention of the progressive people of his time to the only accurate science of society and the need to use it, for he saw in this accurate theory a means for the reorganization of the world on a just socialist basis. The awareness that such a theory exists inspired him and gave him strength and inexhaustible historical optimism. Chernyshevskiy's entire life, whether free, in solitary and in jail, in mines and in exile, was one of continuing spiritual growth and creativity in both theory and the revolutionary class struggle.

In describing Chernyshevskiy some researchers show an inclination to describe him--whether for reasons of inertia or insufficient familiarity with historiography or lack of awareness of its latest achievements--as a philosopher belonging exclusively to the precapitalist system, as a representative of the interests of the serfs alone, rather than all the toiling people, including the workers. This is frequently a result of the fact that Chernyshevskiy and his works are studied unrelated to his time and the crucial period in the country's socioeconomic development, the European revolutions of 1848-1849 and the aggravation of the class struggle in Russia itself, which came soon afterwards.

In order to clarify the true significance of Chernyshevskiy's works and, consequently, assess him accurately as a historical personality, Marx not only

analyzed his works but compared them to the specific historical situation which he also studied especially. The most thorough study of that epoch in the life of Russian society and its accurate understanding explained to Marx the reasons for the appearance of the corresponding ideas. In his letter to S. Meier, dated 21 January 1871, Marx explained in detail why he had undertaken new studies aimed at enriching the second and third volumes of "Das Kapital" with new materials, this time drawn from Russian sources and, particularly, Chernyshevskiy's "excellent" economic works. His conclusion was that "the current ideological movement in Russia confirms that a ferment is taking place deep within its lower strata. Minds are always linked to the body of the people through invisible ties" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 33, p 147).

The particular study of Russia's economic and sociopolitical development which Marx undertook enabled him to see in Chernyshevskiy an ideologue, who expressed the interests of the revolutionary peasant and worker masses under particular historical circumstances and conditions. In analyzing economic phenomena characterizing the change from one system to another based on Russia's example, Marx closely studied all essential social features and manifestations of the antifeudal struggle of the masses and revolutionary democracy. Thanks to A. I. Hertzen's publications abroad, Chernyshevskiy's "Unaddressed Letters" (which he studied from manuscript copies and contributed to their publication), and various other works which had passed the tsarist censorship, Marx was familiar with the most important manifestations of the 1861-1863 class struggle in the country, including the savage reprisals by the authorities over the peasants in Bezna village and Kandeyevka. In his "Remarks on the 1861 Reform and Russia's Postreform Development," which is the main summing-up section entitled "The True Nature of the Liberation of the Peasants," he begins with the thesis that "guerrilla warfare was being waged by peasants and landowners" ("Arkhiv Marks'a i Engel'sa" [Marx and Engels Archives], Vol XII, p 14).

Therefore, in undertaking his special study of Russia, Marx began with the study of precisely the time which created Chernyshevskiy himself, with the ideological wealth of the militant epoch of the fall of serfdom and the flight of literary and philosophical-economic and revolutionary-democratic thinking. Marx and Engels dealt in many of their works, both published or in preparation, with the culminating period in Chernyshevskiy's and his "party's" revolutionary activities and the events accompanying the revolutionary situation in Russia. Their study clearly shows the continuity of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the Russian historical process.

Marx, Engels and Lenin considered Chernyshevskiy the son of his time, who had extensively developed his activities with the advent of the revolutionary age. They considered him the head of an entire trend and of the then-democratic mass which was manifesting its creative revolutionism. Marx and Engels knew well that this trend was nurtured by Dobrolyubov's works as well and highly rated the latter's outstanding literary talent, exceptional publicistic gift and, particularly, consistent revolutionary democratic political thinking. They were also familiar with the names of V. G. Belinskiy, N. A. Nekrasov and T. G. Shevchenko. Marx studied M. Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin's political satires, red pencil in hand.

Marx's and Engels' exposure to the ideological works and deeds of the great Russian revolutionary democrats was continued and strengthened by the will of history by the practical alliance between the founders of scientific communism and the young revolutionaries who had previously worked in Russia under Chernyshevskiy's leadership. Chernyshevskiy's school and experience in active participation in the struggle during the general revolutionary-democratic upsurge in the country favorably influenced the shaping of the ideological and political outlook of the revolutionaries, who formed in 1870 the Russian section of the International headed by Marx and Engels. A. A. Serno-Solov'yevich, N. I. Utin, V. I. and Ye. G. Bartenev, Ye. L. Tomanovskaya (Dmitriyeva), A. D. Trusov and other Russian members of the International did not merely remain members of exile circles but consciously and most energetically joined the Western European labor movement. They tried to understand the ideas of the founders of scientific socialism whom they had chosen as their leaders. The active participation of Chernyshevskiy's followers in the most progressive proletarian revolutionary movement and the development of their outlook from the ideology of revolutionary democracy to scientific socialism is an important historical fact which, among others, proves that the Russian revolutionary social democracy did not appear in a vacuum but had its very rich, heroic and instructive prehistory.

Headed by Chernyshevskiy, the revolutionary democrats played a major role in the preparations for a social revolution in Russia. They contributed to its spiritual awakening and to molding the revolutionary awareness of the peoples of our homeland. Their activities broke the ground for the great exploit of Lenin's genius, the creation of the communist party and, thereby, the victory of the Great October.

A proper concept of the "Chernyshevskiy age" enables us to understand profoundly and accurately and to assess his inordinately rich and comprehensive ideological creativity. This relates both to existing Russian reality and to global reality: the development of capitalism in the West, which had already defined its irreconcilable contradictions, the European revolutions, in the vanguard of which the proletariat was already acting, and the inclusion of Russia in the common Western European trend of historical dynamics and the existence in Russia of a particular revolutionism on the part of the people subject to the double yoke of exploitation (semiserfdom and bourgeois). This was a great people who, as Engels said, adopted critically and creatively the achievements of global science and culture and consciously and dedicatedly looked for an accurate revolutionary theory with "extensive intellectual strength." Chernyshevskiy himself, toward the end of his life, wrote in his letters from Vilyuysk that his own scientific activities followed the direction of the brilliant philosophers Marx and Engels.

The bourgeois ideologues are doing everything possible to falsify, belittle and ignore Chernyshevskiy's role. The prime duty of the Soviet researchers is to preserve from distortion the true Chernyshevskiy and to continue to study his extremely rich theoretical legacy, practical revolutionary activities and entire life, which is an exploit for the sake of the people, remembering Engels' words about the "great philosopher to whom Russia owes infinitely much."

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FROM P. L. LAVROV'S FILES

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 86-93

[Text] In his analysis of the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia, V. I. Lenin wrote that "Russia truly reached Marxism as the only accurate revolutionary theory after 50 years of unparalleled pain and sacrifices, unparalleled revolutionary heroism and an unparalleled amount of energy and dedication in the course of searches, training, practical testing, disappointments, verification and comparisons with the European experience" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 8). In this complex and lengthy process Petr Lavrovich Lavrov, one of the predecessors of the Russian social democratic movement, described by Lenin as a "revolutionary theory veteran," had definite historical merit (op. cit., vol 2, p 462).

For a number of decades P. L. Lavrov's tremendous literary legacy and political biography (1823-1900) have drawn the attention of historians of the revolutionary movement, philosophers, sociologists, cultural historians and literary experts. This is quite natural considering the originality and depth of his encyclopedic mind, comprehensive creative and revolutionary activities and great contributions to the international and the Russian revolutionary movements.

Lavrov's fate is quite similar to that of the progressive people of his time. He was born in Melekhovo village, Pskov Guberniya, to a family of rich land-owners, and his education was brilliant, initially at home and subsequently in Petersburg's Artillery School, which he completed in 1842 and received an officer's commission. In March 1849 Lavrov became a regular teacher at the artillery school in Petersburg (subsequently in the Artillery Academy as well); he was already a colonel by 1858. Scorning the family traditions of loyal service to the tsar, which offered him a career, Petr Lavrovich took up as his civic duty the struggle against autocracy and for the liberation of the people from cruel exploitation and oppression.

At the beginning of the 1860s, already known for his antigovernment poetry, which was being extensively copied and printed in Hertzen's KOLOKOL, Lavrov was in the leading ranks of the Russian revolutionary democratic movement. By 1862 he was a member of the "Land and Will" secret revolutionary society and in the files of the Third Department he was already recorded as one of the 50 "most suspicious individuals" along with N. G. Chernyshevskiy, N. V. Shelgunov, and the brothers A. A. and N. A. Serno-Solov'yevich. Lavrov was arrested on 25 April 1866. Although the investigation proved his

noninvolvement with the attempt on the tsar's life made by the revolutionary D. V. Karakozov on 4 April, he was dismissed "from the service" and prosecuted. He was exiled to Vologoda Guberniya in 1867.

During his exile Lavrov published (under the pseudonym of P. Mirtov) his "Historical Letters" between 1968 and 1969. Their slogan was that everything was for the people, including one's own life. Despite its idealistic nature, the theory they developed of the sacrificial nature of the revolutionary and the "unpaid duty" of the progressive intelligentsia to the people played a historically progressive role in mobilizing the young people to revolutionary work and shaping the revolutionary-humanistic views of the period.

With the help of G. A. Lopatin, in February 1917 Lavrov escaped from exile and reached Paris on 1 (13) March. Here, on L. Varlin's recommendation, he joined the First International and became close to the Polish revolutionary democrats--the future legendary generals of the Paris Commune J. Dombrowski and W. Wrublevski. He wrote works imbued with the ideas of internationalism and the class solidarity of the working people. In the period of the Paris Commune Lavrov was the first to describe it in the European revolutionary press as a proletarian revolution. In common with the ideas of the International Association of Workers, he drafted a plan for the reorganization of the entire educational system of the French people with a view above all to exposing the workers to knowledge.

The Paris Commune, which Lavrov defined as an "important epoch in mankind's movement," left an ineradicable impression in his mind throughout his life. It strengthened his faith in the need for a possibility of a revolution in Russia. His work "18 March 1871," which Lenin, as confirmed by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, considered "the best after Marx's 'Civil War in France,'" came out in Geneva in 1880.

At the beginning of the 1870s Lavrov established contacts with the revolutionary underground in his homeland. Such contacts broadened even further after he undertook, with a group of like-minded people, the publication of a journal in Zurich in 1873 (in London in 1874) and the newspaper VPERED' in 1875. It was largely thanks to his efforts that, developing the tradition started by A. I. Hertzen of a free Russian press, these publications became not only organs of the Russian but a rostrum of the international labor and socialist movements and contributed to the strengthening and further development of the principles of socialism in them. In the many articles he published in the journal and the newspaper (the editor of which he remained until the end of 1876), Lavrov spoke as one of the ideologues of populist utopian socialism, developing and promoting his concepts of the originality of Russia's historical development, with the community as the basic element of the future social system, and the secondary significance of the political and the priority of social problems. He also published anonymously in VPERED' his famous song "The Workers' Marseillaise" ("Let us reject the old world! Let us shake off its dust from our feet!..."). Lavrov's vivid publicistic works had a tremendous impact on the young generation of the Russian Raznochintsy intelligentsia, making him one of the inspirers of an unparalleled movement

in terms of scale and nature, which developed between 1874 and 1875: a mass "moving into the people" on the part of hundreds of young men and women, who called upon peasants and factory workers to rebel and who spread among them the ideas of utopian socialism.

In his "Biography-Confession," written circa 1885 and supplemented in 1889, Lavrov, who acknowledged that the idea of socialism became clear to him gradually, noted the significance in this complex process of the influence of the ideas of the First International and Marx's theory (see P. L. Lavrov, "Filosofiya i Sotsiologiya. Izbr. Proizv." [Philosophy and Sociology. Selected Works]. In two volumes, Moscow, 1965. Volume 2, pp 639-650).

This previously unpublished document from Lavrov's file, a message with his note "Not for Publication" (January 1880) enriches the historiographic foundations of the history of Russian social thinking of the end of the 19th century and fills a certain gap in the factual data on Lavrov's activities at that time as a revolutionary theoretician.

In his message, Lavrov tried to apply to the assessment of the basic socio-economic problems of Russia a number of concepts of historical materialism. We see the characteristic aspiration of the author comprehensively to contribute to the unification of the efforts of all trends within the Russian revolutionary movement in the joint struggle against autocracy, achieving unity of action in this struggle and surmounting differences in his own circle; and helping the revolutionaries to develop a proper outlook and tactics. To a certain extent, Lavrov's positions coincided with the tactical line followed by Marx and Engels toward the Russian revolutionary movement. This was the result of his contacts with the founders of scientific socialism. At the same time, however, Lavrov's document reflects populist illusions which, as it were, he was unable to surmount.

The publication was prepared for printing by Candidate of Historical Sciences Ye. K. Zhigunov.

Dear comrades:

I was informed that my messages dated 11 November (30 October) and 15/3 November reached you but, in all likelihood, perished in the catastrophe following Alexander's detention.¹ Although I am not certain of this fact, as the recipient of further proof of your desire for my cooperation, I have hastened, in any case, to rewrite the material which I am sending to the new address, beginning with the first article entitled "Thoughts on Worker Socialism," which is word for word the same as the original, with my full signature, as agreed upon with the now-disappeared Arkadiy;² secondly, I am sending the first "Letter from Paris" on the socialist movement abroad, brought up to date. I would like very much to be notified of the receipt of this material and the time when the continuation of both works will be required, so that the "Letters From Paris" may remain up to date. As to the "Thoughts," I shall send you a second article once I am confident that the first was published. To this purpose it would be quite desirable (as well as for another reason which I shall describe later), for me to receive your publications

sooner; as it is, No 2 of NARODNAYA VOLYA, of 20/8 November I received on 12 December/30 November. I shall be signing my "Letters From Paris" with my initials.

However, this being the first time that I enter into direct contact with groups acting in Russia since 1877,³ I deem it my moral obligation, dear comrades, to speak frankly on what I find to be erroneous and dangerous in your activities. I do not consider it right to express my thoughts sharply in the press, for if read by the enemy or the unconvinced, they could harm the cause of the people whom I acknowledge as my comrades although their means of action may differ from mine. I am writing this, however, not for publication but only for comrade circles, for which reason I can speak frankly. I will merely mention the most dangerous item which should remain almost unmentioned at the present time, for the past is irrevocable and, having taken a certain road, one must proceed along its fateful path. I would like to mention the general system of red terrorism which is taking place in Russia of late in the struggle against the government. I consider this system so dangerous to the cause of socialism, and success along this way so unlikely, that had I even the slightest influence on your conferences and resolutions when you had decided to take this path, and had I been reliably informed of your intention to take it, I would have done everything possible to dissuade you. Now, however, it is too late. You have taken this path, one which is difficult to abandon without a public acknowledgment of the party's weakness, an admission of defeat in the eyes of observers from the side, and without undermining your moral significance in the struggle. That is why I can tell you nothing at the present time about this area of your activities of which you must be aware at least as well as I am if not far better. I do not dare...tell you that I hope that you will win in this terrible and uneven battle. I can only sincerely wish that your enemies lose their heads, which are not strong as it were, and grant you victory. Better than anyone else, you know that your strikes must be extremely well-aimed and that even a single major error along this dangerous way could doom the entire future of the revolutionary party for decades.

But let me go on to your program of action or, to be more specific, to your programs, for I have been informed of the existence of two and even more trends among the active Russian groups. Printed matter has reached me expressing one direction the organ of which is NARODNAYA VOLYA, but I am also told that CHERNYY PEREDEL has numerous supporters who have not spoken out as yet.⁴ Therefore, their program should be guessed at.⁵ For this reason I begin with the supporters of NARODNAYA VOLYA but, actually, I am addressing this letter to all comrades belonging to the different factions.⁶ When I was visited last October by the now-disappeared Arkadiy, he accused me that at the end of my report on the 1877-1879 movement, published in JAHRBUCH,⁷ I spoke of an apparent rapprochement between active groups of socialists and constitutionalists; he claimed that I was wrong by interpreting in this sense a number of expressions in Nos 3 and 4 of ZEMLYA I VOLYA.⁸ I was willing to believe him and it was in that sense that I wrote my "Introduction" to "Thoughts on Worker Socialism," a copy of which I am sending you now. I believed him even more after reading issue No 1 of NARODNAYA VOLYA, for there as well the expressions used were so similar as to be interpreted in the

sense of political activities not in favor of the Constitution or parliamentarianism but in the sense of the organization of political activities as inseparable from socialist tasks. Now, however, I have in front of me issue No 2, which openly speaks of a "constituent assembly" which would consist of "90 percent of peasant deputies" and elections which would presume "suitable smartness in the activities of the party," i.e., of the social revolutionary party.⁹ In that article, without the least objection on your part, your correspondent is telling you that you should not "fear the constitutional regime." We must conclude, therefore, that you have adopted a constitutional program and intend, on a parliamentary basis, to gain, first of all, a parliamentary majority through elections, followed by "a total change in all of our economic and state relations" by voting in the "constituent assembly." Is this the way in which your program should be interpreted?

If such is the case, your policy must be directed toward an alliance with the constitutional elements in Russian society. This means that as a political party which is trying to "put the power of the state in the hands of the people," you will enter and will be forced to enter into an alliance with the representatives of land ownership and flexible capital, who are becoming organized in the course of this struggle in a different political party, which will try to put the "power of the state" in the hands of the prosperous minority. Let us set aside for a minute any kind of socialist task or economic overturn and consider the likelihood of the triumph of one of these two political parties or the other in the course of their competition for the power which, together, they will take away (we assume) from the autocracy. What is the likelihood that the predictions of NARODNAYA VOLYA will come true? That precisely the party supporting the poor working people will have 90 percent electoral majority? Or that the socialists will be sufficiently influential among the voters (regardless of the type of electoral system) so that they may send their supporters to the constituent assembly? Let me inform you of the sad circumstance that I have yet to see a single person who would not be amazed or laugh at such an incredible prediction. What we have here is not something absolutely new or unparalleled in history, but a new edition of the frequent repetition of a case of the supporters of the poor and working population waging a struggle for power against the supporters of the minority of owners of real estate and moveable property. The latter have triumphed always and everywhere. This is as accurate as it is inevitable, so that now even the European socialist parties which have deemed it necessary to use parliamentary weapons have never hoped for a victory but have considered such a struggle as having different objectives. We know that we shall never gain a majority in a reichstag or landtag, the German orthodox social democrats say. However, we need the reichstag and the landtag as a rostrum from which we can announce our convictions to the rest of the world without hindrance. They have begun to realize of late that they cannot accomplish even this "without hindrance." One of the most energetic personalities in the French socialist movement told me a couple of months ago, that we know the people we have elected to the Chamber of Deputies will be lost to the party. However, the electoral agitation itself is a way to increase our strength; considering French customs, abstaining from elections would be suicidal to our party. Furthermore, when we promote our candidates we teach the workers hostility toward the famous radical bourgeoisie whom they trust.

I somewhat fear that experience will prove to the French socialists that they cannot achieve their objectives this way. In any case, virtually no supporter of the people in Europe nurtures any hope of gaining a majority in a constituent assembly in representing the poor classes, given the current distribution of the wealth. Yet the supporters of NARODNAYA VOLYA apparently believe that this is possible in Russia where political ideas are less widespread among the masses than anywhere else and where it is difficult for the peasants to send to the uyezd center a member of a jury or a counselor. Yet here they speak of a "90 percent" representation in the main city of the entire country, in a constituent assembly which will discuss problems most unrelated to ordinary peasant life! This is an inconceivable, a dangerous illusion toward which one does not know even what kind of attitude to assume. Finally, if a revolutionary party is able to engage in the type of extensive agitation or propaganda among the people or anything such as to motivate the poor population the moment the autocracy falls to send to the constituent assembly 90 percent of the people elected from the "party," it would be far easier to call upon that same people openly to rebel under the flag of the socialist principles and engage in the expropriation of the minority, which are ideas incomparably closer to and understood by the people compared to the intricacies of a constituent assembly.

What does all this lead to? Is it that I am rejecting all political activities on the part of a revolutionary socialist party? Or that I am advising you to leave politics and its problems aside? Not in the least. I cannot even conceive of any Russian socialist to be preaching something of this kind. I do not recall in VPERED!, RABOTNIK or OBUKHINA¹⁰ or in the brochures and books of the Bakuninists¹¹ even a single expression which could be interpreted in the following sense: make peace with the Russian emperor for the sake of suppressing the developing bourgeoisie; do not struggle against the government, for your enemy is exclusively economic, and so on. It is true that THE DAILY NEWS has Mirskiy¹² saying to the judges "our party cannot be considered political in the narrow meaning of the term," and "I cannot consider it antigovernmental, for, not having created or invented a system, we logically cannot call for the destruction of the monarchic principle." Could this be apocryphal? Finally, what does an occasional statement in court matter? In any case, this view is quite unique to Russia. I fully agree with the fact that "a party of action must set itself specific objectives, realistic and useful to the people;" that "this fact--the Russian state, the Russian government, with all of its specific characteristics and all consequences of its significance and activities, cannot ignore a revolutionary party if it is in step with historical requirements;" that the "struggle against the existing government...is entirely inevitable;" and that, finally, "given our state system, a political and social coup would blend totally and that one would be inconceivable without the other."¹³ However, there is quite a difference between agreeing on such items and aspirations regarding the constituent assembly in which one would triumph through elections, voting and legislation.

A political coup d'etat cannot be separated from a social one. Never having been an anarchist, I frankly believe that a people's revolution which results in a social or economic coup cannot occur without the seizure of power and

without its organization and, consequently, without purely political measures. The only concern in this case would be to see to it that the share of this power is as insignificant as is possible. However, it would have to be granted a certain amount of power, not only in making the revolution but in the course of preparing for it. Yes, a revolutionary party which desires an economic coup must be politically organized and try to seize the power from its two enemies: the political might of the government and the economic might of those who own and possess the wealth. In Russia the bourgeoisie is a-borning without being as yet organized and to describe it as an unorganized predator, as we read in issue No 2 of NARODNAYA VOLYA, is a major error. There is no bourgeoisie as yet but there is a minority of haves. The purpose of a socialist revolution, therefore, is inevitably double: to overthrow the government and to expropriate the owning minority. No expropriation whatsoever is possible without overthrowing the government and allowing the working class to seize the power. However, by postponing the expropriation and overthrowing the government jointly with the owning minority, the people's party makes any true expropriation impossible and difficult in the immediate future; once the bourgeoisie has become organized after the fall of the autocracy, such a future may become distant, the more so since the Russian bourgeoisie will be relying on the class of the peasant kulaks who stem from the people themselves, for which reason it will be far more difficult to fight it than it would be to fight landowners, stockholders, manufacturers and other such groups which have alienated themselves from the people. Therefore, political activities are necessary and the struggle against the government inevitable; however, it is precisely because "a political change would be inconceivable without a social change," our path cannot follow an alliance with the constitutionalists or include any kind of constituent assembly called prior to the expropriation and the deprivation of the owning minority of its power. Political organization and political agitation must be such that the expropriation could take place at the very first minute and that the power be given to the people over whom there would be no economic oppression.

The entire question is, can the socialists try to attain this objective? If the Russian revolutionaries are dreaming of a 90 percent representation in the constituent assembly, they should have supporters who, the moment the government breaks down and the army and the administration become demoralized (which is an unavoidable prerequisite for a situation under which a true constituent assembly could be convened), could act as firm centers of the people's uprising. If the Russian revolutionaries are unable immediately to organize an extensive people's political party, which would be as hostile to the owning minority as to the government, they would be unable to achieve any kind of political objective in the immediate future and they should not even dream of "putting the power of the state in the hands of the people," but think of means to organize that same popular force which, at the proper time, would be able to transfer such power. In my view, in order to achieve this, the dissemination of socialist ideas, even Western,¹⁴ remains one of the best, if not the only, means. However, setting this question aside, in any case, now or in the future a people's political party must be organized, consciously hostile to the possessors of economic power and convinced that neither elections, votes, or constituent assemblies, given the current economic situation, could shift the power to the people and that the people

would be able to assume this power, beginning with the expropriation of the economic enemies and the parallel undermining of autocratic power. Possibly the revolutionaries would be unable to accomplish this before the imperial power grants concessions and drafts a constitution. Use should be made of what will be available. Such a people's party should be organized, be it under better conditions or whatever conditions may exist. Perhaps the Russian revolutionaries, like the German social democrats and the French and Belgian revolutionaries today, may deem it necessary to participate in the electoral campaign. I would not dare to predict that this would not be useful to Russia in the least. However, I can claim quite confidently that whatever objectives may be reached as a result of it, they would not involve gaining a majority in the constituent assembly and passing a number of legislative decrees promoting economic change. This view must be expanded further. However, I cannot engage in providing details. In any case, I hope that you will understand this idea, which I can sum up as follows: a political struggle against the government is necessary and inevitable for the socialists. However, it cannot be achieved through an alliance with non-socialist radicals and liberals; one should not rely on the parliamentary way; such a struggle can be based only on the organization of a politically pure people's party. Personally, I can conceive of such an organization only on the grounds of socialist ideas and with the help of socialist propaganda.

At this point, I turn to the other faction, the faction of the new "populists," about whom I must somewhat guess, for I have no positive documents and proofs regarding their program. I am forced to be guided by rumors, taking into consideration some statements in ZEMLYA I VOLYA and Stefanovich's¹⁵ article in OBUCHINA, although the involvement of Aksel'rod¹⁶ in CHERNYY PEREDEL creates a certain doubt in my mind as to whether I understand accurately the line taken by this faction. In the past, we describe both propagandists¹⁷ and rebels as "populists," with the idea that a change could be achieved only through a popular movement rather than Jacobin decrees. Now, I am told, the term "populists" is applied in Russia to those who believe that all that is necessary is to organize the people's forces and as to socialist principles, the "populists" seem to be convinced that these principles have already been assimilated by the Russian people in their communal aspect and that anything in Western socialism, not included in such instinctive foundations, is entirely unnecessary to the Russian people, for which reason it should not be promoted among them.¹⁸ I repeat, I may have an incorrect understanding of these trends and I would be very happy to be proven wrong. If I am not, however, once again I cannot conceal from people I consider my comrades that I believe this to be a tremendous and very dangerous error. We are faced not even with the primitive Russian community of the 14th century mentioned by Sokolovskiy.¹⁹ We are faced with a peasantry which has experienced 500 years of serfdom and fiscal oppression, with a community which inevitably has become distorted and twisted, in which the class of the kulaks and the desire to become a kulak are developing quite naturally. All that remains in it is some vestiges of old-time working solidarity. This could be used as a starting point in developing scientific socialist ideas, but that would be all. On the other hand, present-day scientific socialism is not an accidental product of local conflicts and prerequisites; it is the product of a general historical movement and a great deal of thinking. Like any real

and practical product, it can be easily assimilated, for its ideas are simple and accessible to all working people, providing that the interests of these working people make such ideas acceptable. But to assume that the majority of the people could not only assimilate these principles but reach them alone, invent them, the way Pascal hit upon Euclidean principles during his childhood, means ignoring all psychological experience and historical proof. There is no example of a primitive community unspoiled by egotistical conflicts and of the development of the family, ownership and power having led to the rational principles of progressive socialism. Suddenly, however, you wish for a present-day community subjected to corrupting principles from all sides, as though hit by a pressure hose, a community which produces kulaks on a daily basis, to come up by itself to the principles of solidarity among all working people, the principles of total joint ownership not only within the community but among communities and so on! No, your duty, starting from the elements of communal solidarity retained among the Russian people, is to disseminate the contemporary socialist ideals in the form which you find accessible and which, through you, must become accessible to the people. There neither is nor should be one socialism for developed people, for the revolutionary aristocracy, and another socialism for the simple people, for the crowd, in the way the enlighteners of the 18th century wanted to have beliefs for the "nobles gens,"²⁰ and other for the "canailles."²¹ The conclusions of socialism must be the same for all and so must its practice. A developed person can only see more clearly the precise reason for these conclusions; to him they are a more sensible persuasion and scientific confidence whereas to the majority they are a heartfelt belief. The same applies to astronomy, geology, and so on. As a result, there should be no difference. Therefore, the dissemination and application of socialist principles in all sectors is an absolute necessity for the convinced socialist working among the people. This propaganda alone can be the base for a proper organization of a people's party. I shall not engage in a debate as to whether both could be conducted simultaneously or, as Aksel'rod assumes, such functions should be split between two types of groups and personalities.²² This becomes clear on site. In any case, the propaganda must be based on the broadest possible socialist principles. Naturally, history will force concessions upon us. However, this will come at a time which no one will predict any more than the type of concessions which will be necessary or unnecessary. For the time being the propaganda must be conducted as though no concessions are necessary and as though the Russian people can implement in full the socialist idea. This, in my view, should be the real role of the true "populists."

But tell me, please, where are the old propagandists, the former supporters of VPERED!? What are they doing? Why are they silent? While terrorists are fighting and politicians are trying to organize a political force and the new "populists" are trying to organize the people's forces with the assumption that the people will come up to the socialist ideas by themselves, how is it that no pamphlets, books or leaflets promoting socialist ideas are being printed? Although I parted company with my old comrades for the reason that at the 1876 meeting in Paris²³ their representatives took a rather rigid and, in my opinion, unfair view of my activities, I could not even conceive that in such stormy times they would keep silent and fail to carry out even a

single one of their projects. I am ashamed of my old comrades. It is precisely along with this dirty terrorist struggle and political agitation that they should preach, print and explain principles. If they believe in what they used to believe, if they believe in the principles of socialism in their full extent, by what right do they remain silent? Yet they have remained silent for the past 3 years. To sum it up: perhaps you, dear comrades, would be unwilling to listen and to believe an old propagandist and will come up with something better, something more practical. To me, however, who has followed closely and sympathetically all sectors of your activities, even the ones which angered me, which sometimes frightened me and sometimes made me indignant, your activities should be roughly the following:

1. All convinced socialists must become organized within a single federation of secret circles performing a variety of functions but, whenever possible, assist each other and act jointly. Individual and general delegate congresses should unify the common project.
2. There should be a single target: a social upheaval, both economic (expropriation of owners) and political (overthrow of the current government); obviously, a different number of organizations should be assigned to perform these different functions.
3. Since the Russian revolutionaries have already taken the way of terrorism, inevitably some forces should be assigned this function, using them as little and as sparingly as is possible. Perhaps focusing the efforts on the liberation of imprisoned comrades by force may provide a solution to the present situation.
4. Political activities must consist of organizing a people's party consciously hostile to the existing government and the more or less liberal and radical parties which do not accept an economic revolution. As it becomes better organized and stronger, this party should be used, in all cases, for the purpose of breaking down the existing governmental order and blocking the power from going to a capital-owning minority or preventing the establishment of any kind of rule relying on this minority. Electoral agitation (should a constitution be adopted) could be used as a weapon in the struggle, although this is quite doubtful. In no case, however, could parliamentarianism lead to the triumph of a people's party. The people's party must not join or make deals with any other party rejecting an economic upheaval. The moment the people's party becomes sufficiently strong, it should directly concentrate its efforts on a political upheaval, inseparable from the economic expropriation of the minority.
5. Together with the organization of a party and the struggle against the enemies, as many forces as is possible should be directed toward the dissemination of socialist ideas, both with the help of the personal influence of convinced socialists scattered among the people and recruiting comrades among them, who clearly understand the tasks of socialism or at least firmly believe in the need for their implementation, as well as with the help of publications and circles for the youth, to develop new conscious propagandists who would develop the features suitable for the new system.

6. The publication of periodicals and leaflets in Russia is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the unity and organization of the party and its influence on society. It may be necessary also to publish propaganda pamphlets and larger theoretical and historical works which could be printed abroad more conveniently.

7. Setting the principles of anarchism aside for better times, in order to ensure the better deployment of available forces and material facilities for these various objectives, it may be useful to create a central action organ and be concerned with establishing the proper relations both among the various party groups in Russia and the groups abroad. A secret organization of strictly selected individuals is necessary. It seems to me that an executive committee means a committee or congress of executives. Bearing in mind the terrible contemporary struggle, it is hardly necessary to adhere strictly to principles which are naturally important (an unquestionably independent group and independent personalities), but secondary considering the need for victory.

Let me add a few specific items. I believe that it would be useful to provide foreign socialist organs with accurate and speedy information on the Russian movement. Most contradictory and wild ideas are being printed and reported concerning the Russian nihilists. I have had to prove at socialist meetings that they are socialists. Others write that the movement has no principles. Others again consider nihilism a movement outside any kind of civilization, and so on. I have been asked by EGALITE to provide information on this subject and by REVUE SOCIALISTE²⁴ to write more serious articles. It would be useful if you were to send me your new publications as quickly as possible and inform me in writing if possible, as to what you would like to be disseminated should you be unwilling to print it yourselves for one reason or another. I should also have some of your previous publications of which I have only portions. I do not have the full issues 3 and 4 of ZEMLYA I VOLYA, pamphlets Nos 4 and 5,²⁵ nothing on the trial of the 192²⁶ and many of your proclamations. Arkadiy promised me to do something about sending them to me but now.... I have heard that you intend to publish the history or data on the history of the latest movement.²⁷ If I can be useful to you on any specific matter on this project I would be very pleased to do so. However, we must be particularly concerned with organizing the proper way to send my foreign publications and to receive yours. In a few days I shall be sending you a few copies of the first printing of my pamphlet on the Commune of 1871, which has just been published.²⁸

My respects to all your factions and the means through which you are working for the victory of our common cause.

13/1 January 1880²⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. A reference to A. A. Kvyatkovskiy, member of the executive committee (EC) of NARODNAYA VOLYA; detained in Petersburg on 24 November 1879.

2. A reference to A. I. Zundelevich, member of the NARODNAYA VOLYA executive committee; he was in charge of political relations between the organization and foreign countries; detained in Petersburg on 28 October 1879.
3. Lavrov's starting point is his withdrawal from the editorial board of VPERED!, which he headed between 1873 and 1876.
4. Unlike the Narodovol'tsy, who supported the political struggle against the autocracy essentially through "threatening terrorism," the supporters of CHERNYY PEREDEL acted through propaganda essentially among the peasantry. Lavrov was somewhat misinformed, for it was the Narodovol'tsy trend which was dominant at that time.
5. The CHERNYY PEREDEL program, like the Program of the Northern Russian ZEMLYA I VOLYA Society, was published in No 2 of CHERNYY PEREDEL in September 1880.
6. A copy of this document was also in the possession of L. N. Gartman, who was in London. See "Russkiye Sovremenniki o K. Markse i F. Engel'se" [K. Marx and F. Engels in the Eyes of Their Russian Contemporaries," Moscow, 1969, p 164.
7. Reference to "Jahrbucher fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik," Band I, Zurich, 1879; Lavrov published this material under the heading "The Socialist Movement in Russia" in the journal KATORGA I SSYLKA, No 1 (14), 1925, pp 43-84.
8. Printed organ of the organization bearing the same name, from October 1878 to April 1879 (a total of five issues were published).
9. Here and subsequently Lavrov cites the editorial ("The Party's Tasks") in issue No 2 of NARODNAYA VOLYA.
10. VPERED!, RABOTNIK and OBUKHINA were Russian revolutionary publications abroad in the 1870s.
11. M. A. Bakunin's followers were also known as the rebels.
12. L. F. Mirskiy participated in the revolutionary movement in the 1870s. He shot but missed A. R. Drentel'n, the chief of the gendarmes, in Petersburg, on 13 March 1879. Sometime later he was arrested in Taganrog. Mirskiy's case was tried by the Petersburg Military District Court between 15 and 17 November. Information on the trial was published in NARODNAYA VOLYA, No 2. See "Literatura Partii NARODNAYA VOLYA" [Literature of the NARODNAYA VOLYA Party], pp 41-43.
13. Excerpts from the editorial of NARODNAYA VOLYA No 2.
14. In the lectures "Review of the Tasks of Worker Socialism," delivered in Paris between July 1877 and February 1878 to a group of socialist emigres of Slavic nationalities (including Russians), Lavrov defined as follows

the "historical purpose" of "critically thinking individuals" in terms of Russia: propaganda by the intelligentsia among the workers of the ideas of Western European socialism so that the inevitable and subconscious process of unification of the workers as a class may become purposeful; doing everything possible for this process "to take place consciously, so that the interests binding the workers be illuminated by clear convictions and scientific socialist theory." Lavrov referred to the "Communist Party Manifesto" (TsGAOR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution] of the USSR, File 1,762, List 2, Case 203, Sheet 37).

15. Ya. V. Stefanovich was a member of the revolutionary movement in the 1870s-1880s and one of the founders of CHERNYY PEREDEL. Lavrov notes Stefanovich's tendency, like that of some members of ZEMLYA I VOLYA to substantiate and develop the accuracy of the Bakuninist tactics of "individual outbreaks" (peasant uprisings and rebellions).
16. By the end of the 1870s P. B. Aksel'rod, one of the founders of CHERNYY PEREDEL, opposed the struggle for granting parliamentary freedoms in Russia. He considered the political struggle against autocracy inevitable but "under the control of socialism as the supreme criterion of revolutionary activity." See O. V. Aptekman "CHERNYY PEREDEL (A Page From the History of the ZEMLYA I VOLYA Society of the 1870s). In the book "CHERNYY PEREDEL. Organ Sotsialistov-Federalistov 1880-1881 g." [CHERNYY PEREDEL. Organ of the Socialists-Federalists. 1880-1881]. Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, p 100.
17. A reference to Lavrov's followers also known as Lavrists.
18. Faith in the socialist instincts of the Russian peasantry, the Russian community in particular, through which the revolutionaries conceived of the future conversion to a socialist system, inherent at that time to an almost equal degree among the supporters of CHERNYY PEREDEL and NARODNAYA VOLYA.
19. P. A. Sokolovskiy was an economist and historian. He published his major works by the end of the 1870s: "Historical Outline of the Rural Community in the North of Russia," St. Petersburg, 1877; "Economic Life of the Russian Agrarian Population and the Colonizing of the Southeastern Steppes Before Serfdom," St. Petersburg, 1878. Lavrov considered Sokolovskiy "one of the best later students of the economic history of the Russian people" (TsGAOR USSR, File 1762, List 2, Case 282, Sheet 16).
20. "The nobility."
21. "The riffraff."
22. A reference to the article by P. B. Aksel'rod "Transitional Moment for Our Party," in Nos 8-9 of OBSHCHINA (November-December 1878). Its detailed presentation and analysis are provided in Aksel'rod's work "Experienced and Considered" (No 1, Berlin, 1923, pp 272-298).

23. A joint congress between representatives of propaganda circles in Russia (VPERED! supporters) and members of the editorial board took place in Paris between 3 and 14 December 1876, at which Lavrov parted with the majority in terms of their views on propaganda tactics. Lavrov assumed the duty of editor of VPERED! and moved to Paris in 1877. See P. L. Lavrov, "Narodniki-Propagandisty 1873-1878 gg." [Populists-Propagandists 1873-1878]. Leningrad, 1925, pp 257-258.
24. Organs of the French socialist press. Lavrov published in issues Nos 1 and 2 of L'EGALITE for 1880 (21 and 28 January) under the signature of "Old Russian Socialist" an essay on the development of the Russian revolutionary movement of the 1860s-1870s entitled "Russia. The Socialist Movement."
25. LISTOK ZEMLI I VOLI, a publication of ZEMLYA I VOLYA supporters, published six issues between March and June 1879.
26. Error in the text: should have been the trial of the 193. Lavrov refers to the official publication of materials of the trial which took place between October 1877 and January 1878 of the participants in the mass populist movement of 1874-1875 of "going to the people." See "Minutes of the Case on Revolutionary Propaganda in the Empire. Session of the Special Pending Committee of the Government Senate," Vol I, St. Petersburg, 1878.
27. The implementation of this task abroad was assigned initially to L. N. Gartman and subsequently to N. A. Morozov. See K. G. Lyashenko, "On the Authorship and the History of the Creation of the Manuscript 'Essay on the History of the Chaykovtsy Circle'." ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1965, pp 145-150.
28. A reference to the work entitled "18 March 1871." Geneva, 1880.
29. Lavrov's autograph (TsGAOR USSR, File 1762, List 1, File 2, Sheets 22-30); on fine glossy paper with author's numbering (pp 1-11).

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CENTENNIAL OF THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR GROUP

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 94-99

[Text] The date 25 September 1983 marks the centennial of the founding of the first organization of Russian Marxists--the Emancipation of Labor Group which, as is noted in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress," played a notable role in the intensive process of dissemination of Marxism in Russia. In the course of its 20 years of activities (1883-1903) the group, which was founded by five revolutionary-populist emigres--G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Aksel'rod, V. I. Zasulich, L. G. Deych and V. N. Ignatov--did a great deal for the dissemination of Marxist ideas in Russia. V. I. Lenin highly valued the literary-publishing activities of the Emancipation of Labor Group and frequently spoke of its contribution to the Russian revolutionary movement.

The announcement "On the Publication of a 'Modern Socialist Library,'" written by G. V. Plekhanov--its ideological leader and organizer--was the manifesto which proclaimed the creation of the first Russian Marxist organization. The document is dated 25 September 1883, considered today the birthday of the founding of the Emancipation of Labor Group.

The beginning of this document was never to be found in previous reprints. Possibly, Plekhanov himself deleted it for one reason or another. The document which follows is published in its entirety for the first time. It is of interest in terms of understanding the initial period of activities of the Emancipation of Labor Group and the views which Plekhanov held at that time. Noteworthy is the author's thought of the need to create a party of "representatives of labor" (i.e., the proletariat), and the formulation of its separate program so that, after the overthrow of the autocracy, to gain from the other opposition parties as many rights as possible for the benefit of the working people. The document is interesting on another level as well: it indicates the difficulty of the first steps taken by the Russian supporters of scientific socialism. Marxist terminology was only beginning to be developed in the Russian language. Along with the precise definition of "working class" we come across concepts of "representatives of labor," and "the toiling population." Clearly, the author was looking for a precise formulation.

Also published is an article by the outstanding German Marxist Klara Zetkin "From the Russian Movement (Correspondence)," on the Emancipation of Labor Group and its ties with the revolutionary labor movement and social democratic parties in the European countries. F. Engels welcomed the activities of the Emancipation of Labor Group and gave it friendly assistance from its very first steps; the group was actively supported by leading personalities in the

Western European proletarian movement such as A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Zetkin, P. Lafargue, E. Marx-Eweling and others. Zetkin's article was published in 1890 under the pseudonym Zkw in DER SOZIALDEMOKRAT, organ of the German Social Democratic Party. Klara Zetkin writes not only of the previous publications by the group but also about its plans and accurately describes the basic problems of the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia toward the end of the 1880s. She discusses Plekhanov's preface to the pamphlet "P. A. Alekseyev's Speech," which triggered a tempest of indignation among the populist personalities, caused by the author's claim that only those members of the intelligentsia who had totally converted to the viewpoint of the proletariat could be considered revolutionaries. K. Zetkin presented in detail Plekhanov's preface and voiced her full support of his criticism of the populist "intelligentsia," which considered itself revolutionary only because it was ready to oppose the tsarist government, but had only a vague idea of the ways and means for overthrowing it and failed to understand the role of the working class in the revolutionary reorganization of Russia. Also noteworthy is the high rating which Zetkin gave to Plekhanov's work and the activities of the Emancipation of Labor Group.

The third document of the Emancipation of Labor Group is the greetings to the French Worker Party Congress, which was held in Marseilles, signed by Vera Zasulich. It was published in French in LE SOCIALISTE, the party's organ, in its 4 October 1892 issue, among other greetings, and was subsequently reprinted in its Russian translation in S RODINY I NA RODINU, the Narodovoltsy journal. At that time Russia was experiencing a grave economic and political crisis caused by the hunger which had spread over a considerable part of its territory. Indignation at the autocracy, whose policies had brought about the suffering and death of millions of people, was increasing among the popular masses in the country and progressive people abroad. It looked as though this indignation would develop into a revolution in Russia. On A. Bebel's initiative, the German Social Democratic Party offered aid to the Russian revolutionary emigres if an agreement could be reached between the social democrats, headed by Plekhanov, and the Narodovoltsy, headed by Lavrov. The talks which were to be held in London in Engels' premises broke down and the situation in the country changed: with the help of repressive measures the tsarist government was able to suppress the indignation of the masses.

The greeting to the Marseilles Congress is a reflection of the support of the ideas of proletarian internationalism by the Emancipation of Labor Group.

In marking the centennial of the founding of the Emancipation of Labor Group, loyal to the Leninist tradition, the communists turned to the legacy of the first Russian Marxists and to the history and theoretical activities of the first Marxist organization in Russia which played an important role in the ideological-theoretical preparations for the creation of a revolutionary-Marxist party of the Russian proletariat in the 1880s-1890s, something which was accomplished at the Second RSDWP Congress in 1903.

The publication was prepared for printing by Dr of Historical Sciences I. N. Kurbatova, curator of Plekhanov House in Leningrad.

I

G. V. Plekhanov

On the Publication of a "Contemporary Socialism Library"¹

Everyone describes the current state of affairs in Russia as transitional. The revolutionary struggle, which has become aggravated in recent years, has clearly proved to thinking people that no tranquil and proper course in Russia's social development can be expected without profound changes in our sociopolitical relations. Everyone is waiting for change and everyone demands change more or less energetically, and everyone agrees that the irrepressible logic of things does not allow us to start with the semireforms of the previous reign. Some advise the government to go back to Nicholas' regime or even to the pre-Peter Rus system. Others beg it to make concessions to the spirit of the times and to give society the possibility of participating in settling the current confusion. Others again, who account for the least numerous yet most decisive group, are engaged in an energetic struggle against absolutism, having long abandoned hope of any major serious concessions on its part.

However, all revolutionary struggle presumes one ideal or another and one system of social relations or another, for the sake of which the revolutionary movement exists. The Russian absolute monarchy is such an obvious anachronism that one does not have to be a follower of "extreme doctrines" to hate it most sincerely. Even social classes which in the progressive countries in the West are already representatives of stagnation and reaction appear revolutionary compared to it. The struggle against the current governmental system rallies people with very disparate ideas, with major differences among them on the tasks and limits of the Russian revolutionary movement. Those who represent labor may toil on the destruction of absolutism side-by-side with the liberal representatives of capitalism. Several social trends have already developed within the awkward Russian monarchy, ready to engage in an open internecine struggle immediately after the fall of absolutism.

For this reason, the parties representing these different trends must not only struggle against absolutism but secure for themselves the strongest possible influence for the future, when the new structure of Russian social life will begin to be erected on the ruins of absolutism. Each one of them must engage in active propaganda among the class or social stratum the interests of which are expressed in its program. Each one of them must organize and prepare its members for war even if it has done everything possible to resolve its disputes with its enemies peacefully. The party which relies on a significant social force will be the only one with the opportunity and the right to have its requirements met.

The struggle against absolutism--a historical task shared with the other progressive parties in Russia--will not bring the Russian socialists the possible influence in the future were the fall of the absolute monarchy to meet the Russian working class in an undeveloped condition, indifferent to social problems or ignorant of how to resolve such problems accurately in its own interest.

That is why socialist propaganda among the toiling strata of the Russian population considered receptive to its ideas and the organization of at least the most outstanding representatives of such strata are among the most serious obligations facing the Russian socialist intelligentsia.

The creation of worker literature, which would provide a simple, concise and clear interpretation of scientific socialism and would clarify the most important sociopolitical tasks of contemporary Russian life from the viewpoint of the interests of the working class is a necessary prerequisite for such propaganda.

Before undertaking the creation of such literature, however, our revolutionary intelligentsia must itself master the contemporary socialist outlook and abandon old conflicting traditions. That is why the criticism of programs and doctrines prevailing among it should assume an important position in our socialist publications.

Anyone familiar with the contemporary condition of our socialist literature knows how little it satisfies both stipulated requirements. The members of the groups which were the first to undertake the publication of CHERNYY PEREDEL² (in 1879-1880), have resolved to assist with all possible means in the filling of such gaps, for which reason they are now undertaking the publication of a "Library of Contemporary Socialism."

While fully acknowledging the need and importance of the struggle against absolutism, they also assume that the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia has so far excessively ignored said tasks in organizing the working class and disseminating socialism among it; they believe that the struggle waged by the working class against the government has not been sufficiently paralleled by preparing the Russian working class for conscious participation in the country's political life. The destructive work done by our revolutionaries was not supplemented by the creation of elements for a future socialist worker party in Russia.

Having now changed their program in terms of the struggle against absolutism and the organization of the Russian working class as a separate party with a specific sociopolitical program, the former members of the CHERNYY PEREDEL group are now setting up a new group entitled "Emancipation of Labor" and proclaim a total break with the old anarchic trends.*

* Considering the repeated rumors of an alleged merger of the old CHERNYY PEREDEL group with NARODNAYA VOLYA, we consider it necessary to say a few words on this subject. During the past 2 years talks on unification have indeed taken place between the two groups. However, although two or three members of our group have fully joined NARODNAYA VOLYA, no full merger could be accomplished, unfortunately. As the reader will see from the pamphlet "Socialism and Political Struggle," published here, this merger is hindered by the differences between us and NARODNAYA VOLYA on the question of the so-called "seizure of power" and some practical means in the tactics of revolutionary activities based on this programmatic item. However, the two groups have so much in common that they can act side by side in the tremendous majority of cases, reinforcing and supporting each other.⁵

The success of the first undertaking of this group depends, naturally, on the sympathy and support of revolutionaries operating in Russia. That is precisely why it turns to all circles and individuals, both in Russia and abroad, who sympathize with said views, with the proposal of exchanging services, organizing reciprocal relations and engaging in the joint formulation of a fuller program for work in favor of the common cause.

This group will consider the "Library of Contemporary Socialism" an initial effort, the successful outcome of which would enable us to broaden its work and undertake the publication of socialist collections or even periodical reviews.

The task which the publishers of the "Library of Contemporary Socialism" set themselves hardly needs a more detailed explanation after this. It may be reduced to two main points:

1. Dissemination of the ideas of scientific socialism through the translation into Russian of the most important works of the school of Marx and Engels,³ and of original works, bearing in mind the different levels of training of the readers.
2. Critique of revolutionary theories found in our circles and development of the most important problems of Russian social life from the viewpoint of scientific socialism and the interests of the working population in Russia.⁴

Geneva, 25 September 1883

II

K. Zetkin

From the Russian Movement
(Correspondence)

The "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats,"⁶ which is expecting a decisive victory in the struggle against the current ruling political system in Russia from the labor movement alone, and which considers, for this reason, as the basic task of the Russian revolutionaries the enlightenment and organization of the developing industrial proletariat, created several years ago the "Worker Library"⁷ with this view in mind. The "Worker Library" is a series of popularly written pamphlets aimed at the political and economic education of Russian industrial workers with the help of the social democratic doctrine and developing in them an awareness of their historical mission. Unfortunately, "Worker Library" editions could not come out regularly because of long interruptions due to lack of funds. Recently, after the publication of the two excellent pamphlets "Labor Movement and Social Democracy" by P. Aksel'rod and "Who Lives As What?" by Dikshteyn, "Petr Alekseyev's Speech" (at the Trial of the 50 in St. Petersburg in 1877) was published, soon to be followed by "Varlen's Speech" at the second trial of the leaders of the International.

Petr Alekseyev's speech assumes particular importance thanks to the excellent preface written by Plekhanov.⁸ As we know, the particular interest in the Trial of the 50, on which the Petersburg Senate passed a final sentence in March 1877, is due to the fact that several workers were among the accused and that one of them, Petr Alekseyev, refused to defend himself, for the sentence had been passed in advance, thus turning the trial into a comedy. The speech which he addressed to the court was in no way a defense but an accusation of the government and the capitalists. After describing in simple yet deeply felt and touching words the poverty of the Russian workers, Petr Alekseyev expressed the belief that the worker can rely only on himself if he is to improve his situation. He enthusiastically mentioned in good terms the Russian "youth intelligentsia" and "students" who were the only ones to extend a fraternal hand to the Russian peasant, to listen to him and to answer his appeal for help. The same youth will march hand in hand with the workers in the future, "until the strong hand of millions of working people is raised and the yoke of despotism, protected by army bayonets, is smashed to smithereens."

Praise of the Russian youth intelligentsia of that time was entirely suitable and justified. The Russian students of the 1870s indeed proved themselves full of splendid idealism and dedicated to educating the people with fiery passion and a feeling of self-sacrifice.

These are different times, however, for which reason Plekhanov particularly comments on parts of the speech which point out to the workers their own strength and which discuss the role of the youth intelligentsia. Quoting Alekseyev, he develops in a popular and easy-to-understand manner the principle that only workers as a class can help other workers and that their liberation will take place the wishes of the other classes notwithstanding. This truth, which was the basic idea of the International, is today becoming familiar to millions of Western European workers. The seizure of the power of the state by the workers becomes a preliminary condition for its implementation and preparations for it involve acquiring the freedom of assembly, association and press and, above all, universal suffrage. The Western European workers are familiar with the value of these gains and make particular use of the right to universal suffrage in order to send their own representatives to legislative assemblies. If the upper classes call for restricting the (executive) state powers, the workers as well must demand the same, without however forgetting that they can overthrow despotism only through their own efforts. The defenders of the worker cause must be recruited among the proletariat itself, as is already frequently the case in Western Europe. If they are to achieve their liberation, the workers cannot rely on the youth intelligentsia as a whole, for it is beginning to forget the people. Some of its members are now claiming that Russia has no working class; others believe that the workers are too stupid to be addressed. Having no hope of obtaining a great deal from the so-called intelligentsia in its totality, the Russian workers must make an even greater effort to secure the support of people who have abandoned its ranks, providing that they have fully taken up the cause of the proletariat, thus despite all dangers engaging in propaganda activities among the proletariat and for the proletariat. What Alekseyev said of the Russian intelligentsia 13 years ago truly applies to such people today.

Plekhanov has major reasons for energetically appealing to the workers to rely only on themselves and for making a clear distinction between individuals who are members of the intelligentsia and the intelligentsia as a whole, based on their attitude toward the worker cause.

Bearing in mind the characteristics of conditions in Russia (which must be taken into consideration), the concept of "revolutionary" applies to very disparate elements. More or less common to all of them is the aspiration or at least the desire to overthrow the current absolutist system. Other than that, their views on the objectives and tactics of the movement are totally disparate. Incredible differences in the perception of reality and, partially, an inconceivable confusion of views prevail not only among the bourgeois liberals, whose supreme ideal is a Kike constitution of the Western European model, but also among the revolutionaries themselves. In the eyes of many Russian revolutionaries, for example, the "intelligentsia," the "youth intelligentsia" in particular, is still being looked at as a messianic-revolutionary element elected to promote a social rebirth which, based on idealism and without the assistance of the broad popular masses but only by drawing them to itself could carry out the revolution and decree from above a just social order the way a child may be presented with a new and more beautiful hat.

The "Union of Russian Social Democrats," headed, along with Plekhanov, by P. Aksel'rod and Vera Zasulich, believes that it is the working class which is the bearer of the truly revolutionary movement, a class which, by virtue of its economic status, is primarily a revolutionary element, whereas the remaining population strata, including the "intelligentsia," become conservative the moment their special interests have been satisfied.

Plekhanov arrived at this outlook not only thanks to his inordinate talent but also his thorough study of sociopolitical Western European publications, which provided him with the type of profound and comprehensive knowledge not as yet encountered in any other young Russian revolutionary writer. Plekhanov's development is also decisively influenced by his close contacts with the Western European labor movement which he has studied with particular thoroughness. The fact that Plekhanov was able to surmount his former prejudice to the effect that the "youth intelligentsia" is the alpha and omega of the revolutionary movement and that he gives priority to the principle of the class struggle is precisely consistent with the spirit of the times. Clarity toward the objectives and tactics of the movement is necessary in order to ensure the successful further development of events. If the Russian intelligentsia at large is incapable of being the bearer of a social renaissance, for the time being it is particularly those who have abandoned its camp who must work on the education and organization of the broad popular strata. However, before they can prepare the people for the performance of their historical role, this role must be entirely clear to themselves.

In the past few weeks the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats" undertook the publication of the journal SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. Its content is extremely interesting and, in addition to a story translated from the French, includes the following articles: "Our Populist Novelists" by G. Plekhanov; "Bourgeois

Revolutionaries" by V. Zasulich; "Chernyshevskiy" by G. Plekhanov; "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" by F. Engels; "Centennial of a Great Revolution" (G. Plekhanov); "The International Worker Socialist Congress in Paris" (signed by) "A New Comrade;" "On the London Dockers' Strike," letter to the editors by El. Marx-Eweling; "Resignation of the Bourgeoisie" by F. Engels; "Internal Review," "Massacre of Political Exiles in Yakutsk" and "Detentions in Russia."

DER SOZIALDEMOKRAT, No 12, 22 March 1890

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First publication in the Russian language

III

Vera Zasulich, (G. V. Plekhanov)

Greetings to the Marseilles National Congress
of the French Worker Party⁹

Dear comrades!

The Russian social democrats greet the French delegates gathered in Marseilles for the National Congress of the Worker Party.

May the name of the city where 12 years ago representatives of the French proletariat drafted the program of the worker party, based on the principles of contemporary scientific socialism, be a good omen!¹⁰ Bourgeois France is throwing itself into the embrace of the tsar precisely when the autocratic system is agonizing and when all of Russia has been brought to a situation of terrible hunger through the greed and stupidity of the government, and is ready to deprive the bloodstained hands of its oppressors from the right to mold its destinies.¹¹

Worker and socialist France is a merciless enemy of despotism; it will ally itself only to those who are fighting for the political and economic liberation of the productive class.

Old Russia, which is dying, is the natural ally of all reactionary elements in Europe, for which reason it is a threat and an eternal obstacle to the triumph of the proletariat throughout Europe.

The new Russia, European and progressive, which will emerge from the current crisis, will not only not hinder this triumph but, conversely, will contribute its numerous battalions to the great international army of the social democratic proletariat the world over.

Long live worker and socialist France! Long live the alliance of socialist parties the world over!

S RODINY I NA RODINU, No 2, Geneva, 1893, p 106

FOOTNOTES

1. The announcement "On the Publication of the 'Library of Contemporary Socialism'" was written by Plekhanov in September 1883 and published as an eight-page pamphlet. One month later it was reprinted as an appendix to Plekhanov's pamphlet "Socialism and Political Struggle," and subsequently published in 1885 as an appendix to Marx's work "Speech on Freedom of Trade;" it was reprinted repeatedly in subsequent years. The announcement always began with the second half. The first half of the documents (before the asterisks) remained unknown to both contemporaries and historians. However, a copy of the first edition has been preserved at the library of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, based on which this document is published for the first time since 1883.
2. CHERNYY PEREDEL was the organ of the revolutionary populist organization of the same name. Five issues were published in Geneva and Minsk in 1880-1881.
3. Eighteen works by Marx and Engels were published in full or partially in the "Library of Contemporary Socialism" series.
4. In addition to the works of Marx and Engels, the "Library of Contemporary Socialism" series included the following works by Plekhanov: "Socialism and the Political Struggle," "Our Differences," "A New Defender of Autocracy or Woe Unto Mr Tikhomirov" and others.
5. Remark ascribed to L. G. Deych.
6. Klara Zetkin named the group "Emancipation of Labor" for the reason that at the constituent congress of the Second International, in 1889, Plekhanov was a delegate with a mandate signed by V. Zasulich on behalf of the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats."
7. Starting with September 1884, the "Emancipation of Labor" group began to publish the series "Worker Library," which included pamphlets especially written for workers with an average level of education who were just beginning to read political literature. As the awareness and educational level of the Russian proletariat grew, such publications as well became more complex. The "Worker Library" series for 1901 had 10 editions; the "Speech by P. A. Alekseyev" was the third issue, published at the end of 1889; "Varlen in the Corrective Police Court" by V. Zasulich was published in 1890 as issue No 4 of the "Worker Library."
8. Plekhanov's preface to the pamphlet "Speech by P. A. Alekseyev" (see G. V. Plekhanov, "Soch." [Works], Vol III, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, pp 113-117).
9. The 10th Congress of the French Worker Party took place in Marseilles from 24 to 28 September 1892. Greetings to the participants were sent by representatives of socialist parties of a number of countries. The congress delegates were greeted by P. L. Lavrov on behalf of the

Narodovol'tsy (for which reason the document was printed in their organ S RODINY I NA RODINU) and the "Emancipation of Labor" group. The greeting to the group was signed only by V. Zasulich but, according to R. M. Plekhanov, it was drafted jointly with Plekhanov.

The Marseilles congress discussed the situation and activities of the party, the May Day celebration, participation in forthcoming parliamentary elections, and others. It passed an agrarian program.

10. Reference to the constituent congress of the French Worker Party, which took place in October 1979 in Marseilles. It discussed a program drafted by P. Lafargue and J. Guede, with the participation of Marx and Engels. The program was adopted on 14 November 1880 at the party's congress in Le Havre.
11. Reference to the crisis of the autocracy in connection with the crop failures in 1891 and 1892 as a result of which millions of peasants were doomed to hunger. The socialist and democratic press of all countries wrote of the tragedy. The Russian government appealed to the French government for loans which it needed less in order to help the hungry than to fight the increasing opposition within the country.

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RUSSIA'S TESTED SHIELD

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 100-111

[Article by Yu. Konishchev]

[Text] On the night of 25 September 1943 the advance detachment of the 331st Division, commanded by Maj L. A. Romanov, and the infantry battalion commanded by Capt P. F. Klepach, rushed into Smolensk on the heels of the enemy. At about 3 am P. F. Klepach, who was subsequently made Hero of the Soviet Union, hoisted the red flag on the tower of one of the few remaining buildings which offered a panoramic view of the city. Ancient Smolensk was liberated. Forever.

The following day KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA wrote: "Night and day we looked achingly to the west, repeating to ourselves: 'Smolensk lies there!' This was also our oath: Hoist once again on your stones our red flag! You came back to the ancient family of Russian cities to which you are linked with wide highways, military roads and innumerable pedestrian paths, with common toil and common songs, common battles and victories."

As it had throughout the preceding 11 centuries, the city displayed true miracles of bravery in the most bloody battle on our soil. Its population, worthy of its ancestors--"daring and fighting"--did not surrender to the hated enemy.

They Were Few But Daring and Fighting

Smolensk...Is there one heart which will not ache at the mention of that name? The people of Smolensk have experienced a great deal in its long-suffering history: trouble, oppression and feuds; great changes and troubled times, when enemies rushed at the Russian land from all sides, in the hope of getting rich at someone else's expense, and enslaved the industrious people.

The firm-spirited people of Smolensk, however, honorably withstood all of these trials. In the history of our homeland Smolensk was fated to become the western shield of Russia. Regardless of how often it was destroyed by its enemies and wrecked, the city was reborn again and again. Arising on the main watershed dividing the Zapadnaya Dvina, the Dnepr and the Volga basin, Smolensk rapidly developed, became prosperous and thus drew to itself the greedy looks of foreigners. Smolensk was first mentioned in the chronicles of the year 863, described as a "great and very populous city." On frequent

occasions the people of Smolensk repelled the raids of the Polovtsy, and took part in campaigns against them. The author of "Tale of the Igorev Regiment," who described courageously and bitterly the defeat of the Russian forces, called upon the Russian princes to unite in repelling enemy invasions. He named among them Smolensk's Prince David: "You, courageous Ryurik and you, David! Your soldiers in their gilded helmets, did they not swim in blood? Is it not your brave unit which roars like aurochs while your wounded lie in unnamed fields? Ride on your golden stirrups, oh princes, against the insults of our time, for the Russian land, for Igor's wounds, for the brave Svyatoslavich!"

Could the author of this brilliant poem anticipate that a few years later, in honor of the victory won by the united Russian forces over the Polovtsy David would build in Smolensk, on the Dnepr, the church to Archangel Michael (Svirskaya), preserved to this day?

How often have the people of Smolensk resisted the pressure of numerous aggressors! In the year 1184 the German hounds-knights marched against the Slavic lands. The Smolensk units hastened to help Polotsk, inflicting a crushing defeat on the crusaders. The enemy was expelled from Russian land. However, there was a threat from the south. In the battle of Kalk (1223) the Russian princes suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Mongols-Tatars. The Smolensk unit, headed by heavily wounded Prince Vladimir Ryurikovich, was able to break through the enemy's ranks. It was with good reason that the chronicler wrote then that "although they were few (the Smolyane), they were brave...The Smolyane are daring and fighting."

The threat of the Mongol-Tatar yoke rose over Rus mercilessly. In 1239 one of the Batyya detachments approached Smolensk from Yelna. A bloody battle took place on a huge field (today the Square imeni V. I. Smirnov and the Street imeni N. K. Krupskaya). The Smolensk unit, headed by Merkuriy, destroyed many of the aggressors and defended the city. In the first half of the 14th century the horde once again tried to capture Smolensk but failed. The Smolyane bravely fought at Kulikovo field as well.

On three occasions--in 1401, 1402 and 1403--the forces of the Lithuanian feudal lords tried to capture Smolensk. Throughout the following spring the Smolyane heroically defended themselves, and it was only the betrayal of the boyars that helped the enemy to enter the city on 26 June 1404. For the 110 years which followed Smolensk was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania without, however, losing its features as a Russian city. As in the past, Smolyane fought for the Russian lands. During the famous Grunewald battle (1410) the combined Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Polish forces, with the help of Czech detachments, inflicted a crushing defeat on the knights of the Teutonic Order. The Smolensk regiments, which withstood the main strike in the center, played a decisive role in this victory. This battle undermined the forces of the order once and for all and made the German knights disinclined to attack Slavic lands.

At the beginning of the 16th century the Moscow Tsar Vasiliy III was able to help the Smolyane who were fighting for reunification with the Russian lands, and after a third and decisive campaign captured the city on 1 August 1514. Smolensk was restored to Russia.

Aware of Smolensk's importance as a front end in defending the western borders of the state, the Moscow government did everything possible to reinforce the city. A stone fortress was built in the city, designed by the talented Russian architect Fedor Konya. Its grandeur, military power and beauty are striking and admirable to this day. His contemporaries described the Smolensk fortress wall as the "necklace of Moscow Rus." The fortress was completed in 1602, just in time. Seven years later, on 13 September 1609, the Polish king Sigismund III marched on Smolensk with a huge force and besieged it. At that time Moscow had to repel the pressure of the army of Lzhedmitriy II. The young military and state leader M. V. Skopin-Shuyskiy earned great credit in the struggle against the interventionists. During that difficult time he was able to neutralize the Swedes and even to involve them in an alliance in the struggle against the Polish forces. After defeating the troops of the supporters of Lzhedmitriy II, Skopin-Shuyskiy forced the interventionists to lift the siege of Moscow and solemnly entered the capital and began to prepare a campaign to assist the Smolyane. He introduced a number of progressive changes in the army. In particular, he introduced the field training of the troops, which immediately strengthened military discipline. Finding out that many peasants were hiding in the Smolensk forests, Skopin-Shuyskiy sent 30 warriors there to create special units to fight in the rear of the Polish forces. The first to begin the fight were the Smolyane. The scope of the guerrilla movement widened. The detachment commanded by one Treski, numbering as many as 3,000 men, caused the interventionists heavy losses.

Skopin-Shuyskiy died suddenly in the very midst of the preparations for the march on Smolensk. D. I. Shuyskiy took over, but was defeated at the battle of Klushino, in June 1610. The situation of the defenders of the Smolensk fortress worsened. There was no hope of aid from Moscow. Nevertheless, for one more year they withstood the Polish siege. The king stormed the fortress with his main forces when no more than 400 defenders remained. After blasting the fortress wall, the interventionists rushed into the city on 3 June 1611. The battle was fought for every single house, alley and ditch. Unwilling to surrender to the enemy, many of the residents, together with the remaining soldiers, locked themselves in the main church and blew themselves up. The church blew up (some 8,000 poods of gunpowder had been stored in its basement). At the other end of the city, the Russian patriot voevod M. B. Shein fought with a handful of soldiers until, heavily wounded, he was captured....

Here is the way the chronicler describes the heroic defense of Smolensk in 1611: "What courage they proved and what glory and praise fell on our entire Russian state! Spread not only in our famed land but among the hordes in Lithuania and Poland and many other lands, as far as Rome and even farther."

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of the heroic defense of Smolensk in 1609-1611 in terms of the destiny of Russia. For 2 years it blocked around its walls the main royal forces. Firmness of spirit and the unparalleled heroism of Smolensk inspired the populations of other cities in their struggle against the aggressors, enabled the Russians to raise a people's militia and, in the final account, to expel the interventionists from the native land.

The occupation of Smolensk did not come to an end until 1654. At the time of its liberation the city numbered no more than 200 people. A new Uspenskiy Cathedral, the splendor of which amazes anyone who visits Smolensk to this day, was built in honor of Smolensk's liberation, on the highest point of the city--Sobornaya Gora.

Smolensk gained further military credits during the Patriotic War of 1812. The most important events of the war took place on Smolensk soil. It was here that the two Russian armies--those of M. B. Barklay de Tolli and P. I. Bagration--joined, thus defeating Napoleon's strategic plan of routing them separately and thus clearing the way to the fast seizure of Moscow. The battle at the walls of Smolensk was one of the first major ones of the war. The guerrilla movement was widespread around the city. One of the peasant parties and detachments in Sychevskiy Uyezd was commanded by Vasilisa Kozhina, Vasilisa the Elder, who enlisted for this detachment women and adolescents. The name "Sychevka" terrorized the French marauders, as it was later to panic the fascist aggressors. A people's militia, reinforcing the Russian army, was raised with Smolensk volunteers. In the words of Tolstoy, in the final account, the cudgel of the people's war was the great power which crushed Napoleon's "grand army."

Enthralled by the courageous fight of the Smolyane against the French, M. I. Kutuzov addressed himself to the Smolensk population as follows: "Worthy population of Smolensk, kind compatriots! I receive most enthusiastic reports from everywhere on the unparalleled efforts of your loyalty and dedication.... Even in the most severe calamities you are showing the inflexibility of your spirit.... The enemy was able to bring down your walls and turn your property into ruins and ashes and put his heavy chains on you but he was unable and will be unable to win and conquer your hearts. Such are the Russians..."

Failure of the Blitzkrieg

Again, as in the past, during the terrible years of the Great Patriotic War, Smolensk was fated to fulfill the heroic mission of defending the country, stopping the fascist aggressors and protecting Moscow. Together with the entire country Smolensk fought the Hitlerites. It became the most important bastion on the gigantic front and experienced the biggest and fiercest battle of the first months of the war. The Hitlerite strategists ascribed prime importance to the seizure of the Soviet capital. This made the advance to Moscow their main direction. At the beginning of the war it was here that the Wehrmacht concentrated huge forces: 50 divisions and two brigades, more than 1 million soldiers and officers, about 2,000 tanks and assault guns and more than 1,600 combat aircraft. By 10 July the Hitlerite group directed toward Moscow had been considerably reinforced. It already included 62 divisions and two brigades. Our forces in a westerly direction were lesser: about 800,000 men, 6,800 guns, 780 tanks and 545 mostly obsolete aircraft.

After capturing Minsk, the fascist tank and motorized divisions of the Group of Armies Center rushed straight toward Smolensk. Halder, Hitler's chief of general staff, recorded in his diary on 30 June 1941 that "the Fuehrer believes that if Smolensk can be reached by mid-July the infantry formations

could occupy Moscow in August." But Smolensk blocked the path of the fascist forces.

The Battle of Smolensk began on 10 July with the offensive mounted by Guderian's Second Tank Group, which bypassed Smolensk from the south, and Goth's Third Tank Group, which advanced from the north.

Applying the tactic of active defense, our forces opposed stubbornly the enemy's pressure. Three of our armies were concentrated in a western direction, in the Smolensk area: the 16th, commanded by Lt Gen M. F. Lukin; the 19th of Lt Gen I. S. Konev, and the 20th of Lt Gen P. A. Kurochkin. The defense of the city was assigned to the 16th Army.

On 15 July the city was subjected to fierce bombing and artillery shelling; toward the evening the Hitlerites penetrated the southern part of the city. The same day the fascist propaganda proclaimed that "Smolensk is an open door. The German army has opened the way to the depths of Russia. The outcome of the war has been decided." However, the enemy erred. In the middle of the night our troops retreated to the right bank of the Dnepr, blowing up the bridges. The moment M. F. Lukin was informed that the enemy had seized the southern part of the city, he immediately went to the unoccupied northern part to organize its defense. Returning to his headquarters in the morning, in Zhukovo village, M. F. Lukin and Military Council member Maj Gen A. A. Lobachev unexpectedly met with elements of the 129th Infantry Division (19th Army) commanded by Maj Gen. A. M. Gorodnyanskiy. This force was a major reinforcement in defending the city.

All in all, five of our divisions fought in Smolensk, short of weapons and ammunition. They contained the fierce pressure of 11 elite Hitlerite divisions, including the SS Reich. Bearing in mind that a German infantry division regularly numbers as many as 17,000 soldiers and officers, while our divisions numbered 6-7,000 men and, after long and hard battles, no more than 1-2,000 men, one can imagine the ratio of forces on that sector of the front. The enemy received reinforcements steadily. No reinforcements were available to our forces. The enemy tried to cross the Dnepr but failed. On the night of 22 July, enjoying a great superiority in forces, the Hitlerites were able to cross the water barrier in several places and penetrate the northern part of the city. The battle was fought for every street, home and floor.

The 27 July 1941 combat report of the command of the 16th Army to the staff of the Western Front on the battles of Smolensk read: "The northern part of Smolensk is entirely occupied by our units. The clearing of the remaining resistance points began the morning of 27 July. Two enemy regiments have been totally destroyed...." It was only by order of the command that our troops began to withdraw, faced with the danger of being surrounded. The last elements of the 16th Army abandoned the city only on the night of 29 July, with the exception of one battalion of the 152nd Infantry Division, under the command of Senior Political Instructor A. S. Turovskiy, who subsequently became a guerrilla.

Many elite German divisions commanded by "famous" Hitlerite generals were crushed in the Smolensk battle. A total of 250,000 fascists died in the

battles in the approaches to Smolensk, in the city and in the Dnepr. The fascist leadership was forced to hurry in ever new reserves. This could not fail to affect the situation of the German front as a whole. In many front sectors the enemy converted to long-term defense.

The Smolensk battle was of great importance in gaining experience in combat operations in a large city. According to A. M. Gorodnyanskiy, commander of the 129th Infantry Division which defended Smolensk, no such experience was available to us and proper attention had not been paid to street combat, one of the most complex types of fighting, during peacetime training. In his memoirs entitled "Boyevoye Kreshcheniye" [Baptism of Fire], K. L. Sorokin, former chief of the Political Department of the 16th Army, noted that the fight for Smolensk was virtually the first case of heavy street fighting in a large city in the early part of the war, which was to be thunderously echoed 1 year later in the battle for Stalingrad.

The battle for Smolensk lasted until 10 September. Our guard was born in the battle for Yelnya: four divisions, to which two more were subsequently added, became guards divisions. The fearless son of the Belorussian people Nikolay Gastello took off from the Smolensk airfield for his flight to immortality; in the battles for Smolensk the Uzbek Tashtamir Rustamov blocked with his body the embrasure of an enemy pillbox.

Here is what M. F. Lukin, 16th Army commander, subsequently wrote on the results of the Smolensk battle. The best divisions of the Group of Armies Center were deprived of the opportunity actively to advance for a long period of time. In order to continue his advance on Moscow, von Bock, commander of the Group of Armies Center, had to bring up reserves and reinforce his tank and motorized divisions with new equipment. This required time. Meanwhile, however, we also replenished our divisions and regrouped and what seemed close and possible to the enemy in fact proved unattainable. The outcome of the struggle for Moscow was decided mainly at the Smolensk-Vyazma battle, on the distant approaches to the capital. As it were, the Germans did not enter Moscow. This means that we did not lose but won the Smolensk battle in 1941 although we conceded the area to the enemy.

The Soviet military leaders and marshals of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. I. Yeremenko, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovskiy, V. D. Sokolovskiy and S. K. Timoshenko and Army Gen P. A. Kurochkin gave a high rating to the Smolensk battle.

Here is the way the results of the battle were summed up by the Hitlerite generals, Goth, for example: "Using the forces of five divisions, the enemy continued to strike from the east, as a result of which all units and formations of the Third Tank Group, including the training brigade, were committed to battle to repel his pressure... The measures which had to be taken to come out of this difficult position drew to the south (to the Yelnya sally--the author) an increasing amount of force, thus laying the beginning of the fatal development of future events."

Under fascist occupation, headed by the oblast party organization, the Smolensk people organized a dedicated heroic struggle behind enemy lines. As

early as October 1919, V. I. Lenin wrote that "the winner in a war is the one with greater reserves, greater sources of manpower, greatest support among the people" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch" [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 237). These words on the support of the broad popular masses in the struggle against the enemy were taken up by the party and soviet organs in the Smolensk area. The party organized four okrughkoms, the gorkom, 34 clandestine party raykoms and 16 Komsomol raykoms. They managed 119 partisan detachments numbering 62,000 people's avengers, which included the famous Dedushka large unit, the partisan regiments imeni S. Lazo, imeni 24 Godovshchina RKKA and "Trinadtsat'," regiments commanded by V. V. Zhabo and I. F. Sadchikov, the Kletnya and Vadin partisan brigades and many others. Following the great heroic traditions of their predecessors, during the fascist occupation the Smolensk area partisans killed more than 100,000 enemy soldiers and officers and destroyed 1,358 railroad echelons with equipment and manpower, more than 3,000 trucks, more than 500 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 58 airplanes, hundreds of bridges and dozens of kilometers of railroad tracks. Four partisan areas developed on the oblast's territory: Dorogobuzhskiy, Severo-Zapatnyy, Vadinskiy and Yuzhnnyy Yelninskiy. The Soviet system was restored in these areas and kolkhozes, enterprises, schools and hospitals functioned.

As it had in the past, once again the soil was burning under the feet of the fascists in Sychevka where the Rodina partisan detachment operated.

The Trinadtsat' partisan unit, commanded by Tank Lt S. V. Grishin, made daring raids behind enemy lines, destroyed 40 Hitlerite garrisons, and derailed 314 enemy echelons. The fascist command directed against these punitive forces a resting division, with tanks, artillery and aviation. Sergey Grishin, a young Red Army officer, competed in battle skills against Hofgarten and Polle, two Hitlerite generals. He withstood. With his detachment he broke through the encirclement and caused heavy casualties to the enemy. Many troops in the detachment were presented with government awards while S. V. Grishin was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, dated 7 March 1943.

The raid conducted by the cavalry group commanded by L. M. Dovator behind Hitlerite lines, in the northwestern part of the Smolensk area, roused the population. With every passing day an increasing number of partisan detachments operated. The occupation forces committed unparalleled crimes in Smolensk soil and the hearts of the Soviet people were filled with anger. Entire families joined the partisans. A report submitted by the Semlevskiy party raykom to the VKP(b) Obkom on the patriotic activities of the Vasil'yev family in 1941-1942 states that in Khvatov-Zavod village Akim Nikonovich Vasil'yev organized a clandestine hospital. The partisan headquarters was in his home. The patriot was captured in August 1942. His wife, Anastasiya Ivanovna, collected medicines and food for the wounded and carried out a variety of assignments for the partisan unit. In January 1942, in the course of an assignment, this courageous woman fell in the hands of the fascist executioners and was killed after undergoing savage tortures. Their 17-year-old son Aleksandr was head of the hospital's security. Here, in addition to guerrillas, there were wounded soldiers and Red Army commanders who had been

surrounded. Sasha was able to steal a radio station from the Germans and the patients were able to listen to Moscow and to receive and disseminate among the population communiques issued by the Soviet Information Bureau. In the partisan detachment Aleksandr became a radio operator-scout. He was wounded twice. Successful raids on villages and settlements occupied by the enemy were conducted based on his intelligence data. A. A. Vasil'yev subsequently joined the ranks of the Red Army. The Vasil'yevs' 13-year-old daughter Antonina worked in the clandestine hospital as a nurse and, together with her mother, collected products, bandages and medicines for the wounded and disseminated leaflets among the population. She was sent to reconnoiter on several occasions. By order of the Western Front, dated 4 June 1942, Akim Nikonovich Vasil'yev was awarded the Order of Lenin; Anastasiya Ivanovna Vasil'yeva was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (posthumously); Aleksandr Akimovich was awarded the medal "For Bravery" while Antonina Akimovna was awarded the medal "For Merit in Battle."

How many such simple people of Smolyansk who fought the fascist aggressors were there, how many exploits did they commit, and how many great names have been recorded in history! They include subversion worker Volodiya Kurilenko, related to the Saturn group, who became Hero of the Soviet Union at the age of 18; partisan and then Red Army scout Hero of the Soviet Union Sgt Mikhail Yegorov, who hoisted the victory flag on the captured Reichstag, together with Meliton Kantariya, and others.

The fatherland highly appreciated the combat exploits of partisans and clandestine workers in the Smolensk area. More than 10,000 people were awarded combat orders and medals, many of them posthumously.

The Smolensk area wasted away in fascist slavery more than 2 years, living with the hope of liberation. Then the hour came.

Operation Suvorov

The Smolensk offensive operation, code-named Suvorov, in the course of which thousands of settlements and Smolensk, the ancient Russian city, were liberated, lasted from 7 August to 2 October 1943. As a result of successful combat operations, our troops reached a line from which, subsequently, the liberation of Belorussia began.

The offensive was started by the forces of the Western Front (Col Gen V. D. Sokolovskiy commanding) and the left wing of the Kalinin Front (Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko commanding) while the battle for Kursk was under way and was completed when the battle for the Dnepr was at its peak, in the south. The Hitlerite command steadily reinforced and improved the defense of this sector of the front, fearing a flank and rear strike to the Group of Armies Center. Furthermore, it was still hoping to mount a new offensive on Moscow. What the enemy realized above all was that this was the shortest route for the German troops not only to Moscow but also to Berlin, for the Red Army as well. The enemy had created here a strong, suitably prepared defense consisting of five to six defense lines 100 to 130 kilometers deep. In this sector of the front he kept more than 850,000 soldiers and officers, as many as 8,800 guns and

howitzers, about 500 tanks and assault guns and as many as 700 combat airplanes. At the beginning of the offensive the forces of the Kalinin and Western front numbered more than 1,250,000 men, 20,600 guns and howitzers, 1,430 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,100 airplanes. In the course of the operation, however, the enemy reinforced his forces by transferring from other sectors 13 divisions, including eight divisions from the Orel direction, although as a result of the counteroffensive of our forces this cost the enemy heavy casualties. This is yet another confirmation of the importance which the Hitlerite command ascribed to Smolensk.

The offensive was prepared by our command thoroughly and in deep secrecy. Orders were issued to the high command personnel orally. On 3 August Marshal of the Soviet Union J. V. Stalin, supreme commander in chief, arrived on the Western Front. During his meeting with V. D. Sokolovskiy in the Yukhnov area and A. I. Yeremenko, in Khoroshevo village, near Rzhev, he asked about the readiness of the troops for the offensive, the measures for operative camouflage and the deployment of command cadres and issued a number of instructions on the practical preparations for the operation. In recalling his meeting with J. V. Stalin, Marshal A. I. Yeremenko said that the supreme commander in chief asked him above all questions about the enemy and food and ammunition supplies to the troops, after which he heard a report on the forthcoming operation. The plan for the operation was approved.

The partisans and the clandestine organizations were to assist the advancing forces. In August and at the beginning of September the Smolensk area partisans blew up 14,149 railroad tracks. This "track war" paralyzed the railroads behind enemy lines on the eve and during the course of the Suvorov operation. In some sectors train traffic was stopped for weeks and even months.

In the Smolensk direction the Hitlerites resisted fiercely but our forces advanced steadfastly. The operation involved the forces of the Western Front consisting of the 31st, Fifth and 68th armies. On 16 September advance elements entered Yartsevo. The retreating fascists blew up the bridge on the Vop River, although fighting in the streets continued. The Hitlerite command had sacrificed those units of its troops which had remained in the city.

The direct way to Smolensk was opened with the operation of Yartsevo. In an effort to hold onto the city at all costs, the Hitlerites continued to transfer here divisions from other front sectors. The 31st Army, commanded by Gen V. A. Gluzdovskiy, advanced fighting 10 to 15 kilometers daily. The advance elements crossed on the march the Khmost River and liberated on its western bank about 2,000 local residents whom the fascists intended to take to Germany. On 24 September several divisions approached Smolensk. S. I. Iovlev, who commanded one of them, was a local resident. He was well familiar with the surroundings of the city and suggested for the sake of accelerating the storming and the seizure of the crossing of the Dnepr within city limits the creation of mobile advanced detachments consisting of the most combat-capable subunits. The army commander approved the suggestion. The advance detachment of the 331st division was headed by L. A. Romanov, chief of the operative section of the division's headquarters. Interacting with it was an infantry battalion in the same division, commanded by P. F. Klepach.

Prokofiy Fedorovich Klepach recalls the following:

"Our assignment was to pursue the enemy, enter Smolensk behind him and hold on until the main forces could cross. During the night the fascists began to withdraw from the suburbs. We rushed after them but not down the highway where we could have become engaged in a long battle, but straight out, crossing the Kolodnya River. Toward midnight we entered the city from the north-east. The fascists panicked. We profited from this and hurled ourselves toward the wooden bridge across the Dnepr, which the Germans had not yet been able to mine. We reached the other side. We saw near the Dnepr many of our people behind barbed wire. We freed them and quickly went on. Having reached the center, I was able to hoist on the tower of Hotel Smolensk a flag on which we wrote in chalk: '331st Infantry Division.' The city was liberated within a single night, although the Hitlerites had substantial forces. The party and the government highly rated the exploits of the Soviet forces. Thirty-nine military formations and units were awarded the "Smolensk" honorific title. Thousands of soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals and 56 of them were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. However, everyone in this battle was a hero.

... In the battle for Hill 233.4 on the way to Smolensk, Ivan Gromak was severely wounded. Before that, he had destroyed with his antitank weapon a machine-gun nest in a pillbox, set an enemy tank on fire and, already wounded, he was able to take from a dead Hitlerite officer a map case, after which he fainted. Coming to at the medical battalion, he asked about the case. "It was taken by the brigade political department," the nurse answered. "It contained some maps and photographs." One month later the entire country and the world learned about those photographs. The German officer belonged to the 332nd Regiment which had taken part in the execution in Petrishchevo in 1941. Five photographs had recorded the courageous death of Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya. For a long time Ivan Gromak fought along the roads of Poland and Germany before accidentally coming across the verses by Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, dedicated to him.

... It is thus that
In the ranks of the N Brigade
My Ivan Gromak fought
A fighter, hero of Smolensk.

Salty sweat blinded
The eyes of this young soldier,
Who was a man in war
But was a boy at home...

The heroes of the Smolensk area... The land of Smolensk gave the country and the people 254 Heroes of the Soviet Union or, if we include the prewar boundaries of the oblast, some 350. There were 40 full knights of the soldier's Order of Glory. With few exceptions, all of them were young. Let us take the name Ivanov, for example. Jr Sgt Party Member Scout Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Ivanov was made Hero of the Soviet Union at age 22; Infantry Company Sr Lt Party Member Mikhail Romanovich Ivanov became Hero of the

Soviet Union at age 21; diver pilot Lt Party Member Nikolay Vasil'yevich Ivanov was 22; battery commander in a guards howitzer regiment Lt Pavel Petrovich Ivanov was 23; Lt Gen Party Member Semen Pavlovich Ivanov was 38; mortarman guards Sgt Party Member Fedor Ivanovich Ivanov was 22. Vasiliy Gavrilovich Ivanov bravely fought in the sky over Moscow. In 1943 he became a test pilot. In 1957 Col V. G. Ivanov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Like the entire Soviet people, the people of Smolensk committed exploits everywhere, along the entire gigantic theater of military operations. While the fascist propaganda was thundering that the Soviet air force had been totally crushed, long-range aviation Capt Vasiliy Vasil'yevich Vasil'yev, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, was bombing the German rear. Between April and September 1942 alone he made 11 combat sallies including raids on Konigsberg, Stettin and Berlin.

Vasiliy Semenovich Minenkov in the detachment commanded by Sr Lt Ol'shanskiy participated in the Nikolayev landing. In a sudden headlong attack the landing troops captured the port and held it for more than 2 days until the morning of 28 March 1944, when the Soviet troops, benefitting from the confusion of the Hitlerites, rushed into the city. Severely wounded and burned by a flamethrower, V. S. Minenkov fought to the last moment. He died clutching his submachine gun. He was not even 23 years old. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to all 67 troops of Ol'shanskiy's detachment.

There were exploits everywhere in the Smolensk area. Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops Normandy-Neman Air Force Regiment fought in the skies, while on the ground the First Polish Infantry Division imeni T. Kosciuszko fought.

In the course of the Suvorov offensive operation the enemy suffered tremendous losses. The Red Army units routed seven enemy divisions and severely hit 14. The fascist aggressors were expelled from the Smolensk area at the beginning of October 1943.

It seemed impossible to bring order to the chaos which the Hitlerites had left behind. More than 16,000 hungry and tortured people had remained in the city, slightly more than one-tenth of the prewar population....

Soviet hearts broke when the atrocities which the fascists had committed in the Smolensk area became known. According to the Extraordinary State Commission, the Hitlerite executioners tortured and shot here more than 350,000 people, more than 135,000 of whom were from Smolensk alone. More than 87,000 Smolensk residents were exiled to Germany and many of them perished in slavery. In some areas no more than 19 to 25 percent of the population remained. The population of hundreds of villages had been totally eliminated.

Many examples of vandalism have been recorded in history. However, they could hardly match the one committed on Smolensk land. The purpose of the fascist occupation forces was to turn the Smolensk area into a "dead zone." In Smolensk 7,300 of 8,000 buildings were destroyed, and those which were not

destroyed were mined. In the building of Hotel Smolensk alone sappers detected and disarmed 12 500-kilogram bombs. The Uspenskiy Cathedral and other historical monuments were mined. On 22 September the Hitlerites blew up the flax combine, the water main, the power plant, the railroad station, the viaduct, the bridges across the Dnepr and telegraph poles.

It was only the headlong advance of the Soviet forces, unexpected by the enemy, that prevented the barbarians from fulfilling their plan entirely. However, even that which they had been able to accomplish is staggering with its cruelty and senselessness: 935 industrial enterprises, 818 communal enterprise projects, the entire railroad system, 2,400 schools, 428 hospitals, polyclinics and pharmacies and, in Smolensk, 93 percent of all housing was destroyed in the oblast. The material damage cause Smolensk Oblast totaled 40 billion rubles (in prewar prices).

The fascists opened Concentration Camp No 126 outside Smolensk on 20 July 1941. Here they destroyed no fewer than 115,000 Soviet prisoners of war. The mass destruction of Soviet people in this concentration camp began immediately, even before the gas chambers, crematoria and murders had been organized...

One cannot remain indifferent reading about the atrocities committed by the Hitlerites who spared no one--old men, women or children. History will never forgive the fascist executioners their crimes.

The people of Smolensk had to begin life anew after the liberation of the oblast. They were helped by the communist party, the Soviet government, the entire country. As early as October 1943 the USSR Sovnarkom passed a special decree "On Priority Measures for Rebuilding the Economy of the City of Smolensk." In November 1945 the Soviet government passed a resolution on the priority rebuilding of 15 Russian cities, including Smolensk. The desire of the people of Smolensk to see their city reborn sooner was such that after work they voluntarily repaired housing, cleared streets of rubble, covered the craters from bombs and planted trees. Following the example of Aleksandra Cherkasova in Stalingrad, who had decided to rebuild Stalingrad with a brigade of volunteers, girls from the voluntary Komsomol-youth Klavdiya Savchenko Brigade appealed for the faster rising of Smolensk from the ruins and the ashes and making it even more beautiful than before the war. They themselves worked in the oblast communications administration and during the evenings and Sundays and holidays worked free of charge as construction workers in rebuilding the city. The initiative of the brigade headed by Klavdiya Savchenko was approved by the bureau of the Smolensk party gorkom and the city soviet executive committee. The party, Komsomol and trade union organizations of the city's enterprises and establishments raised ever-new volunteer brigades. By the first anniversary of the liberation of Smolensk the first part of the flax combine, the clothing factory and a number of other enterprises had been commissioned.

The dedicated work of the Smolensk people accomplished something considered impossible. Within a relatively short time they eliminated the heavy consequences of the fascist occupation, restored the city and the villages and

the railroad transportation system, and built thousands of new palaces of culture, clubs, schools, polyclinics, stadiums and residential buildings.

During the postwar five-year plans machine building, electrical engineering and aviation industrial sectors and an instrument manufacturing industry were created. Today's face of industrial Smolensk is made of the YaK-42 airplanes and Iskra computers, Smolensk refrigerators and the famous "northern silk"--linen, and high-grade units for automobile manufacturing. Today as well the population of the Smolensk area is enhancing the glory of this ancient land through its labor exploits and examples no less worthy than those of the senior generations. During the present 11th Five-Year Plan weaver V. M. L'vova at the Smolensk Flax Combine pledged to fulfill two five-year plans. The N. P. Dmitriyev link at the Kolkhoz imeni Radishchev, Gagarinskiy Rayon, averaged last year 35 quintals per hectare in grain crops. Milkmaids A. F. Marenkova, at the Aleksandrino Sovkhoz, R. A. Kalinina, at the Krasnyy Dobrovolets Kolkhoz and L. T. Stebneva Breeding Farm imeni Komintern average more than 5,000 kilograms of milk per cow. V. I. Shcheglova, assembly worker at the Iskra Production Association and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, produces only excellent-quality goods.

In their extensive socialist competition in honor of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Smolensk from the fascist aggressors, the working people in the city fulfilled ahead of schedule their plan for the first 7 months of 1983 for the production and marketing of industrial output. During the first half of the five-year plan the volume of industrial output increased by 7.9 percent. Last year some 44,000 tons of flax reached the flax processing enterprise. This accounts for one-third of the output in the entire Russian Federation! The oblast is steadily increasing the production and sales of milk, meat and eggs to the state. The city of Smolensk was awarded the Red Challenge Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and Komsomol Central Committee in the all-union socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

The people of Smolensk sacredly honor the memory of their predecessors, and all those who have made their happy present. Metal plaques stand like shields on the fortress wall on V. I. Smirnov Square, where once the people of Smolensk had defeated the forces of Batyya and where the Red Flag of victory was hoisted in 1943, on which the following words of the memorial scroll are engraved in bronze:

"Comrade! Read and Remember!"
Memorial Scroll

"This scroll is in honor of the exploits of the valorous ancestors of the Smolyane, for the glory of our great homeland, adopted at the 28 September 1963 anniversary session of the city soviet of deputies of the working people, with partial amendments made in 1975.

"On the days of the celebration of the 1,100th anniversary of the mention of Smolensk in the Ustyuzhskiy Chronicles we, the descendants of the great population of our city, citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

participants in the great building of a communist society, solemnly proclaim our feeling of profound gratitude to all those who built and embellished our city, defended it from its enemies, and brought glory to its name through revolutionary, labor and military exploits for the sake of the fatherland: the working people who created ancient Smolensk; the soldiers of the three Smolensk regiments; heroes of the Grunewald battle of 1410; the builder of the Smolensk fortress, the talented architect F. S. Konya; the citizens of the city who participated in the defense of Smolensk in 1609, 1611; the heroes of the 1812 Patriotic War, the Smolyane-Guerrillas and the Russian military leader M. I. Kutuzov-Smolenskiy; the Decembrists-Smololyane P. I. Pestel', P. G. Kakhovskiy and I. D. Yakushkin and other courageous fighters against the oppression of serfdom and tsarist autocracy; the workers-revolutionaries P. A. Alekseyev and P. A. Moiseyenko; the Smolensk bolsheviks and their leaders V. Z. Sobolev, S. P. Sered and V. A. Smol'yaninov, and all those who dedicated themselves to the struggle for the victory and consolidation of the Soviet system; the Red Guards and Red Army men: First Commander in Chief N. V. Krylenko, military leader M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and the people of Smolensk who participated in the creation and strengthening of the Red Army; the Smolensk workers, kolkhoz members and members of the intelligentsia --builders of socialism--and their party leaders I. P. Rumyantsev and D. M. Popov; the people of Smolensk who participated in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and the soldiers, officers and generals who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism on Smolensk soil; the great partisans and clandestine workers; M. A. Yegorov, who hoisted the flag of victory over defeated Berlin; native sons of Smolensk: the founder of Russian classical music M. I. Glinka, explorers N. M. Przheval'skiy and P. K. Kozlov, the founder of scientific soil science V. V. Dokuchayev, Navy Commander P. S. Nakhimov, the first Russian flier M. N. Yefimov, the first Soviet stratospheric cosmonaut G. A. Prokof'yev, aviation designer S. A. Lavochkin, sculptors M. O. Mikeshin and S. T. Konenkov, Soviet poets A. T. Tvardovskiy, M. V. Isakovskiy and N. I. Rylenkov, who brought fame to our homeland with their works; and Yu. A. Gagarin, the pioneer in outer space.

"Smolyan, honor their memory! You owe your happy life and bright fate to them. Be worthy of your glorious predecessors!"

Smolensk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War First Class for the courage and firmness displayed by the defenders of the city, active participation of the working people in the partisan movement in the struggle against the German-fascist aggressors in the Great Patriotic War, and successes achieved in rebuilding the city and developing the national economy. It is thus that the homeland assessed the exploit of Smolensk, the city-soldier, the city-worker, the city of Russian glory.

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F. E. DZERZHINSKIY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLANNED ECONOMY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83) pp 112-120

[Article by Dr of Economic Sciences O. Latsis]

[Text] It so happens that F. E. Dzerzhinskiy's economic activities have been closely studied by historians but little studied and known by economists.

The need to study in general the experience of the first years of the Soviet system, when economic construction was directed by V. I. Lenin and his fellow workers, is unquestionable. However many new socialist revolutions may occur in the future and however many countries may take in the future the path of building a new system, the October Revolution will remain forever the first victorious proletarian revolution, and the Soviet experience, the historically first effort in building socialism. Therefore, those who want to gain a profound understanding of the most common and basic features of socialist economic management are bound to study the period during which these features were appearing in practical activities for the first time.

Specialists in the field of contemporary socialist economy are certainly familiar with Lenin's stipulations on socialist socialization of production and labor, social accountability and control, state planning and use of commodity-monetary relations. The modern specialist, who uses cost accounting as his daily tool, knows that the very combination of the words "cost accounting" was produced by Lenin and that it was Lenin who developed the basic cost accounting principles. Also widely known are Lenin's thoughts on the role of "trusts" (associations in current terminology) in socialist economic management, the importance of profit and profitability, material incentive and many others.

What could the study of Dzerzhinskiy's works add to this knowledge (from the viewpoint of current practical problems)? Feliks Edmundovich's political and economic views coincided with Lenin's concepts entirely and totally. He embodied Lenin's ideas in his economic activities. However, naturally, Lenin's fellow workers did not limit themselves to the simple practical application of the familiar instructions. Work on the organization of a socialist economic management system in general, the shaping of the system and the methods of the new economic policy, which was initiated in 1921, and the extension of this work, through the formulation and implementation of the first five-year plan, were all, unquestionably, implementations of Lenin's ideas; however, the solution of a number of specific economic problems which had not appeared in Lenin's lifetime was equally necessary.

At that time Dzerzhinskiy was one of the leading practitioners of economic management and thinking. His role in the organization of the socialist economic management system is defined, naturally, not only in terms of the significance of the positions he held but his actual personal contribution to the solution of the specific problems facing the party and the country.

One of the first major general economic problems which Dzerzhinskiy encountered as people's commissar of railroads and subsequently during the first months of his work for the USSR Sovnarkhoz was the marketing crisis caused by the price gap between industrial and agricultural commodities. Dzerzhinskiy not only played a major, if not decisive, role in the elimination of this gap but formulated important principles of socialist price setting.

A complex and urgent problem which arose in the summer of 1924 involved resolving the conflict between the Sovnarkhoz and the trade unions on the subject of labor productivity and wages. After intensive work and a sharp debate, Dzerzhinskiy's position was supported by the party's Central Committee plenum. Even more important, the Sovnarkhoz was able to surmount the difficulties related to increasing labor productivity and paying for it.

Dzerzhinskiy also completed the shaping of an integral system for the first socialist associations--trusts, syndicates and stockholding companies (the first steps along this way had been taken on Lenin's initiative and under his guidance, but the overall outlines of the system were clarified subsequently, above all through Dzerzhinskiy's efforts). The struggle which was initiated at the end of 1924 to accelerate the convertibility of working capital in industry, which subsequently developed into an all-embracing economic system, was of tremendous importance. In 1924 Dzerzhinskiy was one of the first, if not the first, to undertake the solution of the most complex problem of sources of accumulation for socialist industrialization without foreign help. Finally, in 1925-1926 he was one of the most active opponents of the attacks on the alliance between the working class and the peasantry mounted by the "new opposition."

Naturally, the limitations of a journal article do not allow the systematic review of this entire tremendous work and of all original economic ideas it contributed. However, with a number of examples, an attempt could be made to illustrate the style of Dzerzhinskiy's economic work and his approach to the solution of the gravest problems, above all those which, reformulated, remain relevant to this day.

The most important slogan of the 26th CPSU Congress is that the economy must be economical. The reasons and circumstances may have been different, but the same problem was just as urgent when Dzerzhinskiy guided industry. He organized a campaign for a comprehensive regimen of savings throughout the industry.

The impetus for it was provided by grave practical necessities. The Labor and Defense Council (STO) curtailed the production plan for the 1924-25 economic year, which had been suggested by Glavmetall. The reason was the shortage of loans to replenish the working capital which industry, which had

still not completed its postwar restoration, urgently needed. The reason was objective. However, the decision to reduce the plan undermined the hope of rapidly reducing unemployment among metalworkers. Furthermore, it sharply reduced the efficiency of the sector. Dzerzhinskiy disagreed with the STO decision. Nevertheless, observing his firm rule, he did not ask the state to supply the necessary funds but undertook, as he liked to say himself, to seek them "at home," i.e., to find reserves directly in the production process itself.

His main idea appeared quite simple: if working capital is in short supply we must accelerate the turnover of the available capital in industry. However, this was to be accomplished immediately, within a period of several weeks, for Dzerzhinskiy wanted to affect the outcome of the plan of the already initiated economic year. Therefore, he made the problem of convertibility of working capital, the interest in which did not usually go beyond bookkeeping departments, an object of heated daily interest on the part of every Red director, trade union official, worker and nonparty specialist. Mass raids were made on plant warehouses in search of unneeded stocks; materials which had remained unused since the World War were brought to light. A study was made of the speed of freight traffic by rail, its loading, unloading and processing. Plant technology was restructured on the basis of the accelerated production cycle. Dzerzhinskiy studied Henry Ford's book, which had come out at that time, and propagandized at broad meetings progressive methods in production organization. TORGVO-PROMYSHLENNAYA GAZETA, the Sovnarkhoz organ, wrote that "a live kopek is better than a dead ruble."

As a result, the metallurgical industry was able to put in circulation an additional 44 million rubles. This enabled Dzerzhinskiy not only to defend the initial Glavmetall plan but even to increase it drastically. That year the sector's output doubled. The campaign was completed with the elimination of the obvious gaps in individual large economic management sectors, after which Dzerzhinskiy undertook to organize a comprehensive savings system.

As we pointed out, the reasons for giving priority to economy then and now are entirely different. At that time economy was important because of the crying poverty and catastrophic shortages of all sorts of material resources in the country which, without even completing the restoration, was immediately forced to think of industrialization in a hostile encirclement, without outside aid. Today the topical nature of this task is due to our wealth, if one may say so. Resources have been accumulated, which, in Dzerzhinskiy's time, might have seemed fantastic in terms of scale, and the increased efficiency in their utilization has in itself become a most important economic resource. However, although the reasons for the particular attention paid to the problem of economy are different from those of the past, economic methods have common features and the discoveries of the past may be of use today.

No less topical are Dzerzhinskiy's views and practical actions in the struggle against departmentalism.

"I have been informed that you have laid about 100 versts of railroad tracks and constructed capital buildings in sizes considered excessive in terms

of our overall need." This is an excerpt from a letter which Dzerzhinskiy wrote to I. V. Kosior, chairman of the board of the Grozneft' Trust (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, "Izbr. Proizv." [Selected Works]. In two volumes, Volume II, Moscow, 1977, p 16). Written in March 1924, only 1 month after Feliks Edmundovich was appointed head of the country's industry, this letter describes his views on a number of most important problems of economic management.

Dzerzhinskiy went on to write that "you recently raised wages by 30 percent by increasing withholdings for cultural needs and factory-plant committees. Meanwhile, however, in a number of sectors we are trying to find funds to meet the payroll based on reduced indices in our main industrial sectors, even if only in the Donbas. It is as though we have no Sovnarkhoz. Each trust and syndicate looks out for itself....and each one of them tries to use its 'happiness' to its own advantage, while shifting 'misfortunes' to the state, demanding subsidies, loans and high prices" (ibid.).

What did Dzerzhinskiy favor?

"I dream that all of our managers of main trusts--everyone in his position--become a single entity--follow a single state line and pursue a single state objective, be a single block..."(ibid.).

Dzerzhinskiy had grounds for expressing his views so confidently and clearly, although he was still a novice in industry (he writes in that same letter that "for the time being I must learn") (ibid.). Before his appointment to the Sovnarkhoz, for almost 3 years (since April 1921) he was head of the People's Commissariat of Railroads. Three years is a short time in terms of today's manager but was tremendous at that time. The entire experience in peaceful socialist construction in the country, ever since the tax in kind had been lifted and "war communism" abandoned, did not exceed 3 years. His work in the People's Commissariat of Railroads gave Dzerzhinskiy experience which enabled him properly to assess the importance of pursuing a unified state line. The transportation system, which he headed on Lenin's request, was best prepared for centralized planning: it was essentially a single economic enterprise, using identical technology, without private entrepreneurs and without the scattered nature of production which then existed in industry, not to mention agriculture. Nothing seemed simpler than to take over and command, and "issue" the plan.

An attempt to command had been made before Dzerzhinskiy's takeover. In 1920 a five-year plan had even been adopted, known as "Order No 1,042," issued by Trotkiy, the people's commissar of railroads. The order included a program for rebuilding the fleet of steam locomotive engines. A significant share of the forces of the country, dislocated by the war, was thrown into increasing the number of locomotive engines. Hundreds of them were purchased abroad, paid for in gold; several of the largest domestic plants were retooled for their production and they were repaired in all the depots. As a result, long before the five-year period had lapsed, the number of heavy-duty locomotive engines by far exceeded the prewar level, while industrial output and the volume of transportation were far below half of the prewar level. It seemed

that the transportation system should have done its work with incredible ease; however, as before, the trains were barely moving.

By the end of 1923 Dzerzhinskiy, who had already worked hard to surmount the consequences of Order No 1,042, noted at a Gosplan meeting that "we are being told that we have 5,800 powerful locomotive engines instead of 1,700 (1913). However, we are unable to make full use of them because our bridges are too weak. What we need are not locomotive engines but bridge girders. A certain proportion must exist among our individual account items, dictated by technology" ("V Sovet Truda i Oborony. Dokladnaya Zapiska po Voprosu o Metallopromyshlennosti F. E. Dzerzhinskogo" [At the Labor and Defense Council. Report by F. E. Dzerzhinskiy on the Metal Industry]. Transpechat', Moscow, p 55).

Dzerzhinskiy recalled asking in a 1925 speech at a Central Committee plenum "Why is it that Trotsky made a most horrible error with Order 1,042? Because he promoted a separate unit to a universal rescuer."

Throughout his entire economic activities Dzerzhinskiy invariably repeated that there are no "universal rescuers" in economics; the state plan must encompass the economy in all of its interrelationships. Here is one of his numerous statements on this subject, an excerpt from his report to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of Metalworkers, dated June 24: "All departments must be made to understand that they are part of an entity. We must outlive this way of ignoring interconnections and all of us together, considering the interests of the entire industry, must draft the type of plan which will ensure the further development of the metal industry. A real plan for the development of the metal industry can be created only if all cells within the national economy participate in its formulation" (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., pp 28-29).

The same principle was formulated not only in speeches and not only for others, for Dzerzhinskiy himself strictly obeyed it as manager of this department (Glavmetall). Plans for individual sectors of the metal industry, such as the shipbuilding five-year plan for example, seemingly quite good, were frequently submitted to him. This was no longer 1920 but 1924 and the restoration of the national economy was nearing completion. Invariably, however, Dzerzhinskiy rejected such plans and suggested that annual plans be drafted instead. Naturally, it was tempting to adopt a five-year plan for one large sector or another, plus the fact that individual parts of the submitted projects were fully coordinated. However, they were not coordinated with the plans of other economic sectors, nor could they be in the absence of a general economic five-year plan. Essentially, this amounted to a plan for a self-seeking development of individual sectors, which Dzerzhinskiy could not permit.

Dzerzhinskiy's contribution to the struggle against departmental discoordination is expressed not only in terms of his principles and planning practices. He persistently developed the organizational-economic mechanism which could counter departmental bureaucratic administration. Together with the planning-executive organs--sectorial main administrations and territorial

sovmarkhozes--he "nurtured" a system of organizations which linked enterprises through economic ties. These were associations created on a cost-effective basis--syndicates and stockholding companies.

Unquestionably, the syndicates (which shall be described later in greater detail) were the backbone of the industrial management system, based on cost-accounting. However, as sectorial organizations they did not provide a full solution to the problem of the struggle against departmentalism, although they did not suffer from it to the extent of the main administrations. However, within the system of associations, which was developing under Dzerzhinskiy's management, some intersectorial organizations existed as well--stockholding companies. Feliks Edmundovich himself was chairman of the council of one of the largest among them--the Transport Transportation-Shipping Company. Unlike the syndicates, the stockholding companies did not encompass all facilities and basic activities of their member enterprises. They were created for the purpose of jointly resolving individual problems and affected only part of the resources of their members, allowing the latter total autonomy in basic economic affairs. For that reason they could bring together enterprises and organizations under different sectorial administration, different in terms of ownership (state, cooperative or occasionally even private), and were different in terms of economic nature (enterprises, trusts, syndicates, banks, people's commissariats, soviet organs, and public organizations).

It was precisely this type of contractual intersectorial association which is of particular interest from the viewpoint of current problems. A still-unresolved problem such as the optimal management of the territorial production complexes, for example, in which enterprises under different ministries must interact, could be fully or partially resolved on this basis. The press has even reported the existence of a scientific plan for managing the development of the Kansk-Achinsk Fuel-Energy Complex with the help of an intersectorial association created by interested ministries on a shareholding basis and partial combination of their resources and joint management.

One of the basic requirements constantly formulated by Dzerzhinskiy in drafting economic plans was linking production to financial possibilities and market conditions. This, noting the progress achieved in the formulation of the 1924-25 economic year plan, compared with previous ones, Dzerzhinskiy said: "The plans for that year were no longer exclusively based on technical-production possibilities regarding the amount of fuel, installation of machines or manpower, but above all on the study of budget-financial possibilities--the possibilities of the technology and the market" (ibid., p 92).

In another speech once again he substantiated the same idea, noting in particular that relations with the market under the then-existing circumstances meant relations with agriculture above all: "If you think that we can introduce communism by sitting in our offices surrounded by books and drafting an ideal plan and then implementing it, we should clearly realize that we would fail, for our plan is a process of coupling our state industry and its individual sectors among each other, each one of them with our market and with those for whom we work, i.e., the peasantry" (ibid., p 186).

Somewhat later he approached the problem from another side: "We must concentrate on linking the plan aspect with that of economic expediency and commerce. We must determine the method which we must use to combine these two principles within our system in order to obtain a harmonious entity favoring the development of our industry" (ibid., p 234).

The tasks of planning changed fundamentally during the time of Dzerzhinskiy's work in the Sovnarkhoz. Its initial purpose was the restoration of the national economy and, above all, the restarting of enterprises which had stopped during the war and the dislocation. The restoration was essentially completed by 1925 and the development of the production process based on the expansion of "basic capital," i.e., new construction, began. Never before in world history had such a task been resolved through state planning. The methodology for this work had to be created from scratch.

The basic achievements of Soviet economic science, without which the formulation of five-year national economic plans could not be undertaken, were concentrated in the directives adopted at the 15th Party Congress (December 1927) on the formulation of the five-year plan. This document has retained its tremendous basic importance to this day. Dzerzhinskiy did not directly participate in its formulation, for he died almost 6 months before the 15th Congress. However, these directives, the result of the party's collective creativity, combined the entire experience of the previous period, including many of these ideas repeatedly expressed by Dzerzhinskiy.

As early as December 1924, in a note to his closest assistants M. K. Vladimirov and V. N. Mantsev, Feliks Edmundovich suggested the elaboration and submission to the STO through the Gosplan a plan for the creation of "basic capital," emphasizing that this project must be approached not amateurishly but on a broad scope, as it is needed and possible by a country "consciously marching toward socialism." The methodology of the approach to the formulation of such a plan, which largely coincided with the one subsequently adopted at the 15th Congress, was expressed in the following note: "... We must formulate a plan...based on the objectives, needs and means of the entire state--for each basic economic sector, on the basis of interdependence and importance in terms of increasing the entire national wealth, so that the pace at which this wealth will increase defines, in turn, the pace of the creation of productive capital based on the latest technological development, and so on. Therefore, it seems to me, we must proceed on the basis of the restoration of agriculture (in terms of tools) and the production of consumer goods, aimed at their comprehensive price reduction and popularization and the rationalization and reduced cost of thermal energy and raw materials. All industrial sectors will benefit from this except for defense, which must become a separate task" (ibid., p 114).

In May 1925, at a meeting of the USSR Sovnarkhoz Presidium, chaired by Dzerzhinskiy, the resolution "On the Immediate Work on the Restoration of Basic Capital in Industry" was adopted. A study of its content easily reveals a number of ideas coinciding with those which became the foundation for the directives adopted at the 15th Party Congress and were used as a manual for action in the formulation of the 1st Five-Year Plan.

One of Dzerzhinskiy's most persistent demands was that of substantiating plans (not only plans but reports and other documents on the basis of which the production process is managed). Simply stated, he always demanded the truth. He did not tolerate any embellishment of the situation, which was a particular manifestation of his character. His statements on this subject are quite numerous and vivid. In one of his last speeches, delivered at a conference of senior USSR Sovnarkhoz personnel, on 9 July 1926, Dzerzhinskiy pointed out that "I insist that the figures given to us by the trusts are inflated and imaginary. The type of accountability we are collecting is imaginary, it is nonsense. The point is that we have no feeling of responsibility for figures. What does responsibility for figures mean? It means not taking a senior worker to court for wrong figures, but simply informing everyone that so-and-so stole, deceived or inflated. Our public must be informed of this.... Why is a trust left socially without responsibility for the figures it gives us? Because it gives us some figures, we alter them and the Gosplan alters ours. The result of this system is that one could steal as much as one likes. We know in advance that you are stealing and I assume in advance that the figures given will be wrong. What kind of responsibility could there be in such a case!" (ibid., p 497).

He considered personal responsibility for each assignment and the fact that the manager must address himself to the apparatus under his jurisdiction and to the direct performers of one assignment or another, regardless of their position, as the solution. Furthermore, he ascribed tremendous importance to issuing specific assignments and the knowledgeability of managers. He scornfully wrote in PRAVDA about managers "who themselves are ignorant of the work and do not study thoroughly: this is known by their organizations on whose desks mountains of voluminous reports are piled up" (ibid., p 59). He considered this a permanent topic. In the letter to I. V. Kosior we mentioned, he wrote that "to look at his apparatus in the eye means the death of the manager."

Did he personally find the observance of such requirements easy? His apparatus consisted of knowledgeable people. Most of them, however, were bourgeois specialists alien to the Soviet system. "Without a specific bureaucratic apparatus which would operate with the precision of clockwork no management is possible," Dzerzhinskiy emphasized. "The Sovnarkhoz must be this kind of precise machinery. It must be strengthened and reinforced. However, that which life creates is not a machine. Life creates thought and will; life and will create communist willpower, Soviet willpower and awareness of the tasks we face" (ibid., p 12).

Actually, the question was the following: Who would manage whom--would the communist manager manage his apparatus or would the apparatus manage the manager? Dzerzhinskiy unquestionably managed his apparatus, not only because he learned and mastered anything new with incredible speed. He properly realized the main faults of the bureaucratic approach and was always on guard. The departmental apparatus tended, to begin with, to embellish the situation and to exaggerate successes and, secondly, to place the interests of "its own" department above anything else and make excessive demands on the state. Those were the two particular vices which Dzerzhinskiy fought mercilessly.

He was intolerant of the good "rose-colored" reports submitted by his subordinates. D. F. Sverchkov, one of the managers of the Petrograd railroad district, reported to Dzerzhinskiy on the situation in the district in which he essentially emphasized shortcomings. Dzerzhinskiy listened to him and said, smiling: "Although you sound like the widow of a noncommissioned officer flogging herself, your report is quite accurately structured. Today one should not discuss matters which are proceeding properly. One copes and that is all. Tell me only about problems and shortcomings which require my intervention. I am pleased that you are not concealing but are yourself emphasizing your errors and shortcomings" ("O Felikse Edmundoviche Dzerzhinskem" [On Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy]. Moscow, 1977, p 195).

Dzerzhinskiy perfectly realized the cost of figure-juggling, the "art" with which cleverly selected statistical data could create a false impression. That is why he closely rechecked the figures he was given and exposed the true meaning of all indicators. Here is one of his typical statements: "... In this case the steam/verst indicator is concealing our negligence, for we have frequently used locomotive engines needlessly. However, one must be cautious also in terms of pood/versts, for they may vary. If we use too many pood/versts for economic transportation, the use to the country and the transportation system would be small, for this would be our outlay rather than income" (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., Vol I, pp 390-391).

It was roughly when this was being said that the People's Commissariat of Railroads was drafting its plan for the 1923-24 year (at that time the economic year began on 1 October). According to the specialists, the transportation system required a subsidy considered huge for the period--500 million chervontsy rubles. Dzerzhinskiy became extremely indignant and even cited the fact in his letter to the Politburo, as one of the reasons for not leaving Moscow (the Politburo was to discuss the question of his leave). Dzerzhinskiy ordered a recomputation based on the fact that transportation needed no subsidy. The year 1923-24 became the first in the restoration period during which the transportation system did not work at a loss. Let us note that at that time the railroads of France, Britain, Switzerland and the United States were operating at a loss although their rates were higher than the prewar ones. Guided by Dzerzhinskiy, that year the Soviet railroads reduced their rates to the prewar level.

One of the most difficult problems in planning the entire management system was the correlation between the roles of the economic center and the "periphery," the associations and the enterprises. Dzerzhinskiy's answer to this question was extremely clear: what was needed was centralism, not a stifling centralism based on rigid commands from top to bottom, but a centralism based on a unified line and will, which left scope for local initiative.

During the very first year of work in the People's Commissariat of Railroads, following the expedition to Siberia, which took food and seeds at the beginning of 1922, Dzerzhinskiy emphasized that "in my view, the main conclusions to be drawn from the Siberian operation are the following: the need to decentralize transport management and to grant greater local rights, establishing closer ties between transportation and the local organs, creating within the

transport system itself organs concerned with the economic-commercial aspect of the matter on the model of the former railroad managements, and settling the question of worker supplies" (ibid., p 245).

However, he was able to develop the idea of the correlation between the center and the "local areas" in planning when he became a head of industry. Dzerzhinskiy believed that although the common objective was met, there were two relatively independent levels of management: the general economic level, represented by the Sovnarkhoz, and the level of the big associations, represented by syndicates and trusts.

The creation of syndicates was undertaken in 1922 on the initiative of V. P. Nogin, who became chairman of Textile Syndicate, the largest among them, and who later also headed the All-Russian Council of Syndicates. Nogin died soon after Dzerzhinskiy was appointed head of the Sovnarkhoz, so that the latter had no opportunity to work together with him. Although both were Sovnarkhoz organs, totally subordinated to him, Feliks Edmundovich considered them as having a relatively autonomous structure. He supported the activities of the local syndicate councils and urged the creation of an all-union council of syndicates. Along with his practical activities, Dzerzhinskiy made a very important contribution to the elaboration of the theory of the syndicate movement and the principles governing syndicate work.

The syndicates were voluntary share-holding associations of enterprises (trusts) initially created for the purpose of centralizing the marketing of goods on the sectorial scale. However, this marketing method quite rapidly led to an actual centralization of production management in the course of which syndicate management proved to be more efficient than the work of Sovnarkhoz main administrations. Consequently after Dzerzhinskiy's death, this led to the abolishment of most main administrations and the creation of associations based on syndicates (incidentally, such a reorganization was substantiated by G. K. Ordzhonikidze in the report of the TsKK-RKI [Central Control Commission-Workers' and Peasants' Inspection] to the 15th Party Congress). The role and significance of the syndicates and their work methods were reviewed in a number of Dzerzhinskiy's speeches. His views on the first associations in Soviet industry should unquestionably be topics of special research. At this point let us merely mention some of his statements on the role of the syndicates on the planning system.

In 1925 Dzerzhinskiy said that "we are struggling against methods of bureaucratic control, i.e., the type of control which demands that here, in the center, someone issues orders and makes allocations, and so on. We are fighting this, for we say that our industry and our workers are stressing their efforts not merely for the sake of producing goods or showing a profit but for satisfying the needs of the population and, naturally, their own requirements.... Therefore, the trust and plants cannot refer to some kind of main administration or say that this is not their concern. They must know and take into consideration where and why such goods are allocated and those whom they reach... It is precisely for this purpose that the trusts have formed syndicates. The syndicate is a planning organ which controls and distributes the produced items among the population" (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., Vol II, pp 295-296).

Dzerzhinskiy persistently supported and repeated this idea. In a note to one of his closest collaborators, V. N. Mantsev, dated 23 May 1925, he emphasized that "it is necessary for all of our syndicates and trusts to realize that they, these syndicates and trusts, are not only commercial apparatus of trusts and plants, but also operative organs for the state distribution plan under the conditions of the NEP, i.e., of a market commodity turnover added to the Soviet system" (ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, No 2, Moscow, 1960, p 82).

Incidentally, in the first part of the note we read that "... It seems to me that the STO chairman believes that we are showing an essentially erroneous trend in favor of the market element." The STO chairman at that time was Kamenev. Six months later, together with Zinov'yev, he was openly to take the lead of the "new opposition." The development of a separate opposition line was only at its leisurely starting point, but Dzerzhinskiy was virtually among the first to sense the hindrance created by this "line" in his daily work. He was able to see the wave of militant bureaucratism which was rolling over industry, created by organs headed by Kamenev. Feliks Edmundovich immediately "joined the fray."

In the months which followed Dzerzhinskiy made a number of speeches on syndicate planning. The biggest among them was the speech he delivered to the Sovnarkhoz Trade Commission on 6 November 1925 which, unfortunately, was not included in any one of the collections of his works. Dzerzhinskiy named his opponent from the very beginning: the newspaper EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN' (the STO organ) accused the Sovnarkhoz of being allegedly against control and planning. Although Kamenev was not mentioned directly, the person rebuffed by Dzerzhinskiy was clearly identified. On the surface, the topic of the polemics was whether the People's Commissariat of Trade should "drop" to the local areas so-called rigid plans for commodity procurements or allow the syndicate--economic rather than administrative organs which operated on a cost accounting basis and directly represented industry and, at the same time, were well-acquainted with market conditions--to control the work. EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN' was a fierce supporter of the centralism promoted by the People's Commissariat of Trade, hiding behind the banner of a planned economy. The Sovnarkhoz firmly defended syndicate rights. Dzerzhinskiy addressed the trade commission and convincingly proved that "rigid procurements" are a manifestation not of planning but of bureaucratism, that they actually disorganize trade and create goods shortages and, in the final account, clear the way for private entrepreneurs and speculators.

Dzerzhinskiy asked whether regulation was needed at all and firmly answered that it was. How was this to be accomplished? "... Regulation consists, above all, of the type of influence on the market in the course of which we set wholesale and sale prices. We determined sale prices, i.e., we defined the framework, the channel, the pace of development. We determined, all other conditions being equal, the increased requirements of the population and, therefore, our base for future development..." (TORGVO-PROMYSHLENNAYA GAZETA, 7 November 1925). It turned out, however, that under the circumstances of the then-existing commodity hunger, regulation through wholesale prices did not benefit the population: retail prices increased while wholesale prices were low, and the difference was pocketed by "jackal-middlemen"

--private, cooperative and sometimes even governmental. Voices were heard claiming that industry should not engage in regulatory activities at all.

Dzerzhinskiy asked: "Is this formulation of the question accurate? It seems to me that it is bureaucratic and is inconsistent with our approach and our formulation of the matter.

"Unlike the capitalist countries essentially based on competition; unlike a situation in which anyone who has commodities tries to find the most advantageous conditions for earning the highest profit, unlike all of this, we represent a single orchestra in which the musicians do not play their own tune in pursuit of the profit set by the state within one limit or another. In our view, our orchestra is aimed at performing in such a way as to play a symphony, to carry out the tasks set by the worker-peasant state. This can be achieved as a whole only if each individual trade unit is guided by the common objective set by the state as a whole.

"Therefore,...if the syndicate and its departments and subdepartments, if the Sovnarkhoz, the trusts, factories and plants are not guided in their specifically set boundaries by a common policy and common tasks set by the state, there would be no orchestra and we would perform nothing. The result would be the type of cacophony we now have.... Assuming the concept and approach to this matter I mentioned and allowing a division in the sense that some trade, others engage in industry while others control, based on the interests of the peasants, and so on, naturally the result would be the one we have now; the individual parts of the orchestra play entirely different tunes."

He went on to say that "EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN' believes that if we insult a specific plan we are bringing down the foundations of the Soviet system. Naturally, such is not the case. However, if we see a violation of our control principles, of specific principles which lead to a specific objective, we must indeed consider this a state crime.

"Does this exclude any role played by the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade in state control? Not in the least. You know that when the orchestra plays, there must be a conductor's baton. However, if suddenly such a baton begins to direct something else by itself or else conduct each instrument separately and, instead of giving the general direction, tells every individual what he must play and how to play it, what would the results be? A total confusion. The conductor's baton is in the hands of the Commissariat of Internal Trade. However, nothing comes out of its efforts to convert from a baton into a tuba or any other performing instrument" (ibid.).

Dzerzhinskiy always saw behind all purely economic plans the social and political consequences. He always considered the political assessment as determining.

The discussion covered the status of labor productivity. Before all specific computations (many of them existed and he looked at them quite closely), Dzerzhinskiy assessed the basic significance of the problem as a whole. His assessments were almost literally like Lenin's: "The entire essence of

communism and worker power lies in enhancing labor productivity higher than that of capitalism" (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., Vol II, p 58).

Three weeks after Dzerzhinskiy's appointment to the Sovnarkhoz, he held his first meeting with the main industrial managers at a plenum of the Council of Congresses of State Industry and Trade. Feliks Edmundovich immediately defined the main feature of their work: "...We are not rebuilding one enterprise or road or another...but are building a new state" (ibid., p 6).

A controversy between the Sovnarkhoz and the trade unions developed: a representative of the trade unions called Dzerzhinskiy a bureaucrat because of the Sovnarkhoz's refusal to approve a collective contract which called for raising the wages of light industry workers. Their wages, however, had already exceeded the prewar level whereas in industry as a whole, heavy industry above all, the prewar level had not been reached by far. The restoration had not been completed, industry was still working at a loss and any wage increase meant increased budget subsidies to cover losses. The funds came from a budget formed by taxing the peasantry, which was insufficient to increase the wages of workers in other sectors. In addition to computations related to labor productivity and wages, Dzerzhinskiy gave the step an immediate political assessment: "It is precisely such high earnings with low labor productivity in light industry that are a violation of the basic law of the Soviet state: unification of the working class with the peasantry. Meanwhile, one segment of the working class is violating the law of the entire working class and prevents the state from finding funds for the restoration of basic heavy industry" (ibid., pp 45-46).

Dzerzhinskiy profoundly realized the nature of relations between socialist state industry and the working class organized in trade unions. He particularly opposed any effort to pit economic managers against trade unions, pointing out that in a state of the working people they pursue a common objective. He emphasized that Soviet industry does not serve exploiters but the entire toiling population and pointed out that "it is this starting point in our existence that radically and essentially distinguishes us from all other so-called 'socialists' or mensheviks who, while supporting the bourgeois system, would like in our country, in Russia, to approach the working class somehow from the side, as an organization fighting for its own interests, i.e., the shop interests of their class in the narrow meaning of the term" (ibid., p 76).

The attention which Dzerzhinskiy paid to the political consequences of economic decisions reflected his understanding that the elaboration and implementation of plans is in no way a technical or economic process in the strict meaning of the terms: it is a social process as well. The plan is fulfilled by people and its success depends on people; in turn, the well-being of the people depends on the accuracy of the plan.

Exceptionally characteristic of Dzerzhinskiy was the following view: "We have a number of reasons--economic, political and others--which demand a division of industry between all-union and local. For example, the textile industry is, in general and as a whole, of unionwide significance, for the

allocation of manufactured goods and their prices determine our union with the peasantry. Or else, consider our metal industry, our machine-building plants, our metallurgy. Why are the Urals of all-union importance? Because they must not engage in rivalry with the south. We cannot allow and we must eliminate such unhealthy rivalry, for unhealthy rivalry and competition are two different matters. If we allow rivalry we would have no planned economy or planned principles and we would lose our political interests which do not allow the death of an individual area which promotes culture among the workers" (ibid., p 105).

That last judgment is of particular interest, if we recall the numerous and very sharp statements expressed by Dzerzhinskiy against monopoly in the economy and against any effort on the part of one enterprise or group of workers or another to put itself in an exclusive position and to benefit from it. In one of his works he directly called for "introducing in the organization of our industry, wherever possible, aspects of rivalry and competition" (op. cit., vol 1, p 380). He was well aware of the economic importance of rivalry and was able to distinguish between healthy (competitive) and unhealthy rivalry. Particularly important here, we believe, is his mention of the value of "worker culture," the very combination of words which proved that Dzerzhinskiy conceived of culture in a broad Leninist term, as the foundation of the new system itself within the people. He derived specific plan solutions directly from the general cultural standard. Thus, frequently turning to the question of obtaining foreign loans for rebuilding Soviet industry, Dzerzhinskiy said that, on the one hand, we shall not be granted such loans if we rely on them and if we are unable to stand firmly on our own feet. On the other, he feared greatly that such a loan may be used "in a consumerist way." He directly related such a possible danger to the overall level of economic standards: "I must say that I somewhat fear such loans..., for I do not know whether we have grown up in terms of our organizational capabilities (organization of output), reaching a level on which we can produce more than we consume; are we still not excessively affected by consumerism and, therefore, would the conditions of the loan and repayment be excessively hard for us..." (op. cit., Vol II, pp 91-92).

Naturally, however, Dzerzhinskiy's clearest understanding of the political significance of plan decisions was manifested in his 1926 speeches in which he opposed the leaders of the "new opposition" and Trotzkiy, who had joined them at that time, particularly in his final speech, delivered several hours before his death. Speculating on "left-wing" phraseology, the members of the opposition demanded an artificial encouragement of the development of industry by "pressuring" the peasantry and reducing its income. It is on this basis that they tried to present themselves as the most loyal supporters of industrialization and the most loyal friends of the working class. In his answer, Dzerzhinskiy convincingly proved that the program aimed at eliminating peasant accumulations was a "senseless, anti-Soviet and antiworker program...." It was precisely antiworker rather than only antipeasant because in a country with a predominant peasant population and peasant economy, a country based on the alliance between workers and peasants, there could be no accumulations by the state and the development of industry, which the workers desired, without accumulations in the peasant economy. In answering Kamenev,

who feared peasant accumulations, from the rostrum of the Central Committee and TsKK VKP(b) Plenum, Dzerzhinskiy said: "We cannot become industrialized if we speak with fear of the well-being of the countryside" (*ibid.*, p 507).

The period when Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy lived and worked is far behind us. It may seem that the experience of his time is nothing but history. However, even if this were indeed the case, we should say that that historical experience as well is quite important in terms of today. We can better understand the present by being aware of the past. Unquestionably, however, the experience of the 1920s and of the first years of building socialism remains topical.

In studying F. E. Dzerzhinskiy's activities on the economic front, historian S. S. Khromov noted his contribution to the theory of socialist economic management in a number of important matters (see S. S. Khromov, "F. E. Dzerzhinskiy vo Glave Metallopromyshlennosti" [F. E. Dzerzhinskiy at the Head of the Metal Industry]. Moscow, 1966; *idem*, "F. E. Dzerzhinskiy na Khozyaystvennom Fronte" [F. E. Dzerzhinskiy on the Economic Front]. Moscow, 1977). However, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy's economic legacy is not only exceptionally interesting, vivid and instructive. It is topical as well. We believe that it should be known not only to historians but to economists and practical economic workers today. Obviously, it would be useful to add to the periodically updated and expanded publication of Dzerzhinskiy's selected works a collection which would include more fully his speeches on economic problems, for many of them have not been reprinted since the 1920s, some of them have been published in newspapers only and some of them, in all likelihood, are still filed in archives.

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CSO: 1802/1

ALONG THE PATHS OF IMPROVING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

PM091329 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 83 (signed to press 2 Sep 83
pp 121-128

[Unsigned book review, "Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i [Selected Speeches and Articles] by Yu. V. Andropov. Second edition. Politizdat, Moscow, 1983, 320 pp]

[Text] The newly published second edition of the anthology of selected speeches and articles by Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, contains, together with some materials from the first edition published in 1979, works from the subsequent period through June 1983. The book has been published by the Politizdat and is aimed at the party and soviet aktiv, ideological and scientific workers, and a broad circle of readers. It casts light on topical questions of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy and demonstrates the party's multifaceted activity in leading the development of Soviet society and implementing the plans for communist building and the safeguarding of peace.

The idea of the communist party's leading and guiding role as the political leader, organizer, and educator of the masses runs throughout the materials in the anthology. Everything gained and created by the Soviet people is inseparably linked with the Leninist party's activity. The higher our society climbs up the ladder of social progress, the broader the scope of its constructive activity, and the larger the domestic and international tasks we have to resolve, the more the party's role grows as the ideological and political vanguard of the working class, all working people, and all people.

Tempered and tested in combat and armed with the knowledge of the laws of social development, the communist party enjoys the Soviet people's boundless trust. The CPSU, the book notes, expresses the aspirations and will of the working people and the objective requirements of society's progressive development in its program and its practical deeds. The party has proved by deeds that it successfully plays the role of leader in all spheres of the country's life. It proved this during the period of the first five-year plans, when the foundations of socialism were being laid, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet people crushed fascism, and during the years of postwar construction, when we had to rebuild the devastation of the conflagration of war. Today, under the conditions of developed socialism, the

party's role as the leading and organizing force of society has grown even more (see p 117).

The unwavering unity between the party and the people, which is the most characteristic aspect of Soviet reality, was born and strengthened during the struggle for the triumph of the great communist ideals. "...From the very beginning of the socialist era," the book notes, "the unity between party and people started to develop and became the powerful constructive force of the new society. This unity has an objective nature, because the Leninist party's goals and program fully reflect the working people's fundamental interests. At the same time, this unity is the result of deliberate and purposeful work by the communists, who are convinced that only the people can be the creators of a truly people's social system" (p 192).

The unbreakable unity between party and people is a vivid manifestation of the fact that the goals and tasks that the party sets for itself gather together the aspirations and requirements of all Soviet people. At the same time, this unity reflects the broad support of the masses for the party line and their desire to implement its policy by practical deeds.

There is no doubt that the CPSU places the interests of the people, the interests of society as a whole, above all else. Convincing proof of this is provided by life itself, by the entire history of the Soviet state. "Looking back over the path covered by the USSR in 60 years," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said in the report devoted to the portentous jubilee, "we can clearly see that all our achievements and victories are inseparably linked with the activity of the Leninist Communist Party. None but the party has been and remains the mighty creative and mobilizing force which ensures uninterrupted progress in all directions and social progress" (p 19).

In view of the enormous historical experience of socialist building in the USSR and a number of other countries, the anthology affirms: In order to reach socialism without deviating from the path to the cherished goal, the working people need their own political party; and not just any party but a party of the fundamentally new, Leninist type. Only such a party is capable of translating the interests and aspirations of the masses into the language of determined political struggle, inspiring them with its own faith and determination, organizing the working people's energy and guiding it along a single track, and winning their recognition of its vanguard role.

Our party is able to express the people's interests and requirements correctly because it is armed with the tool of scientific cognition and transformation of the world--Marxist-Leninist theory, which it creatively develops, enriches, and implements in practice. It considers the strictest scientific character inseparable from a consistently revolutionary nature; detailed analysis of social phenomena inseparable from selfless service to the people. The CPSU links the creative development of theory with the practical activity of the masses, with the urgent tasks of building communism in the land of the soviets, with the progress of world socialism and the entire international communist and workers movement. The optimism of communists and of the communist movement as a whole is founded on the great life-giving force of Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary creativity of the working people.

"Our experience shows," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov wrote in the article "Karl Marx's Teaching and Some Questions of Socialist Building in the USSR," "that successes in socialist building are achieved when the ruling communist party's policy is based on a firm scientific foundation. Any underestimation of the role of Marxist-Leninist science and its creative development, any narrowly pragmatic interpretation of its tasks, any overlooking of fundamental theoretical problems, and any dominance by market forces of scholastic theorizing are fraught with serious political and ideological consequences" (p 247).

The book provides an extensive description of Marxism, whose distinguishing characteristic is the unity between consistently scientific theory and revolutionary practice. Marx's teaching, combining dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and scientific communism into an organic whole, accomplished a true revolution in world outlook and simultaneously illuminated the path for the most far-reaching social revolutions. Lenin raised Marxism to a new and higher level. Leninism is Marxism in the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the age of the colonial system's downfall, the era of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism.

The anthology materials contain a resolute rebuff for those who would like to break the unity and coalescence [slitnost] of Marxism-Leninism or to belittle the significance of Lenin's ideas. The futility of such attempts is proved, because Marxism is simply impossible in our age outside, or apart from, Leninism. Leninism, the author points out, has been, is, and will be the victorious weapon of the world proletariat, of all who are struggling against the old world and are building the new world (see p 190).

Lenin's teaching, its principles, and its ideals are familiar and comprehensible to the masses in their millions. Each generation of people finds in them clear answers to the questions perturbing it. This teaching illuminates mankind's path to the future and brings peace and progress to peoples all over the world. Leninism, by correctly reflecting the objective laws of history and basing itself on all past achievements of leading social thought, constantly accumulates in itself everything new that is brought by the passage of time. Leninism means incessant self-regeneration of revolutionary theory under the influence of revolutionary practice. Lenin's ideas show the working people the right way in the struggle for a better life. This, above all else, is the secret of the mighty influence of Leninism on the historical fate of mankind. For the CPSU and for proletarian revolutionaries, Leninism has been and remains the true science of achieving victory.

The successes of the Soviet Union and the achievements of the other socialist countries in all spheres of social life provide convincing evidence of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism. This living teaching is a reliable compass for independent work over the complicated tasks emerging before the communists at each new historical stage. And the conclusion has been correctly drawn: Being constantly enriched by the practice of communist and workers parties and by the international experience in the building of socialism and the struggle for it, Marxist-Leninist teaching still remains the only correct and reliable guide for actions (see p 274).

In all its theoretical and practical activity, the CPSU is unservingly guided by Marxism-Leninism and keeps sacred its revolutionary principles. Loyalty to Leninism and Lenin's behests is embodied in our party's approach to the solution of any question in the political, economic, ideological, or cultural spheres. It is also manifested in the constant enriching of Lenin's invaluable heritage.

Lenin's teaching, just like Marxism-Leninism as a whole, is a science. And, like any other science, it cannot tolerate stagnation. Relying on the system of fundamental principles and repeatedly tested in practice and on materialist dialectics, Leninism lives on and develops, reflecting constantly new processes and phenomena. At each stage of social progress and at each turning point in history, Marxist-Leninist theory is supplemented by new ideas and conclusions and raised to new heights. Marxism-Leninism today consists not just of the great heritage of the founders of revolutionary teaching, but also of the entire treasury of the experience and theoretical activity of the CPSU and the other communist parties in the world and the experience of the struggle waged by the working class and the entire liberation movement.

Our party, the book notes, attaches great significance to the development of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, as required by its creative nature itself (see p 247). The 26th CPSU Congress placed the elaboration of the concept of developed socialism foremost among everything that has been achieved in this sphere over the past few years. Relying on this concept, the party determined its strategy and tactics for the immediate future and for the longer term, and warned against possible exaggerations in understanding the degree of proximity to the higher phase of communism.

All this has made it possible to define more precisely and specifically the ways and time limits for the implementation of our program goals.

The concept of developed socialism reflects the most important characteristics of Soviet society in its present form. This is a society that has already fully created the economic base, social structure, and political system corresponding with socialist principles and in which socialism develops on its own collectivist basis. But this society needs further improvement. It still contains many objectively conditioned difficulties, which are natural at the present level of development, and quite a few shortcomings caused by subjective factors. It is, therefore, necessary to discern the dialectical unity and real successes in socialist building and in the implementation of many economic, social, and cultural tasks of the initial phase of communism, together with the growing shoots of the communist future and the still unresolved problems.

"We must have a sober impression of where we are," the author warns. "To rush forward means to set unrealizable tasks; to remain satisfied only with what we have achieved means not to utilize all that we have at our disposal. To appreciate the real dynamics of our society, with all its possibilities and needs--this is what is required today" (p 245).

The description of the concept of developed socialism is supplemented in the book by profound theoretical generalizations and conclusions. Drawing attention to the major large-scale tasks arising before our party and the Soviet people in the last decades of the 20th century, the author of the anthology concludes: Taken as a whole, these tasks boil down to what could be termed the improvement of developed socialism, the extent of which will determine the gradual transition to communism. This is followed by the important principled conclusion that the land of the soviets is at the beginning of this lengthy historical stage which, in its own turn, will naturally have its own periods and stages of growth. Only experience and living practice will show the length of their duration and the specific forms they will take.

The party's strategy for the improvement of developed socialism, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov declared in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee June 1983 Plenum, must be based on a firm Marxist-Leninist theoretical foundation. An exceptionally important role in this connection has to be played by the new edition of the CPSU Program, which is being prepared in accordance with the 26th Party Congress decision. It must, obviously, contain a detailed definition of the period of developed socialism and a realistic analysis of the existing situation, together with clear guidelines for the future that link experience of life with the ultimate goals of the communist party. Under contemporary conditions the party program, the speech emphasizes, must be above all else a program for the balance and comprehensive improvement of developed socialism, and therefore for the further advance toward communism (see p 286). Its purpose is to help concentrate efforts on the solution of key tasks of communist building.

A prominent position in the anthology is occupied by the questions of implementing the Leninist principles and norms of party life, enhancing the vanguard role of communists, selecting, placing, and educating cadres, and controlling and monitoring the execution of decisions made, and party leadership of various spheres in Soviet society's life. Light is thrown on the multifaceted work of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo in implementing the plans for the country's economic and social development set by the 26th Party Congress for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980s as a whole. The fulfillment of the congress directives and their implementation in concrete deeds have the purpose of ensuring that the Soviet people's life improves year by year, that their labor yields increasingly tangible results, and that our socialist system demonstrates increasingly fully its humane nature and its constructive potential.

Success, of course, depends on many factors and mainly, as Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the CPSU Central Committee November 1982 Plenum, on purposeful collective work and on the ability to concentrate the activity of party, state, and economic organs and of all labor collectives in the pivotal directions. For this purpose we need: first, to mobilize all means at our disposal and concretize the plan targets in line with the tasks of each enterprise and each labor collective; second, to correctly place cadres so that key posts are occupied by people who are politically mature, competent, enterprising, and masters of organizational skills with a feeling for innovation; third, to step up the working people's activity and ensure that everyone

understands that the plan fulfillment depends on his labor contribution, that everyone is well aware of the simple truth that the better we work, the better we will live. It is, therefore, necessary to further develop socialist democracy in the broadest sense of the word, that is, to ensure the masses' increasingly active participation in the management of state and public affairs. It is also important to show concern for the workers' needs and their working and living conditions.

A mood for deeds and not for bombastic words--this was the requirement posed by the CPSU Central Committee, and it is actively supported by our party and all Soviet people. Emphasis has been placed on improving the work style, stepping up the monitoring of the execution of decisions made and enhancing party, state, and labor discipline. This has won the approval of communists and all working people and is having a positive effect on practice.

Much attention is given to the main sphere of activity by the communist party and the Soviet people--the economy. The entire multifaceted spectrum of the CPSU's economic policy is examined, and there is a detailed description of the goals, tasks, and ways of practical implementation of the USSR Food Program, the development of basic sectors and the improvement of the quality of consumer goods. Stress is laid on the fact that it is necessary to work actively in all sectors of the national economy, to strive persistently for the rationalization and intensification of production, and to utilize the enormous reserves possessed by the land of the soviets. This is the purpose of the latest party resolutions on specific national economic questions and of the measures, already being implemented or elaborated, to improve planning, improve the economic mechanism, and create economic conditions which will stimulate labor collectives' interest in increasing production and improving output quality.

The main task of economic activity is pointed out. The growth of the Soviet people's well-being and the creation of material conditions for the further flourishing of their spiritual and cultural life and public activity comprise the general direction of the CPSU's economic policy and a most important program directive for the party. No matter how multifaceted the tasks facing our economy may be, in the final analysis they are all conditioned by concern for the Soviet man, his working and living conditions, and his spiritual development.

"The steady boosting of the economy and the improvement of the people's well-being," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov notes, "constitute our duty to the Soviet people and our international duty. In posing the question in this way, the party is guided by Lenin's farsighted directive that we will exert our main influence on the world revolutionary process by our economic policy" (p 215).

In its progressive development, Soviet society has now reached a historical watershed at which far-reaching qualitative changes in production forces and the corresponding improvement in production relations have not only matured but have become inevitable and objectively necessary.

The key task in the economic sphere is to fundamentally increase labor productivity and reach the highest world standards in this respect. Today, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, this task

has acquired a special significance both on the internal building plane and on the international plane.

In the interest of the development of production forces it is first and foremost necessary to bring order to what exists in our country, ensure the well-organized and uninterrupted functioning of the entire economic mechanism and the most sensible utilization of the country's production, scientific, and technical potential, and overcome the lagging in such sectors as agriculture, transportation, and the services sphere. And the main path to a qualitative leap in production forces is, of course, the transition to intensive development and the practical combination of the socialist system's advantages with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. And, most importantly, the latter's latest stage, which promises a technological turning point in many spheres of production.

A unified scientific and technical policy now acquires decisive significance. Tremendous work is needed to develop progressive machines, equipment, and technologies. The complex mechanization and automation of production have to be implemented, a sharp fall in the use of manual labor has to be ensured, and computers and robots must be most widely introduced. The utilization of the latest nuclear reactors is on the agenda, while in the longer term we anticipate the practical solution of the problems of controlled thermonuclear fusion, the production of materials with predetermined properties, the development of biotechnology, and the wide application of waste-free and energy-saving technologies and of everything that contributes to a real revolution in the national economy.

Enormous significance for the improvement of production relations attaches to: the long-term fusion of the two forms of public ownership of the means of production--state and kolkhoz-cooperative--into a uniform all-people's form; strict adherence to one of the fundamental principles of socialism--distribution according to labor, corresponding with its quantity and quality; the substantial improvement of planning and management so as to create systems of economic and organizational conditions which stimulate high-quality, productive labor, initiative, and enterprise.

All this enhances the significance of conscientious discipline, of a creative attitude to the set task, of efficient and skillful labor organization. New requirements are being set for the organization of socialist competition. In parallel with the struggle to overfulfill production plans, the attention of those participating in competition must be concentrated also on improving production quality, making better use of production capacities, raw materials, energy, and work time, and effecting savings in material resources. It is necessary to take notice of, encourage, and disseminate in good time all useful and stimulating initiatives.

A substantial part of the book is given over to an examination of social processes in the Soviet Union and to questions relating to ensuring its socio-political duty. Stress is laid here on the need for close ties between the CPSU's economic and social policy, for social, national, and demographic factors to be taken into account and reflected in economic plans, and for an integrated social development strategy to be devised.

The masses' conscious creativity and their initiative, enterprise, and desire and ability to work conscientiously are not restricted to the economic sphere. They take in all social life. Our party proceeds from the premise that the masses' labor and sociopolitical activeness and the attention paid to Soviet people's needs, aspirations, and views largely determine the moral and political climate of any collective and of society as a whole.

Questions relating to the emergence of a classless social structure in all essentials at the mature socialism state, to that society's practical advance along the path of social homogeneousness, and to the increased role of the Soviet working class--the leading force of social progress--are elucidated. The implementation of a carefully thought out and scientifically grounded nationalities policy as an element in the improvement of developed socialism is discussed in detail. The basis of such a policy is Lenin's principles: complete equality of all the country's nations and ethnic groups, their unhindered development within the framework of the fraternal alliance, and an unswerving policy of ensuring their rapprochement. This requires a deep awareness of the common interests of all the nations and ethnic groups comprising the united Soviet people.

The book specifically examines the theoretical and practical problems of state building, developing Soviet society's political system, and increasing the activeness of soviets and trade unions, which now encompass virtually all working people in both cities and rural areas. The need is demonstrated to further the state apparatus, increase labor collectives' role, tighten up the people's control service, and strengthen the legal foundation of state and social life.

The natural law whereby Soviet society has become a society of steadily developing people's power is taken into consideration. A fundamental political attribute of the socialist system--its built-in democracy--is thereby graphically revealed. The experience of their own lives has convinced Soviet people of the organic interrelation between the successes of socialist building and the deepening and improvement of socialist democracy.

Being the nucleus of Soviet society's political system, the CPSU sets an example of democratic organization through all its activities. It formulates and develops the democratic principles that enter every sphere of our socialist existence. This is one of the most important manifestations of the party's leading role and of its inspirational effect on the masses.

The working people's increasingly broad participation in the management of society and the state, the harmonious combining of the fundamental interests of society and the individual, and the sensitive, objective, and attentive consideration of Soviet people's aspirations and interests--which fundamentally coincide but are at the same time very individual--are typical of socialist democratism. The party's demand to reach out to each individual precisely reflects its concern to ensure that this "each" is not a forgotten individual and that every person's voice and opinion is heard and heeded.

Of course, Soviet statehood must continue to be improved and socialist democracy expanded. There are, for example, possibilities for further democratizing the system of decisionmaking on major questions of state and public life.

This means increasingly broad discussion of such draft decisions in labor collectives; compulsory consideration in appropriate cases of the conclusions of trade unions, the Komsomol, and women's organizations; and the most attentive approach to working people's proposals. A lot of publicity in work and regular reporting by leading workers to the population help to bring the activity of party and state organs closer to the people's needs and interests. The strictest observance of laws protecting society's interests and citizens' rights is necessary.

It is exceptionally important, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov points out, to seek to ensure that words never diverge from deeds and that substance is not replaced by form. A real war must be declared against the practice of failing to back up our democratic norms and regulations with actions and of being satisfied with mere show and appearances. This is one of the most important reserves for improving socialist democracy in all elements of state and social life (see p 292).

The anthology materials attach paramount importance to ideological work--one of the basic trends of the party's activity and one of the most important components of communist building. Building communism means not just creating the necessary material and technical base but also educating a new man, worthy of his age. Educating him in the spirit of the most advanced and humane moral principles, in the spirit of the noble ideals to which loyalty has been kept sacred in our country since the era of Great October.

In paying close attention to the sphere of public life relating to ideology, our party is guided by the fact that ideological and educational work is above all a question of the party's link with the masses, that this work, under present conditions, is being increasingly advanced to the fore. The main avenue in this work is the education of all working people in a spirit of lofty ideals and devotion to communism. Constant, abiding, importance attaches to moral education, to the development in Soviet people of an active life stance, an aware attitude to social duty, and lofty sentiments of mutual respect and friendship for all the country's nations and ethnic groups, Soviet patriotism, internationalism, and solidarity with the working people of other countries.

The party builds its ideological and mass political work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, from which the Soviet people draw their unswerving confidence in the triumph of our great cause. "A convincing, specific display of our achievements, a serious analysis of the new problems that are constantly being generated by life, and freshness of thought and word," the book points out, "are the path to improving all our propaganda, which should always be truthful and realistic and also interesting and comprehensible and therefore more effective" (p 12).

As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted at the CPSU Central Committee June 1983 Plenum, all our ideological, educational, and propaganda work must be raised to the level of the great and complex tasks that the party is resolving in the process of improving developed socialism. We must be imbued with an understanding of the full importance of this work and of ensuring its high degree of effectiveness and see clearly the grave harm caused by defects in it. The very rich arsenal of means at our disposal for enlightenment and

education--the press, radio, television, oral propaganda, the network of various types of educational establishments--must be used more correctly and applied more vigorously and creatively, bearing in mind particularly the considerably improved standard of Soviet people's education and needs. Formalism, a hackneyed approach, reticence, and lazy thinking are inadmissible in this matter.

The shaping of the awareness of communists and all citizens of our socialist society is the business of the entire party. But the party committees in the republics, krays, oblasts, cities, and rayons must have specially trained cadres capable of skillfully organizing ideological work and being responsible for it. A new, considerably higher standard of ideological and theoretical work must be ensured in the sphere of the social sciences, above all the economic sciences, and this must be resolutely turned toward real, practical tasks set by life. It is necessary to have a style of political enlightenment and to put an end here to formalism, to the mechanical drumming in of particular general propositions.

The point of mass political study is to ensure that each person has a deeper understanding of the party's policy under present-day conditions, knows how to make practical use of the knowledge he has acquired, has a clearer idea of his own duty, and fulfills it in practice.

In all educational and propaganda work we must constantly consider the specific nature of the historical period through which mankind is living, a period marked by an unprecedentedly intense and acute confrontation between the two diametrically opposed world outlooks and two political courses--socialism and imperialism. Imperialist forces try to use diversionary methods and means in the ideological sphere in subversive activity against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Under these conditions it is essential to raise still further our political vigilance and the effectiveness of our measures to thwart imperialism's acts of ideological sabotage.

A struggle for the minds and hearts of billions of people is under way in the world, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov says. And man's future depends to a considerable degree on the outcome of this ideological struggle. From this we can understand that it is exceptionally important to know how to bring the truth about the socialist society, its advantages, and its peaceful policy to the broadest people's masses throughout the world in an accessible and persuasive form. It is no less important to expose skillfully phony, subversive, imperialist propaganda (see p 285).

The works in the anthology reflect the main avenues of the foreign policy course of the CPSU and Soviet state and the practical activity of our party and government in defending the gains of socialism and thwarting U.S. and NATO plans to secure military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states. The unvarying goals of Soviet foreign policy are to ensure favorable conditions for the successful implementation of the constructive tasks of socialist and communist building, to consolidate the positions of world socialism, and to defend the peoples' right to independence and social progress. This policy hinges on a persistent, consistent struggle to preserve world peace and to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. This policy embodies

the will of the Soviet people, who well know what war is and therefore particularly prize peace. It expresses the sacred aspirations of working people on all our planet's continents.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy is a class-based policy in terms of its principles and its objectives (see p 131). It is such a policy primarily because it is based on the vital interests of socialism and on the fact that socialist and communist building is easier under conditions of the relaxation of international tension and the easing of the arms burden. That is why the socialist countries and their policy in our time are a factor of enormous importance in safeguarding peace throughout the world. The USSR acts in the international arena in close cooperation with the socialist community states, with which it is inextricably linked by ideological unity, common objectives, and loyalty to the principle of socialist internationalism. The further consolidation of the fraternal countries' cohesion is a priority avenue of the CPSU's international activity.

The class-based nature of Soviet foreign policy is also manifested in the fact that our party and state stand firmly on positions of proletarian internationalism and solidarity with the peoples' struggle for freedom and social progress. The USSR gives constant support to developing states that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression and are defending their independence. The policy of mutually advantageous cooperation with these countries is pursued in full respect for their sovereignty and without interference in their affairs.

Our foreign policy is also class-based because it proceeds from a real understanding of the profound differences existing between states with opposite social systems, which makes inevitable the competition between socialism and capitalism and the struggle of ideas. The CPSU and the Soviet state are seeking to ensure that this competition is indeed peaceful, is free of military rivalry, and is of a constructive, not a destructive nature.

In the nuclear age there is no sensible alternative to peaceful coexistence. Its principles are the basis of the USSR's foreign policy course. They have met with broad recognition and are enshrined in dozens of international documents, including the Final Act of the Helsinki All-European Conference. The Soviet Union's proposals have determined the content of the most important UN decisions on consolidating peace and security.

The USSR is actively seeking to lower the ceiling of armaments and military expenditure and has advanced and is continuing to advance proposals aimed at halting the buildup of nuclear arsenals, reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict, and ultimately making it totally impossible. While shameless militarists in the United States and other NATO countries are expatiating on the acceptability of a "limited," "protracted" or other type of nuclear war, the Soviet stance on this burning issue of the present day is absolutely clear: Nuclear war, small or big, limited or total, cannot be allowed. That is why our country suggests halting the production of nuclear weapons, then gradually abolishing stockpiles of these weapons, and immediately banning everywhere all test nuclear blasts, and why it supports the creation of nuclear-free zones. It has undertaken unilaterally to renounce first use of nuclear weapons and has urged other nuclear power to follow this example.

Firmly upholding the course of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, Soviet people do not forget that this course will produce all the greater results, the better the motherland's security is ensured, the more reliably our borders are closed to the agents of imperialism, and the more vigorous and firm the rebuff to hostile intrigues. The present international situation that imperialist reaction, headed by the U.S. ruling circles, has aggravated to extremely dangerous limits, and the adventurism of their policy oblige us to pay paramount attention to consolidating the defense capability of the Soviet state and entire socialist community and maintaining a high degree of vigilance and the readiness to deliver a crushing rebuff to any attempt at aggression.

Of course, the imperialist's insane plans are doomed to failure. No one can reverse the course of historical development. "Attempts to 'stifle' socialism," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov recalls, "were thwarted even when the Soviet state was just finding its feet and was the only socialist country in the world. Still less will anything come of them now" (p 15).

Our party and the Soviet government proceed from the premise that peace and international security cannot be strengthened by pursuing military rivalry, that the peoples' vital interests and the objective processes of the development of international relations require the maintenance and intensification of detente, the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and the utilization of the real opportunities for preventing a new world war. They are doing everything in their power to ensure a peaceful future for present and future generations, and they consistently advocate broad and fruitful cooperation among the world's peoples to their mutual advantage and for the benefit of all mankind. Here we are clearly aware that, on the hard, prickly path toward lasting peace, in the struggle against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, we can expect no easy victory, that every step here requires great effort and vigorous action by all peace-loving forces, with the communists marching in the front ranks.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's selected speeches and articles fully and broadly reveal the CPSU's strategy and political line in the struggle for the implementation of plans for communist building in the USSR and for lasting peace. They contain a profound, consistently expressed Marxist-Leninist analysis of topical issues of vital significance for Soviet people and the peoples of other countries. At the same time they comprehensively substantiate ways and means of resolving specific socioeconomic and educational tasks, strengthening the Soviet state, and improving socialist democracy. They point to the need for vigorous action by international forces supporting peace and the prevention of a new war and opposing the arms race and the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Every reader will find that the anthology raises and thoroughly elucidates urgent problems of the present day. And this makes the book particularly necessary to the party and ideological aktiv and all communists. It will serve them as a useful and reliable aid.

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